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iExecutive Summary 
A. Emergence of a New State: Adverse Initial Conditions 
 
1. Carved out of southern Bihar as a new state of India in November 2000, Jharkhand 
was plagued by adverse initial conditions -- low average income, very high incidence of 
poverty, and little social development. Its nominal per capita income (($314 in 2003/04) is 
low (only 55 percent of the all-India average), though not the lowest among the major Indian 
states.  It is actually higher than the per capita income of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP) and 
similar to that of Orissa.  The average per capita income is also associated with a high degree of 
income inequality and a rural-urban gap within the state as is evident from the high incidence of 
poverty in rural areas.  The initial level of rural poverty, assessed at 49 percent by the National 
Sample Survey (NSS) 55th round in 1999/2000, was the highest among all Indian states, the 
second highest being Orissa (48 percent), followed by Bihar (44 percent), Assam (40 percent), 
and Madhya Pradesh (MP) (37 percent). This suggests a potential distributional issue, as 
relatively better per capita income ranking adversely translates into a lower ranking on the rural 
poverty scale.  The divide is sharper when the rural and urban areas are compared. The incidence 
of urban poverty is, however, only 23 percent, which is similar to or better than Andhra Pradesh 
(AP) and Maharashtra (27 percent), Karnataka (25 percent), and Tamil Nadu (23 percent), and 
much lower than in Orissa (44 percent) and Bihar (34 percent).1
2. Initial health and education indicators in Jharkhand were also markedly 
unfavorable in comparison to both the all-India average and the major Indian states. The 
proportion of children with full vaccination was assessed at an abysmal 9 percent compared with 
the all-India average of 42 percent. The proportion of institutional deliveries was a low 14 
percent, the presence of skilled birth attendants 17 percent, and the proportion of women who 
received at least one ante-natal care (ANC) contact just 42 percent.  These are close to coverage 
levels in undivided Bihar, but much lower than the all-India average.  As per the census (2001) 
figures, the literacy rate of the state at 54 percent is the second lowest in the country (after Bihar) 
against the national average of 65 percent.  With the male literacy rate at 68 percent and the 
female literacy rate at 39 percent, the state has the second highest rate of gender disparity in the 
country after Rajasthan. 
B. Signs of Hope: A Balance Sheet of Change in Recent Years  
 
3. Despite the adverse initial conditions, there are some early signs of turn around in 
Jharkhand in several respects. Poverty declined by an impressive average of two percentage 
points a year between 1994 and 2002.  This may be compared to about 2.5 percentage points a 
year observed at the all-India level during the same period as per official “unadjusted” data. 
Progress was highly uneven, however, between the rural and urban areas with the pace of rural 
1 These poverty estimates are “unadjusted” i.e. without making any Deaton-Dreze (2002) type of adjustment for any possible 
overestimation of per capita monthly consumption from the simultaneous recording of food consumption through 7-day/ 30-day 
memory recall in Schedule 1 of the NSS. Hence, only the official poverty numbers are used here for state-level comparisons for 
both rural and urban poverty.  
ii 
poverty reduction being faster. The sustainability of poverty reduction especially in rural areas is 
a cause for concern given the rainfed agricultural conditions.  
 
4. The state has experienced a modest, volatile, but consistently positive per capita 
growth rate of 2.4 percent per year in Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) during 1993-
2003 and about 2 percent per year in consumption expenditure over 1997-2002, as 
estimated from the NSS. The total GSDP growth rate was about 4.8 percent per year during 
1993-2003 compared with 6.0 percent for India as a whole.  However, almost all sectors in 
Jharkhand showed huge volatility in growth rates year on year.  While the agricultural sector 
grew at a rate of 4 percent (higher than 2.2 percent for all India), the industrial and services 
sector grew at rates lower than the all-India rates.  The mining sector, which contributes nearly 
15 percent of the GSDP (six times more than the all-India level), grew at only 3 percent, 
compared to a 4.6 percent growth of this sector at the all-India level. 
 
5. The poverty-reducing effects of growth have been further helped by improvement in 
distribution in rural areas. In contrast, urban growth was highly inequitable. The Gini index of 
consumption inequality has dropped for both thick and thin round intervals for rural areas.2 The 
corresponding figure for urban areas increased from 34 to 36 percent during the period 1994-
2000, and rose at an even higher pace during 1997-2002. 
 
6. There has been impressive improvement in access to primary education, especially 
in the 6-14 year age-group, for both gender categories and the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled 
Tribe (SC/ST) population. The age-specific enrolment rates for the 6-11 year age-group 
improved from 56 percent in 1993/94 to 58 percent in 1999/2000 (as per the NSS data) and 
further to 95 percent in 2005 (as per the Sarva Shikshya Abhiyan (SSA) household census).  The 
impressive increase in enrolment has been accompanied by greater gender and social equity as 
well. The Gender Parity Index (GPI) for primary grades in the state is 0.98 and for the upper 
primary grades 0.97.  Similarly, as far as the social equity in enrolment is concerned, SC/ST 
enrolment shares were close to their shares in the respective age-group population.  
 
7. Equally impressive progress has been made in some key health indicators, especially 
in the area of child vaccination and prevention of major diseases. The newly instituted “catch 
up rounds” (since 2002/03) has led to a dramatic improvement in the coverage of child 
immunization, and vitamin A and iron supplementation. The United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) has recently estimated that immunization coverage is now almost 50 percent 
compared to 9 percent in 1998/99. This is the most rapid rise in coverage recorded in India for a 
five-year period. The state has made significant progress in reducing the prevalence of leprosy 
and, to a lesser extent, in the spread of communicable diseases such as tuberculosis (TB). The 
prevalence rate for leprosy dropped to 2.69 per 10,000 in 2005 from a high of 10.9 per 10,000 
(three times the national average) in 2001. In the case of TB the state has achieved an impressive 
success rate in treatment of over 90 percent (compared to the national average of 85 percent).3
2 Thick rounds are NSS five- yearly surveys and Thin rounds relate to NSS annual surveys on household consumption 
expenditures.  
3 Jharkhand, however, still lags behind most other Indian states in respect of two key health MDG indicators according to the 
recently completed 2005/06 NFHS-III survey. Firstly, the prevalence of child malnutrition (as measured by the proportion of 
underweight children) remains one of the highest in India, being assessed at 59% compared to 60% in Madhya Pradesh, 58% for 
Bihar, 52% in Chhattisgarh, 44% in Orissa, 40% in Assam, and much higher than the all-India average of 46%. Secondly, the 
iii 
 
8. The decline in poverty and the improvement in social indicators can perhaps be attributed 
to increased allocations coupled with better implementation as well as the involvement of Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs).  Most importantly, it shows that the Government of 
Jharkhand (GoJ) is aware of the challenges it is facing, and is committed to overcoming them to 
improve state outcomes.  
C. Key Strategic Challenges for Inclusive and Sustainable Growth 
 
9. Despite this progress, Jharkhand remains a state with one of the highest poverty 
rates in India. The goal is therefore not only to accelerate growth but also to ensure that it is 
socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable.  This study identifies the central importance 
of three necessary cross-cutting conditions for achieving these objectives: (i) addressing 
institutional gaps (building new institutions as well as improving the performance of existing 
institutions); (ii) improving access to infrastructure (such as irrigation, roads, power, 
telecommunication, storage facilities, schools and clinics); and (iii) expanding rural 
opportunities (which should not be limited to the “access” issue in the sense of creating 
economic opportunities, but also to enhance household and community capabilities to take 
advantage of such opportunities). These are “bottom-line preconditions” in the sense that for any 
development strategy to be successful in the state, these sets of issues need to be tackled up front.  
D. Addressing the Institutional Gap and Improving Performance  
 
10. While the implementation of programs has improved after the separation of 
Jharkhand from Bihar, the state faces significant challenges in overcoming the growing 
weaknesses of implementation capacity. This is especially important in the context of the huge 
increase in planned capital expenditure (mostly on account of infrastructure building) from 2.8 
percent of GSDP in 2003/04 to 7.7 percent of GSDP by 2006/07 (budget estimates).  
 
11. Weak institutional performance can be observed from the deteriorating fiscal 
situation.  The fiscal deficits of the state have been rising at an alarming rate.  The state is 
unlikely to meet most of the performance criteria posited by the Twelfth Finance Commission 
(TFC) for debt relief and may lose out on substantial fiscal receipt on that count.  This does not 
augur well for the state as it faces major development challenges that require increased public 
sector allocation especially for infrastructure and human resource development.  
 
12. Except for the one year, 2003/04 (when the central elections took place and the 
model code of conduct was in place), fiscal deficits have risen rapidly in recent years and 
reached a high of 10.1 percent of GSDP in 2005/06 (RE). The biggest increases have come on 
the expenditure side -- in particular, transfers and capital expenditure -- which may well be in 
line with a desired development strategy but which have not been matched by increases on the 
revenue side.  This is typical of a new state, as with other new states, where finances are better in 
the first few years and then deteriorate in the following years as the division of assets and 
liabilities takes place and new hirings begin to fill up gaps in capacity. 
infant mortality rate in the state stands at 69 deaths per thousand live births compared with 70 in Madhya Pradesh, 62 for Bihar 
and 57 for the all-India average. 
iv 
 
13. In order to put its fiscal house in order, the state needs to introduce reforms for 
improving resource mobilization, increasing cost effectiveness of expenditure and 
rationalizing the budgetary processes. While large increases in expenditure on infrastructure 
and social development of the underprivileged groups in the state are warranted, it is important to 
ensure that these are within the absorptive capacity of the state. A good monitoring mechanism 
needs to be put in place to ensure there are no leakages in the system.  Consolidation of schemes 
will help cut down administrative costs.  Some common expenditure control measures to be 
considered include restrictions on the creation of new posts, rationalizing of existing posts and a 
ceiling on contingent liabilities.  Improving public procurement should also play an important 
role in enhancing the effectiveness of public spending while at the same time reducing 
unproductive expenditure.  
 
14. At present, the budget does not reflect a realistic picture of the financial position of 
the state. While the overall level of debt is known, other disclosures such as large outstanding 
pension liabilities and contingent liabilities (committed contracts, guarantees, bad debts etc.) are 
not known. The government needs to prepare a medium-term expenditure plan and place its 
annual budget preparation within the context of this plan.  This plan should be prepared in 
consultation with the line departments and be consistent with resource mobilization efforts to 
ensure fiscal discipline in the medium to long term.  Other immediate steps include drawing up 
of a Medium-Term Fiscal Reforms Program (MTFRP) incorporating the incentives outlined in 
the TFC award. 
 
15. Apart from managing the finances, the effectiveness of implementation is affected 
by four sets of factors: (i) high micro-risks such as insecurity relating to extremist violence; 
(ii) problem of corruption; (iii) inadequate administrative capacity; and (iv) low 
beneficiary participation and satisfaction. 
 
16. In terms of the incidence of left-wing extremist violence, Jharkhand is second to 
Andhra Pradesh.  There is a widespread perception in civil society that while corruption in 
Jharkhand is considerably lower than in Bihar, it is a growing menace. The 2005 TI-CMS 
perception survey ranks the state as being 14th among 20 states in terms of “efficiency and 
transparency of governance”. Although the relative ranking is better than Bihar, MP, Karnataka, 
Rajasthan, and Assam, it is worse than Chhattisgarh (one of the other newly created states) and 
Orissa. 
 
17. Severe administrative capacity constraints that have been captured by some proxy 
indicators include: (i) extent of shortfall in program implementation; (ii) frequent 
premature transfers of top-level managers; and (iii) absence of key departments while some 
others being understaffed. The extent of shortfall in program realization can be observed across 
sectors—in education, health, anti-poverty schemes, infrastructure-building -- the shortfall being 
higher than the all-India average. For example, last year, the health department of the state was 
able to spend only 68 percent of funds allotted. The implementation of food security programs is 
unsatisfactory, especially the off take of rice from the Public Distribution System (PDS).  
According to the Concurrent Evaluation of the Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojna (SGRY) 
conducted on behalf of the Ministry of Rural Development, Jharkhand had lifted only 18 percent 
vof the authorized allocation in 2002/03, and only two-thirds of the meager share lifted was 
distributed to beneficiaries. 
 
18. While many important departments have not been established yet, some others have 
serious manpower shortages with numerous technical positions vacant, especially in the 
districts. To give one example, the state does not have a department of economics and statistics 
(DES), vital to the monitoring of development outcomes. Both the finance and the planning 
departments currently have a severe shortage of technical manpower. The same applies to service 
delivery departments such as agricultural extension, education and health. In many districts, the 
share of single-teacher schools is as high as 40-50 percent. In most districts of Jharkhand, the 
share of female teachers in the total teacher workforce is less than 30 percent, adversely affecting 
the schooling outcome of girls. 
 
19.  In a state like Jharkhand with a huge mineral endowment and large forest cover, 
the management and governance of minerals and the natural environment assumes 
heightened importance. The localities often get inadequate attention in the rush for mineral 
development and end up suffering in economic, social and environmental terms. For example, 
the existing legal framework for regulating land for mineral leases is weak and leaves ample 
scope for unfair losses for those whose land is acquired. The legal opinion in GoJ seems to be 
that the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894, which allows acquisition of land for “public 
purposes”, is the official route for acquiring land for mining leases. However, the LAA does not 
provide any real space to the affected parties for protest, negotiations or even discussion.  
 
20. An important “missing institution” in Jharkhand, crucial for inclusive development, 
is the absence of a popularly elected, administratively and fiscally empowered local 
government/Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs).  This is true both for scheduled and non-
scheduled areas leading to low beneficiary participation, poor accountability of service 
providers, and low user satisfaction. The PRI elections have been put on hold by a court order 
because of legal challenges over the state’s reservations policy, thus aggravating not only the 
pre-existing feeling of isolation of previously excluded groups but also affecting the institutional 
performance of development programs on the ground.  As per the central Panchayat Extension to 
Scheduled Areas (PESA) law and the 2001 Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act, in scheduled areas, 
the Gram Sabha is to be vested with strong powers, such as the right to approve programs and 
projects, select beneficiaries, and certify the correct use of funds by the Gram Panchayat (GP) in 
the form of a utilization certificate. This is potentially a powerful tool for accelerating 
development in the state, which has remained trapped in the legal imbroglio. 
 
21. Weak institutions translate into poor service delivery and client dissatisfaction. This 
may be seen from a range of indicators culled from a recent beneficiary survey. For economic 
services such as rural roads only 57 percent of the respondents rated the quality of roads 
constructed as “good”. In the case of water supply, 44 percent respondents reported frequent 
breakdown of water supply. Only a few respondents (4 percent) have reported the availability of 
constructed drainage systems and even of those who have such access, 44 percent remained 
dissatisfied because of water clogging and water overflows. The primary health sector appears to 
be very precarious with high a level of doctors’ absenteeism: 47 percent of rural respondents 
reported doctors’ absence in the Primary Health Center (PHC). The other client satisfaction 
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indicators also tell the same story in rural health. The reasons for poor client satisfaction are 
many: distance, absenteeism, attitude, inadequate provisioning for maintenance, and low local-
level participation. 
 
22. The factors adversely affecting client satisfaction can be overcome through 
appropriate institutional reform. Gradual improvement in the governance of the primary 
education sector is a case in point. Teacher absenteeism, which was as high as 39 percent three 
years ago, according to the Pratham study has improved. On average, the share of primary school 
teachers attending schools was 76 percent while that of upper primary teachers was 75 percent. 
However, on a single day, only 50 percent of primary schools and a shocking 27.8 percent of 
upper primary schools had all the teachers present. Although subjective measures such as a user 
satisfaction survey show primary education in a favorable light, the objective measures indicate a 
much more serious problem of educational achievement. 
 
23. Weak institutions for implementing anti-poverty programs tend to bypass a large 
segment of the needy poor, leading to poor targeting as well as high incidence of program 
leakage. All sources indicate that, despite significant investment, only a small percentage of 
Below Poverty Line (BPL) families benefit from these programs.  Using administrative data, 
even in the best case scenario, program coverage is low, at around 3 percent for self-employment 
and housing programs, 11 percent for wage employment, and 27 percent for old age pensions for 
the elderly living below the poverty line. These estimates are very optimistic, as they assume that 
only BPL families benefited from the programs and that there was only one beneficiary per 
family per program.  Survey-based data allows for a clearer picture.  For example, according to a 
recent Program Evaluation Organization (PEO) evaluation of the Targeted Public Distribution 
System (TPDS), only 57 percent of BPL families were able to avail of TPDS benefits and a 
similar evaluation commissioned by the Department of Food and Public Distribution found that 
those who received benefits still depend on market sources for more than half their rice 
requirements.  The recent evidence for 2005, as generated by the present study, also confirms the 
picture of low target group coverage. With the exception of PDS, no program covers more than 
10 percent of all rural households.  
 
E. Improving Access to Infrastructure Services 
 
24. Bridging the huge gap in the provision of infrastructure services, a critical 
requirement for accelerated and inclusive growth, requires large investments along with 
concurrent institutional and policy reforms. Investments in infrastructure not only accelerate 
growth, but also have strong linkage effects with other complementary inputs such as human 
capital, access to finance, and adoption of new technology. With improved connectivity, for 
instance, economic and social development literally moves into the areas connected. Improved 
institutional performance on the other hand reduces the “transaction costs”, which, in turn, 
increases the productivity as well as the rate of investment via favorable investment climate 
effects. 
 
25. Lack of access to infrastructure can be measured in terms of under-provisioning, 
relative to the rest of India as well, as in terms of high unmet demand in key areas such as 
transportation, telecommunication, power, water supply and irrigation. The extent of 
deprivation is higher in Jharkhand compared to the rest of India and higher in rural areas than in 
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urban areas.  In rural areas, the seriousness of infrastructure constraints, relating to irrigation, 
power and roads, is indicated, among others, by the NSS data. The rate of irrigation is inadequate 
and distributed extremely unequally—more unequally than the distribution of physical and 
human assets. Household access to electricity at 11 percent is extremely low in rural Jharkhand, 
compared to 48 percent for rural India (the only state that has a lower access rate than Jharkhand 
in this sample is Bihar). Merely 36 percent of villages in the state have immediate access to all-
weather roads compared to the all-India average of 57 percent.4 Bihar is the only neighboring 
state, which has a lower rate of all-weather and metal road access. 
 
26. Improvement of infrastructure is equally important for attracting investment in 
urban areas as revealed by Investment Climate Surveys. The availability and quality of 
infrastructure is a critical constraint faced by firms operating in Jharkhand and cited with equal 
vigor by potential investors as a major reason for not choosing the state as an investment 
destination.  Jharkhand lags behind the average figure for India on most infrastructure 
availability indicators, such as road length per 100 sq km, power availability per capita, net 
irrigated area and tele-density.  The picture is starker in relative terms: out of 28 states, 
Jharkhand ranks 22nd on the aggregate infrastructure index which covers the power, 
communications, and transportation sectors. Competing states such as Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and 
West Bengal rank at 17, 14, and 11 respectively.  In terms of infrastructure, the sector-wise 
break-up shows that the state is ranked 21st in communications, 18th in power, and 14th in 
transport. 
 
27. It is possible to improve the provisioning of infrastructural services through sector-
specific investments and policy interventions. The formulation of an infrastructure 
development policy, creation of an infrastructural development board/corporation and an 
enabling act along the lines of the Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure Development Enabling Act, 
would facilitate private investment in infrastructure.  Some short- and medium- term reform 
measures in the transport, water supply and sanitation, irrigation and power sectors have been 
listed in the Box 1. 
 
F. Expanding Rural Opportunities 
 
28. Expanding rural opportunities in no way means retracting from the urban sector. However, 
rural opportunities need to be especially addressed in Jharkhand in the light of uneven distribution 
of access to assets in the state. Estimates based on the 55th round of NSS indicate that the concentration 
of landownership in rural Jharkhand, though lower than the all-India average, is considerably skewed. 
This is despite the legal restrictions on the tribal land transfers, as originally envisaged in the 
Chhotanagpur and Santhal Pargana Tenancy Acts. The estimated Gini inequality of rural land ownership 
for the state is 0.64 compared to the all-India average of 0.71. The inequality of landownership in the state 
is possibly on rise in the recent years through illegal (distress) land transfers. This is borne by the 
Jharkhand Baseline Survey as well, which finds evidence for increasing inequality in rural landownership 
over the past decade.5 The main driver of this process appears to be tribal land alienation. Other non-land 
assets (including human assets) are also distributed unequally across rural land size-class and poverty 
categories, but the extent of inequality appears less sharp.   
4 The corresponding figures for village-level access to metal roads are 25 percent and 45 percent. 
5 According to the Baseline Survey, the Gini index of inequality in the distribution of land ownership increased from 0.65 to 0.70 
over 1995-2005. The inter-temporal comparison is based on “memory recall” on household land-ownership and should be taken 
as indicative only. 
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29. For the disadvantaged poor, access to favorable market arrangements can improve 
the return to initial assets. For example, the land-poor can gain access to land through the 
tenancy market and the returns to land can be enhanced through improved irrigation. The returns 
to labor can be higher if the poor have access to jobs with better remuneration and access to 
capital through credit markets can help support rural farm, off-farm or non-farm diversification. 
This, however, is not the case in rural Jharkhand. 
 
30. The major explanation for the rural factor and output markets functioning poorly is 
the lack of access to rural infrastructure such as irrigation, roads, power, and access to 
credit. Among the key infrastructural elements, appropriate irrigation facility is one of the most 
important. Irrigation-led agricultural growth has been the prime trigger of successful agricultural 
transformations over the past 30 years in most regions of South Asia. The rate of irrigation 
remains one of the lowest among all Indian states. According to the Ministry of Agriculture data, 
the rate is assessed at 11 percent. The NSS data, in contrast, gives a higher coverage, but is still 
restricted to 23 percent compared to 41 percent at the all-India level. Besides, not only is the rate 
of irrigation low, it is also highly unequally distributed. Nearly all the irrigated land classified in 
the NSS data is concentrated in the first two deciles.
31. Although the limits to extending irrigation are relatively low in Jharkhand (only 
approximately 40 percent) compared to other states such as Bihar and West Bengal 
because of land-terrain constraints, irrigation provides a viable entry point for accelerated 
rural development.  Different types of irrigation possibilities, that is major, medium, micro, and 
drip irrigation systems can be developed. Indeed, different irrigation technologies involve 
different ownership mix possibilities: while major and medium irrigation systems are likely to be 
public sector led, micro-irrigation through water harvesting is suitable for the tribal upland and 
likely to be community led.  In Jharkhand, irrigation coverage did not expand in the past largely 
because of under-investment in major- and medium-irrigation systems. Returns to irrigation 
appear to be considerable even in the present context. Based on NSS data, it is estimated that the 
impact of adding an extra unit of land under irrigation increases the average per capita monthly 
expenditure by about 17 percent while controlling for regional effects.
32. The return to rural assets can be enhanced through improved access to physical 
infrastructure such as electricity and road. Evidence suggests that access to both electricity 
and road at the community level can make a considerable difference to average rural incomes. 
This can be measured by a range of indicators. By simply being located in a village with access 
to electricity can increase average income (consumption) of a typical rural household by about 
22 percent.  Good road access conditions can enhance income by approximately 18 percent.  The 
largest impact is noted when a village is directly connected to a wholesale market by good road 
access; the corresponding difference increases by over 40 percent compared to those 
communities without such access. The expansion of this basic infrastructure tends to result in the 
clustering of other infrastructural facilities such as bus-stops, pharmacies, public telephones, post 
offices and small community- level shops around roads and electricity. 
 
33. Attainment of secondary and post-secondary education is important for raising 
rural incomes. This is because   human capital accumulation can raise rural incomes only after it 
crosses a threshold level.  Access to primary education does not have any statistically significant 
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impact on household income. Education in rural areas has the effect of increasing rural 
household income only after the post-secondary (10th grade completed and above) education 
level, suggesting that the incremental effect is rather modest in households headed by someone 
with secondary education while the gains to completing college education are much higher. The 
problem is that only a few rural households in Jharkhand can take advantage of this, as access to 
human capital is extremely limited both at secondary (18 percent of household heads) and post-
secondary (5 percent of household heads) levels of education.  
 
34. Financial access through alternative channels, including those mediated via NGOs 
and the vibrancy of the local economy, appear to have the favorable impact of increasing 
average rural income. Micro-finance and other programs supported by NGOs can have an 
important effect on income:  an average rural household residing in communities with strong 
NGO presence has higher per capita income than its counterpart without such a facility (the 
difference is equivalent to 11 percent of average rural per capita consumption expenditure). The 
most important factor is, perhaps, the vibrancy of the local economy (captured here via the 
presence of community shops).  This factor alone will augment average rural income by an 
amount equivalent to 17 percent of per capita consumption expenditure. 
 
35. Once the above-mentioned infrastructural elements are put in place, the entire rural 
livelihood dynamics can change in a major way. In the changed context, the role of 
agricultural extension becomes important both for informed crop choice, depending on the area’s 
agro-ecological potential, and for the dissemination of improved cultivation practices. With a 
growing marketable surplus, agricultural marketing will expand, which in turn would lead to 
increased demand for new investments in roads and better maintenance of existing roads to 
reduce transport costs. The development of transport infrastructure has a direct effect on 
employment for transport operators. Increasing the purchasing power of the farm sector also 
raises the demand for goods and services produced by non-farm sectors. This, in turn, creates 
scope for increasing the productivity enhancing as well as employment generating potential of 
rural non-farm sectors. Once the demand side constraints are released, access to power (and other 
inputs) can help release the supply-side constraints in the rural non-farm sectors. 
 
36. These developments will lead to favorable pro-poor changes in the labor market as well. 
The study diagnosed five important characteristics in Jharkhand’s labor markets: (i) the 
subsidiary status of farming; (ii) predominance of non-agricultural casual labor as the main 
occupation; (iii) very limited role for rural non-farm self-employment; (iv) relatively higher 
income for non-agricultural (especially salaried) workers; and (v) increasing rate of distress out-
migration.  As access to infrastructure, finance and education increases, more remunerative job 
opportunities will be created in farm and non-farm self-employment than at present. Farming, in 
particular, will become more profitable -- from being just a subsidiary occupation it will turn into 
a main source of income for many rural households. This will create the advantageous cycle of 
greater demand for efficient input use (including farm credit) and agricultural/rural 
diversification. Greater access to education will also help the exit of labor to more remunerative 
and regular wage (salaried) labor markets. 
 
G. Alternative Development Paths: Defining a Middle Way 
 
x37. Two opposite views of the development debate are represented by the different degrees of 
importance given to mining and agriculture. One view contends that the development of the mining 
sector can usher in a new decade of development in Jharkhand. It can act as the natural launching pad for 
growth acceleration and financing of broad-based social development. This view states that since the state 
has the largest share of mineral Gross Domestic Product (GDP) amongst all Indian states, it should 
capitalize on its strength and not on its weakness (in this case, crop agriculture with a near total 
dependence on rainfall). This line of reasoning draws attention to capitalizing on the potentially 
substantial fiscal gains (mobilizing rents in the form of mineral revenue) and spending the additional 
gains on rural and social development, thus providing a win-win situation in terms of both growth and 
equity.  
 
38. In contrast, the second view is that the potential risks associated with the mining sector are 
high and that agriculture has shown great potential through impressive growth6 in recent years 
contributing significantly to poverty reduction and human resource development.   This line of 
thinking suggests there is emerging evidence of high risks associated with the unregulated development of 
the mining sector in conditions of relatively poor governance, apart from the risks of flouting the 
provisions of social and environmental safeguards. In the absence of a separate capital development fund 
supported by mineral revenues and exclusively earmarked for rural and social development, the prospects 
for more than off-setting compensation are uncertain as untargeted funds get used for other less important 
purposes, besides encouraging corruption. All these can eventually lead to greater destruction of 
livelihoods rather than their creation. Hence, the natural launching pad is not all that natural after all, and 
agriculture provides a much safer option given the adverse conditions of governance.  
 
39. To the extent that technological progress is dependent on the expansion of irrigated 
agriculture, especially during the winter season, the prospects of agricultural growth in the state 
will be modest. Even if judicious investment in irrigation schemes, itself a major undertaking given the 
past experience in constructing major surface water based irrigation projects, expands the current acreage 
under irrigation to its potential, it will still be restricted to only 40 percent of the land that can be irrigated 
in the state.7 This can be compared to 70-80 percent irrigable land in the neighboring regions of the 
erstwhile Bengal Presidency that is, Bihar, West Bengal, and what currently constitutes the territory of 
Bangladesh where the groundwater irrigation potential is huge.  
 
40. Crop sector growth even with the fullest expansion of irrigated acreage every year is likely to 
remain restricted to the trend growth rate of 3 percent per year and 4 percent per year for the overall 
agricultural sector as a whole (if one takes the standard achieved in West Bengal and Bangladesh in the 
best possible agricultural growth scenario). If the state realistically aims at a 6 percent growth rate over 
the medium term, from the current trend of 4 percent per year, it will have to focus on sectors outside of 
agriculture as well.  With the proportion of agricultural value addition at only 22 percent, agriculture’s 
direct contribution to the overall growth rate under the best possible scenario cannot exceed 15 percent; 
the remaining 85 percent must be generated in other sectors. 
 
41. On the other hand, the state is yet to develop appropriate institutional and 
regulatory conditions, as well as safeguard mechanisms for embarking upon a fast-paced 
mineral-based growth strategy. In fact, without having such institutional safeguards firmly in 
place, an unregulated mineral-based growth strategy can bring in more risks than rewards. This 
can be judged by several examples. One group of examples relates to the manner in which 
6 The success story in agriculture is based on data up to 2002; hence it needs to be moderated in the light of the drought witnessed 
in the last three years. 
7 World Bank and Government of Bihar, Bihar Plateau Irrigation Project, 1994. 
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institutional safeguards of the local people directly affected by mining activities are being 
addressed, that is the equity aspect of mining-based growth. The other relates to the institutional 
hurdles that genuine private investors face in undertaking new investments in the sector, which is 
the efficiency aspect of mining-based growth.    
 
42. Given the strengths and weaknesses of the two options, the present study suggests a 
middle path, aiming at an inter-temporal balance between the two strategies. While mining 
and broad-based industrial progress will lead growth over the medium to long-term and create resource 
mobilization, it is the agricultural and rural sector that needs to be continuously addressed in the short to 
medium term. This requires several factors to move in tandem.  First, there is a need to focus on 
institutional building, especially the aspects dealing with risk, risk-perception, and risk-mitigating 
measures which are central to promoting growth and the poverty reduction agenda. Second, there is need 
to increase labor productivity in the agricultural and rural sector with high employment and increase in 
employment in the known rural sectors, especially through the development of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). Third, each of the economic sectors should be able to grow to its long-term potential 
including mining and mineral-based industries. However, efforts to “force in” development of a particular 
sector without addressing sector governance constraints can backfire in the context of a rather sharp rural/ 
urban “dualism”, and a socially and spatially polarized economy of Jharkhand. 
 
43. The answer indeed seems to lie somewhere in between, with the crux of the overall 
strategy aimed at reducing risks associated with mineral-dependent growth, especially in 
an economy with high levels of poverty and inequality. Building institutions, increasing labor 
productivity in agriculture and employment of people in the non-farm sectors to the extent 
possible through the development of SMEs is a possible way forward in the short to medium 
term.  A balanced strategy would require broadening the manufacturing base beyond mineral-
based industries and establishing forward and backward linkages leading to employment 
generation.  In order to promote mining development in a sustained manner, a strong governance 
framework and institutional capacity is a must to mitigate any social or environmental impact. 
H. Social Inclusiveness for Effective Citizenship 
 
44. Social inclusion and effective citizenship for all are desirable outcomes everywhere, 
especially in Jharkhand with its sharp social and regional divide. Comparative poverty 
profiles across states shows that not only do SC/SC groups have a higher poverty rate than other 
social groups, the tribal groups in Jharkhand (along with Orissa) have the highest poverty 
intensity in India—higher than the ST groups in other Indian states.8 Over the post-emergence 
years although signs of progress have touched virtually all social groups, the extent of 
improvement has been unequal, with the tribal groups benefiting the least. This is also reflected 
in the spatial differences with high concentration of poverty and greater access-deprivation in the 
remote districts. Hence, the inclusiveness of the tribal groups and remote areas is a priority issue 
from the vantage of citizen rights. 
 
45. Tribal inclusion can be achieved through broad-based social sector investments as 
well as civic and community empowerment. Jharkhand can achieve higher social progress 
8 The head-count incidence of poverty for the ST group is 71percent in Orissa and 56 percent in Jharkhand compared with 47 
percent in West Bengal, 40 percent in Bihar, and only 27 percent in AP, as estimated by the present study from the NSS 55th 
round. 
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such as basic education and health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) even at relatively 
low levels of income, and can improve upon the coverage, targeting and efficiency of the social 
protection schemes for the most needy and vulnerable. In the medium term, institutional 
arrangements need further development of public-private-NGO partnership within a permanent 
collaborative framework that ensures efficient service delivery. 
 
46. Promoting social inclusiveness will be important for achieving sustainable 
development as well. The weakening of socio-political institutions required for protection of 
both weaker groups and natural resources represents a threat both to tribal society and to the 
environment. The weakening of traditional institutions also threatens the environment and 
National Resource Management (NRM) based livelihoods. 
 
47. An important step would be to bridge the current gap between “legal” and 
“customary” rights by explicitly recognizing tribal institutions in Jharkhand as an 
expression of direct democracy. In particular, customary land tenure should be recognized. 
People should be “consulted on their vision of development”; their land should not be acquired 
without their prior and “informed consent (instead of mere consultation)”; they should have 
“shares in any project that comes up on their land” with their land ownership remaining intact; 
and they must be “asked to move only if rehabilitation has been satisfactorily completed”.9
48. Finally, political commitment is needed to “make development happen” in the 
shortest possible time. There is need to ensure that the political gains achieved through years of 
struggle to create a separate “tribal state” start yielding significant economic benefits. It is time 
that the voices of the left-out majority of the state are finally heard and their problems acted 
upon, and that an accelerated and inclusive growth strategy finally ushers in a new development 
decade for Jharkhand. 
 
Short- and Medium-Term Policy Options for Reform 
A. Improving the Investment Climate to Promote Broad-Based Growth 
Short Term
y Removing regulatory constraints, including:  (i) setting up a single-window clearance facility for approval of 
new projects, empowered by legislation; and  (ii) transparency of approvals by setting standards and time 
frames for issuing clearances, with provisions for deemed approval if such clearances are not obtained within 
declared time frames. 
y Improving access to land: (i) creating an industrial land acquisition and facilitation agency for development and 
management of industrial parks in the state; (ii) creating a land bank for industrial purposes, at least for urban 
areas based on rational land-use planning principles consistent with the compensation and safeguard policies; 
and (iii) improving credit information on SMEs through assistance to commercial banks and financial 
institutions to verify and collate historical data on SMEs. 
y Enhancing access to finance through improvement in the credit evaluation and risk management skills of banks 
and other financing institutions. This would improve lending practices by building capacity to reduce 
transactions costs and also reduce and manage risks related to SME lending. 
Medium Term
9 Sundar (2003). 
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y Computerizing and updating of land and property records that impede the use of land as collateral, and 
promoting the use of collateral substitutes. 
y Strengthening business development services and market linkage programs for SMEs to improve 
competitiveness, profitability and creditworthiness. 
y Amending the Contract Labor Act at the state level to allow contract labor to be employed in non-core activities 
subject to certain conditions. 
y Adopting the amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act in line with the proposed central bill amendment to 
enable easy exit options for industries. 
B. Improving Access to Quality Infrastructure 
Short Term
y Formulating an infrastructure development policy, creating an infrastructural development board and 
corporation, and an enabling act to facilitate private investment. 
Transport
` Assigning the core rural road network to the State Road Development Agency, making it functional by 
providing necessary staff and resources, and applying the procedures used in the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak 
Yojana (PMGSY) across the sub-sector. 
` Assigning the core highway network to a semi-autonomous State Highway Authority, after a functional 
reclassification of roads, to be managed along commercial lines as provided for under the Jharkhand 
Highways Bill.  
Water Supply and Sanitation
` Creating awareness about the links between sanitation and health through campaigns. 
Irrigation
` Upgrading the technical skills of personnel in the water resources department to enable them to design, 
operate and maintain modern irrigation infrastructure. 
` Unbundling water resource management from irrigation service provision, setting up of new institutional 
arrangements with a state-level apex body like the State Water Resources Agency, appointing an independent 
regulator to encourage public-private partnerships in developing mini hydroelectric stations and irrigation 
systems with specialized agricultural crop zones. 
Power Sector
` Improving financial reporting and internal controls for each company, including internal auditing, 
procurement, fuel supply and metering, billing and collection for large power consumers. 
` Increasing representation of independent non-executive directors on the boards of power companies through 
a transparent, competitive recruitment process. 
` Operationalizing the corporate restructuring, including: (i) competitive recruitment of managers for each new      
company; (ii) development of human resources in accounting and audit functions; and (iii) establishing new 
financial management systems for each new company. 
` Drafting a clear policy vision for the sector, including plans for restructuring. 
` Evaluating subsidies including an analysis of the distribution of the benefits and development of an   
institutional mechanism to work out cross indebtedness. 
Medium Term
Transport
` Improving and modernizing the Ranchi Airport.   
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` Assigning user charges and road transport improvements.  
` Creating a computerized management information system (MIS), for state and rural roads to inventories, and 
then managing assets more effectively as well as concurrent reforms in business procedures in procurement, 
supervision, monitoring and financial control. 
` Developing an Inland Container Depot (ICD)/dry port for completion of all customs formalities for imports 
and exports, with direct connectivity to Kolkata and Haldia ports. 
Water Supply and Sanitation
` Investment in key business processes such as MIS, data collection, financial management and procurement 
procedures of the Drinking Water Supply (DWS) department, sector NGOs, and other key players.  
` Ensuring that all sector funding streams are integrated into a single financial structure overseen by one body. 
Irrigation
` Designing an investment plan based on a robust set of data used in a Decision Support System (DSS) model 
with appropriate cash flow forecasts. 
` Community participation and involvement of all stakeholders to enhance accountability.  
` Up-scaling of irrigation infrastructure to improve productivity of water and land through agricultural 
intensification and diversification to income-earning crops that can be grown with limited water, using 
improved irrigation and agricultural technologies. 
` Completing of ongoing schemes as quickly as possible in a rational manner. 
` Developing hydropower for increased irrigation through groundwater exploitation by shallow or open dug 
wells. 
` Focusing on minor irrigation along the lines of the Gram Bhagirathi Yojana, with emphasis on participatory 
irrigation management. 
` Groundwater exploitation should be through dug well and shallow tube wells and should not be more than the 
recharge. 
Power Sector
` Developing business turnaround strategies for each company.  
` Increasing transparency and accountability of new power companies to a broader range of stakeholders.  
` Establishing commercial transactions between financially independent companies, including power purchase 
agreements between the generation and distribution companies and a separate licensing and tariff regulation 
for each new company. 
` Creating opportunities for new lower cost entrants to provide power generation and electric service in rural 
areas. 
` Increasing investment in the sector by improving sector finances, which will in turn improve the range of 
financing options. 
C. Addressing Issues in the Mining Sector 
Short Term
y Finalization of the draft of the India Mining Development Policy. 
y Strengthening the capacity of the Jharkhand Pollution Control Board to monitor and enforce compliance of the 
legal and regulatory framework. 
y Decentralizing responsibilities to regional offices and upgrading administrative and technical skills. 
y Amending the Indian Coal Bearing Areas Act to permit private investment in the coal sector. 
Medium Term
xv 
y Rationalizing consent management based on environmental risks and re-allocating resources towards more 
effective inspection and monitoring. 
y Shortening the permit process by eliminating discretion in the implementation of the law. 
y Reducing speculation and encouraging active exploration through structured license fees. 
y Introducing a modern, computerized, on-line, rules-based mining rights cadre to enable quicker and transparent 
access to minerals and securing appropriate mining titles on a “first come first serve basis”. 
y Preparing guidelines for environmental impact assessments, environmental management and community 
development plans. 
y Addressing compensation issues in consultation with all stakeholders, especially local communities. 
y Preparing a consultation framework to facilitate rational land use planning, community development and 
sharing of benefits between local and indigenous peoples, and the dual use of designated forest areas with 
progressive rehabilitation and afforestation. 
y Improving transparency and revenue management by adoption and implementation of the principles of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
D. Improving Governance and Service Delivery 
Short Term
y Curbing premature transfers by: (i) introducing computerized transfer processes at lower levels; (ii) creating a 
statutory civil services board at higher levels of the system; (iii) establishing a computerized database to track 
transfers and monitor compliance with a three-year average tenure norm and (iv) imposing quantitative caps to 
limit transfers. 
y Revising manuals for the greater use of information technology and recasting of secrecy provisions to ensure 
consistency with the Freedom of Information Act (2005). 
y Ensuring greater accountability and transparency through e-governance and full implementation of the Right to 
Information legislation. 
y Strengthening the presence and quality of block administration through more visits to the districts and blocks by 
senior government officials. 
Medium Term
y Clustering departments to improve functional efficiency with a minister and principal secretary for each cluster. 
y Removing schemes of marginal value, curtailing unproductive expenditures and making monitoring more 
effective though zero-based review of all schemes.  
y Improving performance and career management, moving towards a merit-based civil service, with an improved 
performance management system of Grade I and Grade II officers.  
y Amending existing state legislation contradicting the central PESA Act or the Jharkhand Panchayati Raj 2001 
Act and ensuring compatibility between the two.  
y Devolving real power and resources to PRIs through administrative and fiscal measures. 
y Clarifying the powers of different tiers of the PRI system through an activity mapping exercise involving 
critical line departments, elected PRI representatives, and NGOs and publicizing them through training sessions 
with the media. 
y Placing teachers, para-medics and Primary Health Centre (PHC) doctors under the direct control of PRIs. 
y Working with civil society groups to implement programs, train PRI representatives and evaluate public 
services. 
E. Fiscal and Public Expenditure Management 
Short Term
xvi 
y Passing the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA) incorporating medium-term fiscal 
targets. 
y Drawing up the Medium Term Fiscal Program (MTFP) to meet the FRBMA targets. 
y Adopting expenditure control measures such as restrictions on the creation of new posts, rationalizing of 
existing posts and a ceiling on contingent liabilities. 
y Create a separate Mineral Revenue Fund designed to support development activities, especially for supporting 
rural and social development, in order to ensure the effective use of mineral revenues, as untargeted funds run 
the risk of being used for less important purposes, besides encouraging corruption. 
Medium Term
y Implementing the FRBMA and the MTFP targets. 
y Following a realistic budgeting process involving line departments and reflecting policy objectives, leading to 
performance based budgeting within the context of a medium-term expenditure plan.  
y Simplifying procurement rules, adopting electronic procurement, increasing oversight and monitoring and 
training programs for officials.  
y Creating a Finance and Accounts cadre for treasuries, budget division and internal audit division and 
modernization of treasury functions.  
G. Strengthening Human Development Strategies 
Short Term
Health
` Strengthening the drugs management system and the health MIS. 
` Using demand side financing, a means of transferring purchasing power to specified groups, for the purchase 
of health services. 
Education
` Providing incentives such as conditional cash transfers (CCT) to households to send their children, especially 
girls, to school with enhanced emphasis on the completion of primary and secondary education. 
` Filling up vacant positions with teachers possessing subject-specific knowledge for upper primary and 
secondary schools, additional teachers to ease the burden of multi-grade teaching in single-teacher schools, 
adequate female teachers and teachers who understand the local tribal language and are sensitive to the 
contextual culture. 
Medium Term
Health
` Prioritizing available resources for: (i) priority health services (PHS) with focus on reproductive and child 
health care and improving maternal and child nutrition; (ii) focusing PHS on the poor; and (iii) extending 
financial protection to the poor against major illness.  
` Human resource management including development of job descriptions and introduction of performance 
based management systems.  
` Scaling up of the public health service delivery by public and private providers. 
` Developing and strengthening organizations and systems such as planning and budgeting, financial 
management, quality assurance, monitoring, procurement and finally, regulation and accreditation. 
xvii 
` Promoting local oversight for delivery of public health services.
Education
` Upgrading Education Guarantee Schemes (EGS) into primary schools in a phased manner.  
` Providing the minimum pre-service and regular in-service training to teachers without formal teacher training.  
` Analyzing the tenure, qualification requirements, standardization, selection, appointment, pre-service and in-
service training of para-teachers. 
` Setting up of the State Institute of Education Management and Training (SIEMAT) and strengthening the 
links between all these support systems. 
` Provide technical support to the State Institute for Education Research and Training (SIERT) and State 
Institute of Educational Management and Training (SIEMAT) in curriculum revision, textbook development, 
and training of trainers training at the district level, and strengthening capacity for research and evaluation. 
` Addressing under-spending of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) allocations and identifying activities using the 
innovative grants in SSA aimed at introducing state- specific interventions. 
` Promoting public-private partnerships, especially at the secondary level since 10 percent of the total schools 
are under grants-in-aid. 
` Increasing private institutions under grants-in-aid. 
` Expanding the vocational education sector. 
1Chapter 1: A New State: Emergence, Features and Challenges 
1.1 The state of Jharkhand, India’s twenty-eighth state was carved out of southern Bihar and 
came into existence on November 15, 2000.  It is bound by Bihar on the north, West Bengal in 
the east, Orissa in the south and Chhattisgarh and UP in the west.  It covers an area of 79,714 sq 
km, with 22 districts, 32,616 revenue villages and a population of 27 million according to the 
2001 census. With 28 percent of the state’s population comprising tribal communities (compared 
to the all-India average of 8 percent), Jharkhand was created as a “tribal state”.   
 
1.2  The historical evolution of the state has an important bearing on the understanding of its 
current conditions.  The creation of this state was mobilized by the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 
(JMM) movement that gathered momentum in the mid-1980s. However, the move for a separate 
state goes right back to the time of independence when, in 1947, the All India Jharkhand Party 
came into being.  In short, the creation of the new state had antecedents of considerable political 
and social mobilization.10 Following the bifurcation of the state, a BJP coalition came into power 
in Jharkhand with the state assembly being made up of legislators elected in the last all-Bihar 
elections that took place in 2000.  The state had its first elections in February 2005 that were 
closely contested and resulted in a BJP coalition returning to power. The opposition comprised 
the JMM, Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Indian National Congress and the Communist Party of 
India (CPI).11 
1.3 Jharkhand has a rich endowment of natural resources – forests, minerals and abundant 
land.  With only 2.7 percent of the population of India,12 the state possesses approximately 33 
percent of its mineral reserves, and is particularly rich in coal and iron ore. The Dhanbad-Jharia 
coal belt, the minerals of Giridih and the steel towns of Jamshedpur and Bokaro are among its 
national assets. 
 
1.4 There were several advantages that emerged from the separation of Jharkhand from 
Bihar. It took away a bulk of the parent state’s industrial, educational, mineral and forest assets 
and one-third of the population. But Jharkhand remains, along with residual Bihar, among the 
most food-insecure states in the country.  The Vision 2010 document of the government admits 
to a 52 percent deficit in food grain production, with 230 grams per capita daily availability 
against the all-India average of 523 grams.  Undivided Bihar had the highest rate of child 
malnutrition in the country in 1992/93. This is still true of Jharkhand today as indicated by the 
recent 2005/06 National Family Health Survey (NFHS) round. 
 
1.5 The monitoring and analysis of the economy is severely constrained due to the lack of 
data not only for the period up to 2000 but also for the last five years.  A quantitative review of 
the economy can thus be regarded only as broadly indicative. However, despite inadequate data, 
certain key features of the economy and development challenges emerge.  
10
 On the history of the formation of Jharkhand as a political identity, see Prakash (2001) and Corbridge et al (2004). 
11
 The ruling political coalition, however, remains fragile, as indicated by the recent political development, whereby a new 
coalition government came to power in September 2006. 
12
 According to the 2001 census. 
2A. Poverty and Social Indicators 
1.6 Jharkhand has one of the 
highest levels of poverty in India, 
with a sharp contrast between 
rural and urban poverty.13 The 
incidence of poverty at the state level 
is assessed at 44 percent in the state 
compared with 26 percent for India 
as a whole (Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1) 
There is, however, a sharp contrast 
between rural and urban poverty. The 
incidence of rural poverty, assessed 
at 49 percent in 1999/00, is the 
highest among all Indian states, with 
the second highest being Orissa (48 
percent), followed by Bihar (44 
percent), Assam (40 percent), and 
MP (37 percent).14 In contrast, the 
incidence of urban poverty is only 23 
percent, which is similar to or better 
than many advanced states such as 
AP and Maharashtra (27 percent), 
Karnataka (25 percent), Tamil Nadu 
(23 percent), and much lower than in 
Orissa (44 percent) and Bihar (34 percent).15 
1.7 An analysis of poverty trends based 
on NSS rounds throws up interesting results: 
• There is broad consistency in 
annual growth rate estimates 
between survey-expenditure 
and GSDP data. The annual 
growth rate in per capita 
consumption expenditure, as 
estimated from the NSS data, is 
around 2 percent for the thick 
round interval and 1.7 percent for 
13
 In most cases data was not available after 2002, limiting the team’s ability to fully diagnose and access the impact on poverty 
reduction. 
14
 Note that these poverty estimates are “unadjusted” i.e. without making any Deaton-Dreze (2002) type of adjustment for any 
possible overestimation of per capita monthly consumption from the simultaneous recording of food consumption through 7-day/ 
30-day memory recall in Schedule 1 of NSS. Hence, only the official poverty numbers are used here for state-level comparisons 
for both rural and urban poverty.  
15
 In this respect Jharkhand does not stand alone. In fact, the sharpest rural-urban contrast is provided by Assam where the 
incidence of urban poverty is only 7 percent compared with the rural headcount of 40 percent. Strikingly, both the states have 
abundant natural resources. 
 
Table 1. 1: Trends in Poverty as per NSS Thick and Thin Rounds 
 
Thick Rounds 
(50th & 50th)
Thin Rounds 
(53rd & 58th)
Poverty  
Measures 
1993/94 1999/00 1997 2002 
Rural 
Head-Count 61.7 49.2 59.4 47.1 
Poverty Gap 16.1 10.1 15.7 10.5 
Squared 
Poverty Gap 
5.6 3.1 5.5 3.3 
Urban 
Head-Count 27.7 23.1 10.3 14.5 
Poverty Gap 5.4 5.3 2.4 1.7 
Squared 
Poverty Gap 
1.4 1.8 1.0 0.3 
All 
Head-Count 55.6 44.0 50.6 40.6 
Poverty Gap 13.9 9.0 13.3 8.7 
Squared 
Poverty Gap 
4.8 2.9 4.7 2.7 
Source: Estimated from the unit-record data of successive NSS rounds using 
Jharkhand-specific poverty lines. Comparisons are valid only within each 
category of NSS rounds. These are “unadjusted” poverty numbers based on 
reported consumption in Schedule-1 of NSS (see, footnote 1 below). 
Figure 1. 1: Poverty Headcount – Jharkhand & All-India  
(1999/2000) 
44
49.2
23.1
26.1 27.1 23.5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Total Rural Urban
H
CR
(%
)
Jharkhand All India
Source: Estimated from NSS 55th round, Schedule 1. 
3the thin round (Table 1.2). This may be compared to 2.4 percent estimated from the 
GSDP data. 
 
Table 1. 2: Summary Statistics on Consumption Growth and Consumption Inequality 
(1993-2002) 
Rural Urban Year 
Poverty 
Line 
Mean Mean/Poverty 
Line 
Gini 
Index 
(%) 
Poverty 
Line 
Mean Mean/Poverty 
Line 
Gini 
Index 
(%) 
Thick Round 
1993/94 212 215 101.4 23.7 239 421 176.7 34.2 
1999/00 333 376 112.8 22.2 341 673 197.4 36.0 
Thin Round 
1997 278 292 105.0 25.3 285 624 218.9 28.8 
2002 348 391 112.9 21.8 356 819 230.0 32.5 
Note: Poverty line (Rs./person/month) and mean (Rs./person/month) are in current prices. Thick and Thin rounds results 
are not comparable. However, comparisons are possible within each category of NSS rounds. 
Source: Estimated from the unit-record data of successive NSS rounds. 
• Jharkhand has made considerable progress in reducing poverty since the early nineties, as 
indicated by data from both the thick and thin rounds. While comparisons are not possible 
across thick and thin round estimates, one can go by the rate of progress within each category of 
Table 1. 3: Decomposition of Changes in Poverty Measures into Growth 
and Inequality Components 
(change  in percentage points) 
Growth 
Component 
Inequality 
Component 
Residual Total 
Change 
Rural 
Thick Rounds 
H -14.14 0.32 1.28 -12.54 
P (1) -5.61 -1.40 0.97 -6.04 
P (2) -2.41 -0.71 0.61 -2.51 
Thin Rounds 
H -6.92 -4.21 
-1.12 -12.25 
P (1) -2.84 -2.50 0.17 -5.17 
P (2) -1.27 -1.14 0.20 -2.21 
Urban 
Thick Rounds 
H -7.43 1.87 1.01 -4.55 
P (1) -2.20 2.16 
-0.03 -0.07 
P (2) -0.73 1.30 
-0.21 0.36 
Thin Rounds 
H -1.57 6.73 
-0.94 4.22 
P (1) -0.36 0.02 
-0.32 -0.66 
P (2) -0.13 -0.56 
-0.04 -0.73 
Note: Poverty line (Rs./person/month) and mean (Rs./person/month) are in current 
prices. Thick and Thin rounds results are not comparable. However, comparisons are 
possible within each category of NSS rounds. 
Source: Estimated from the unit-record data of successive NSS 50th and 55th Thick 
rounds and 53rd and 58th Thin rounds. 
4NSS rounds (Table 1.2). The rate of overall poverty reduction was quite impressive—about 2 
percentage points a year. This may be compared to 2.5 percentage points a year observed at the 
all-India level during the same period.  
• The comparative performance was highly uneven between rural and urban areas with 
faster progress recorded for rural areas. In general, the pace of rural poverty reduction was 
faster in both thick and thin round intervals.  The incidence of urban poverty dropped as per the 
thick round, but rose as per the thin round NSS data. 
• The Gini index of consumption 
inequality has dropped for both 
thick and thin round intervals 
for  
rural areas, while it rose for 
urban areas. The latter has 
increased from 34 to 36 percent 
during 1994-2000, and rose at an 
even higher pace during 1997-
2002 (Table 1.2).    
 
• While growth has been the most 
important explanatory factor 
underlying the drop in the 
measures of poverty, 
contemporaneous changes in 
inequality also played an 
important role in both the rural 
and urban areas.16 This is 
confirmed by decomposing the 
changes in poverty rates into 
growth and inequality components 
(Table 1.3). Thin rounds data 
provide dramatic contrasts 
between rural and urban areas in 
this regard. In rural areas, poverty 
would have been reduced by only 
7 percentage points during 1997-
2002 instead of the 12 percentage 
points actually observed, but for 
the shifts in the distribution of 
consumption in favor of the rural poor. In comparison, poverty in urban areas would have 
dropped by 7 percentage points instead of 5, due to off-setting adverse shifts in the 
distribution of consumption hurting the urban poor.  
 
16
 This does not mean that the distribution can be necessarily improved without disrupting the present growth process. The 
decomposition results are meant to draw attention to initial inequality as a factor of poverty reduction. 
 
Table 1. 4: Key MDG and Social Indicators  
2000 
Indicators Jharkhand India 
Poverty and Child Malnutrition 
Poverty Head-Count (official 
estimate) 
44 26 
Percentage Children 
Underweight 
54 47 
Percentage Children Stunted 49 46 
Education 
Literacy Rate (6 & above) 54 65 
Male 68 75 
Female 39 51 
Net School Attendance (6-14) 64 77 
Boys 71 80 
Girls 56 74 
Health 
Infant Mortality Rate (2005/06) 69 57 
Percentage Children Fully 
Immunized 
9 42 
Immunized against Measles 18 51 
Immunized against DPT (3 
doses) 
22 55 
Population Growth Rate (1991-
2001) 
2.3 1.7 
Contraceptive Use (any modern 
method) 
25 43 
Sanitation Access 15 30 
Maternal Vaccination (TT) 51 67 
Births Attended by Skilled 
Attendants 
18 42 
Percent of Households with 
Access within 15 Minutes of 
Safe Water Supply 
34 62 
Source: NSS 55th round, NFHS-II, NFHS-III, and 
Population census 2001. 
5• The state’s key social indicators such as literacy, enrolment, infant mortality and child 
nutrition, are well below the all-India average (Table 1.4).  Although positive changes have 
been registered in most of these indicators since 2000 there has been striking deterioration in 
respect of two key indicators during 1998-2005. These relate to the areas of child malnutrition 
and infant mortality. The prevalence of child malnutrition (as measured by the proportion of 
underweight children) has increased from 54% to 59% between the last two NFHS rounds carried 
out in 1998/99 and 2005/06. Similarly, the infant mortality has risen from 54 deaths to 69 deaths 
per thousand live births. On account of both these indicators the state’s current record appears 
worst or next to worst among all Indian states. Firstly, the proportion of children underweight in 
the state, which is assessed at 59%, can be compared to 60% in Madhya Pradesh, 58% for Bihar, 
52% in Chhattisgarh, 44% in Orissa, 40% in Assam, and much higher than the all-India average 
of 46%. Secondly, the infant mortality rate in the state, which stands at 69 deaths per thousand 
live births, may be compared with 70 in Madhya Pradesh, 62 for Bihar and 57 for the all-India 
average. 
B. Growth and Employment 
 
1.8 Contrary to its image, Jharkhand is predominantly a mining and industrial state.  
Close to half of the GSDP of the state accrues from industry with mining, quarrying and 
registered manufacturing contributing nearly 
78 percent of the state’s industrial output.  It is 
the country’s most mineral-intensive state, 
with mining and quarrying accounting for 14.3 
percent of the GSDP (as compared to 2.3 
percent for the rest of India), and 
manufacturing for 27 percent (as compared to 
only 17 percent for all India in 2004).  
 
1.9 Forestry, from which the state 
derives its name, contributes only about 1.3 
percent of the GSDP. It is interesting to note 
that the shares of industry, agriculture and 
services have remained more or less constant 
over the last 10 years, with industry 
contributing nearly 50 percent and both 
services and agriculture contributing 28 
percent and 22 percent respectively year after 
year (Figure 1.2). 
 
1.10 Jharkhand’s economy grew at an 
estimated rate of about 4.8 percent from 
1993/94 to 2003/04, compared to 6.0 percent 
for all India (Table 1.5). Almost all sectors 
show huge volatility in growth rates year on 
year.  While the agricultural sector grew at a rate of 4 percent (higher than 2.2 percent for all 
India), the industrial and services sectors grew at lower than the all-India rates.  The mining 
sector, which contributes nearly 15 percent of the GSDP (six times more than the all-India level), 
grew at only 5.3 percent, compared to an 8.2 percent growth at the all-India level. 
Figure 1. 2: Sectoral Shares in GSDP 
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Table 1. 5: Growth of Real GSDP  
(1993/94-2003/04)                (%) 
JH India 
Agriculture and Allied 4.0 2.2 
Industry 4.8 5.9 
Industry- Mining 3.0 4.6 
Services 5.3 8.2 
GSDP 4.8 6.0 
Source: Central Statistical Organization. 
Table 1. 6: Comparison of Per Capita Growth Rates 
1993/94 - 2003/04 
Nominal Real 
Jharkhand 6.58 2.44 
Bihar  7.19 2.28 
Orissa 8.38 2.52 
Tamil Nadu  10.00 3.97 
Andhra Pradesh  10.65 4.69 
Karnataka  10.68 5.82 
West Bengal  11.80 5.55 
All India 9.90 3.97 
Source: Central Statistical Organization. 
61.11 The high level of industrialization has not translated into high levels of income for 
the state. While the per capita income of the state is higher than that of states like Uttar Pradesh 
or Bihar, it is about half that of the national average (Figure 1.3).  The state’s nominal per capita 
income of Rs.14,147 ($314 approx.) in 2003/04 is below that of countries such as Bangladesh 
($400) and the average per capita income of Sub-Saharan Africa ($510) as well as states like 
Orissa, while it is more than double that of Bihar. The gap between the growth of income 
between Jharkhand and the rest of India has been widening as the state’s per capita income has 
grown only at 3.4 percent per annum compared to 4.8 percent for all India between 1993/94 and 
2003/04.  
 
1.12 Jharkhand’s per capita income has increased slower than that of other states 
between 1993/94 and 2003/04. It ranks below Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Orissa, Tamil 
Nadu, and West Bengal as well as the Indian average in nominal terms and among these states, it 
only scores above Bihar in real terms. 
 
1.13 Lower per 
capita GSDP can be 
attributed to low 
levels of productivity 
across different 
sectors.  Given that 
labor force 
participation rates are 
roughly similar (32.9 
percent for the state 
against 33.6 percent for 
India), lower per capita 
GSDP in the state can 
be largely attributed to 
lower productivity.    In 1999/2000, nearly 90 percent of the state’s workforce was employed in 
sectors where productivity levels were lower than those for India (Figure 1.4 and Table 1.7). 
These sectors included agriculture, mining, utilities, construction, trade and hotels, and storage, 
Figure 1. 3: Growth Gap between Jharkhand and Rest of India 
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Table 1. 7: Productivity Growth in Jharkhand by Sector 
(1993-2000) 
1993/94 1999/00 1993-00 
Share 
in 
GSDP 
Share in 
Employment 
Share 
in 
GSDP 
Share in 
Employment 
Productivity 
Growth 
Agriculture & 
Allied 22.7 64.7 21.7 59.4 3.6 
Industry 49.1 15.7 51.1 19.7 -0.6 
Mining 17.6 3.3 15.4 3.5 -0.5 
Manufacturing 23.9 7.4 30 9.6 2.1 
Others 7.6 5 5.7 6.6 5.7 
Services 28.2 19.6 27.2 20.9 1.1 
Overall 100 100 100 100 2.7 
Source: Estimated from NSS 50th and 55th rounds, Schedule 10 and CSO data. 
7transport and communication; they contributed 
close to 60 percent of GSDP. Manufacturing 
accounted for 30 percent of GSDP but 
employed less than 10 percent of the 
workforce. Further, this diagnosis seems to 
hold true over time. At the all-India level, the 
largest increases in labor productivity have 
been in mining, manufacturing and financial 
services. Of these, Jharkhand has witnessed a 
negative growth rate in labor productivity in 
mining, while the growth of labor productivity in 
manufacturing has been less than half the all-India 
figure. Financial, insurance and business services 
clearly surpassed the all-India growth rate and 
also showed the highest level of productivity in 
1999/00, but contributed only 8 percent of GSDP 
and negligible employment. Thus even though the 
state has a large share of industry in GSDP, this 
has not translated into a high per capita income. 
1.14 While the structure of output indicates a high level of industrialization, the structure 
of employment reveals the predominance of agriculture. Nearly 60 percent of the 
employment in the state stems from agriculture (1999/00), with industry and services accounting 
for 20 percent each (Figure 1.5).  These figures are not vastly different from employment trends 
across the country, as at an all-India level agriculture accounts for 57 percent, while industry and 
services account for about 18 percent and 26 percent respectively.  While the agricultural sector 
employs 60 percent of the labor force, it contributes only about 20 percent to the GSDP of the 
state.  This sector with its low productivity and large employment contributes greatly to the high 
rural poverty in the state. 
 
C. Prioritizing Development Challenges 
 
1.15 Jharkhand, like many other low-income states, is confronted with many development 
challenges, some being more important than others from the perspective of a medium-term 
strategy. As pointed out earlier, the state has experienced a modest growth rate of 2.4 percent per 
year in GSDP over the last decade and about 2 percent per year in consumption expenditure over 
1997-2002, as estimated from the NSS survey. With one of the highest levels of poverty 
incidence in India, the state needs to accelerate the overall growth rate and also make it pro-poor. 
 
Figure 1. 4: Productivity Levels: Jharkhand and 
India  
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Figure 1. 5: Employment by Sector: Jharkhand and 
India  
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8Identifying Bottlenecks to Growth
1.16 A growth diagnostic for Jharkhand reveals that poor infrastructure and lack of 
institutional development are two major constraints to growth. Infrastructural investments 
not only accelerate growth, but have strong linkage effects with other complementary inputs such 
as human capital, access to finance, and adoption of new technology. With improved 
connectivity, for instance, economic and social development literally moves into the connected 
areas. The impact of infrastructure is larger when used in combination and when designed to link 
major growth centers.17 This is because infrastructural elements such as roads, power, 
telecommunication, water and sanitation, irrigation and storage capacity are often synergistic in 
nature. Improved institutional performance, on the other hand, reduces the “transaction costs”, 
which, in turn, increases productivity of as well as rate of investment via favorable effects on 
investment climate.
Access to Infrastructure: Impediments and Improvements
1.17 Lack of access to infrastructure can be measured in terms of: (i) under-provisioning 
relative to the rest of India; and (ii) high unfulfilled demand in key areas such as 
transportation, telecommunication, power, water supply and irrigation. The extent of 
deprivation is higher in Jharkhand as compared to the rest of India and higher in rural areas than 
in urban areas. 
 
1.18. Jharkhand (along with Bihar) has one 
of the poorest road connectivity among all 
Indian states, resulting in high 
transportation costs. Gains from road 
investments can be quite high especially 
when all-weather, good quality roads connect 
communities with “growth centers”.  The 
centers reduce the cost of doing business, 
especially for the small and informal sectors 
and for those residing in rural areas. This can be 
measured both in terms of road density as well 
as surfaced to total road ratio (Figure 1.6 and 
1.7). In terms of road density the state ranks 
third lowest in this sub-sample, better than 
Bihar and AP, but much worse than the other 
states such as Orissa and West Bengal. In terms 
of the proportion of surfaced roads in total road 
length, a more revealing indicator, the state 
ranks the lowest.  The extent of the high 
shadow price on roads can be assessed from the 
relatively high returns on roads in the state. 
Households residing in villages with good 
17
 One obvious consideration would be to use infrastructural investments strategically to maximize the growth impact, for 
example, to prevent the often-noted phenomenon of “roads to nowhere” (Easterly 2006). 
Figure 1. 6: Road Density 
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Figure 1. 7: Percentage of Surface Roads 
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9approach road connectivity have, on average, 18 percent higher income than their counterparts 
without such access. The largest impact is noted in households, which reside in villages directly 
connected to wholesale markets by good road access (where the difference increases to over 40 
percent).18 Hence, significant gains can be achieved with improved road connectivity. 
 
1.19.  Improvements in road service delivery require better planning, core process 
improvements, investments and rural road management in the near future. A medium to 
longer term objective could be to assign larger responsibilities, foster ownership, user charges 
and road transport improvements in general. The creation of a computerized MIS is absolutely 
essential for planning and taking stock of assets. Core process improvements, such as 
transparency in public procurement including better performance-based contracts for both 
investment and maintenance can enhance sector outcomes. Simultaneously the sector requires 
huge investments, roughly 2-3 times of recent annual outlays. Rural roads are being funded 
through the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), and the best way forward would be 
to expand well-established policies and procedures under this scheme to cover all rural roads. 
1.20. Jharkhand has one of the lowest 
tele-densities in India. The state ranks 
third from the bottom with slightly 
improved ratios compared to 
Chhattisgarh and Bihar. The lack of 
telecommunication places the rural poor in 
Jharkhand at a clear disadvantage compared 
to other states. This is especially true as a 
third of the population lives in difficult high 
terrain where it is not easy to build routine 
road networks (Figure 1.8). 
 
1.21.  The power sector in Jharkhand 
has good business potential.  The state is 
well endowed with coal and has the potential 
for low-cost power generation, particularly if 
power plants can be set up in the vicinity of 
coal mines. The sector has a good consumer 
mix, with a high proportion of industrial 
load. In addition, the state is free from the 
legacy of large supply of power to 
agriculture and low tariffs that plague most 
states in India.  
 
18
 Estimated from the Rural Jharkhand BaseLine Survey Data (see Chapter 3). 
Figure 1. 8: Overall State-wise Teledensity 
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10 
1.22. Despite the good business potential, access to power in the state is very low, as 
judged from per capita availability, 
community connectivity, and household 
access. The average power consumption is 
only 30 kwh per capita, the lowest in India, 
(Bihar touching 45 kwh per capita) as 
compared to 373 kwh per capita for all India. 
Only 40 percent of the communities in the 
state have power connectivity (second lowest 
after Bihar) as against 86 percent at the all-
India level.19 The gap between the state and 
the rest of India is even more striking at the 
household level. Only 23 percent of 
households have access to electricity 
compared with the all-India average of 59 
percent (Figure 1.9), while in rural areas 
access is less than 10 percent.20 High costs of 
production and high industrial tariffs coupled with poor collection efficiency, have a significant, 
though poorly understood, negative fiscal impact. Not only do subsidies finance and perpetuate 
inefficiency in the power sector, they also have an opportunity cost to the GoJ in terms of 
foregone investments in other sectors. 
 
1.23.  High shadow prices on electricity can be judged by two indicators: (a) relatively 
high power tariffs; and (b) relatively high return from access to power. In the case of 
Jharkhand (unlike some other states with a very high degree of non-technical system-loss) the 
level of transmission and distribution (T&D) losses is lower than the all-India average (26 
percent vs. 33 percent). The state ranks eighth in terms of high power tariff rate in a 21-state 
sample.21 The micro-estimate of the income effect of power access at the community level also 
shows that households with such access can earn 46 percent higher income than those without 
such access.22 In short, rectifying the power access constraint can result in a significant increase 
in income.  Some elements of improvements in the power sector have been discussed in Chapter 
4. 
 
1.24. Although about 98 percent of the state’s rural communities have access to basic 
water supply (80 percent through hand pumps) compared to the all-India average of 80 
percent, poor maintenance results in lower sustained water supply coverage. Sanitation 
coverage is far lower, at about 7 percent compared with the Indian average of 21 percent; though 
actual usage may be lower still. Lack of local management and ownership, weak service support 
and a weak financing system are among the reasons for this sector’s present state. The GoJ’s 
strategy for this sector is to shift the role of the government from that of a provider to a facilitator 
of services through involvement of user groups for service delivery. District- and village-level 
water and sanitation committees have been created and the next step is to build their capacity for 
19
 Estimated from the NSS data. 
20
 Second lowest rate of electrification nationwide after Bihar and lower than the average in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
21
 Ministry of Power data. 
22
 Estimated from the NSS 55th round data. 
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11 
this task. Simultaneously, the sector requires significant investments in infrastructure for safe and 
reliable water supply. Creating awareness about the linkages of safe water supply, improved 
sanitation and hygiene with health would be necessary, though public investments needed in 
physical infrastructure for sanitation would be relatively low. Investment in the improvement of 
key business processes of the Drinking Water Supply (DWS) department, sector NGOs and other 
key players in areas such as MIS, data collection, financial management and procurement 
procedures are all relatively straightforward activities that nevertheless promise significant 
returns. Ensuring that all sector funding streams - be they transfers from the Government of India 
(GoI), state funds or from other sources - are integrated into a single financial structure overseen 
by one body would help enforce a common policy and practices in the sector.   
1.25. Lack of irrigation facility is another key infrastructural bottleneck. Easing the 
irrigation constraint -- up to the point of the permissible limit of 40 percent from the current low 
level of 15-20 percent -- will have beneficial effects on agriculture, and via linkage effects, on 
rural non-farm growth. Due to slow growth in irrigation, the agricultural sector has not been able 
to perform to its potential both in terms of food production as well as crop diversification. 
However, the expansion of area under irrigation in the state faces a number of techno-economic 
challenges (Chapter 3). 
 
Institutional Performance
1.26. The state faces significant challenges in overcoming the weaknesses of 
implementation capacity. This is especially important in the context of the huge planned 
increase in capital expenditure (mostly on account of infrastructure building) from 2.8 percent of 
GSDP in 2003/04 to 7.7 percent of GSDP by 2006/07 as indicated by the budget estimates. 
These challenges are reflected in four sets of factors: (a) inadequate administrative capacity; (b) 
low beneficiary satisfaction; (c) high insecurity; and (d) problem of corruption.23 
Administrative Capacity 
 
1.27. As part of the problems associated with the creation of a new state, Jharkhand 
suffers from serious administrative and management shortcomings adversely affecting 
implementation effectiveness. There is no catch-all summary measure of administrative 
capacity. The present study uses three proxy indicators: (i) extent of shortfall in program 
implementation; (ii) frequent premature transfers of top-level managers; and (iii) absence or 
weakness of key departments often with high level of under-staffing.  
 
23
 The terms “institutional performance” and “governance” are often used interchangeably in the literature. The study opted for 
the former usage for two considerations. First, governance is often equated with corruption, which is an outcome covered under 
institutional development. Second, a large part of institutional constraints arise from the absence of institutions (missing 
institutions) rather than from the malfunctioning institutions. This is particularly true in the context Jharkhand confronted with 
the challenge of building apparatus of the new state (state-building). 
12 
1.28. The extent of shortfall in program 
implementation (realized vs. allocation) is still 
considerably higher than the all-India average. 
Comparable state-level data for centrally-
sponsored schemes is shown in Figure 1.10. 
Several Government of India (GoI) evaluations of 
anti-poverty programs indicate that Jharkhand is a 
low performing state with regard to 
implementation effectiveness, often falling below 
national averages, and significantly short of top 
performers like Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan.  
 
1.29. A high rate of premature transfers 
undermines institutional performance because 
managers are neither given the minimum lead 
time to institute reforms, nor are they likely to be held accountable  for such a short tenure. 
A very high rate of transfers persists within the Secretariat: there have been five Chief 
Secretaries and five Director-Generals of Police since November, 2000, pointing to a lack of 
continuity even at the highest levels. More importantly, this transfer culture has percolated to 
field-level administration as well. The average tenure of a deputy commissioner since the 
creation of the state is merely one year and a Superintendent of Police only eleven months 
compared with the norm of three years established by Jharkhand’s transfer policy.24 
1.30. Many important departments have not been established in Jharkhand, while many 
service delivery wings of the government have serious manpower shortages with numerous 
vacant technical positions in districts. To give one example, the state does not have a 
department of economics and statistics (DES), vital to the monitoring of development outcomes. 
Both the finance and the planning departments currently have a severe shortage of technical 
manpower. The same applies to service delivery departments such as agricultural extension, 
education and health.25 In the case of service delivery, public-private partnerships can ease the 
strains on administrative capacity. However, the partnership option is presently somewhat 
limited, given the relatively weak initial NGO presence in the state.26 
1.31. An important “missing institution” in Jharkhand for effective decentralized 
development is the absence of a popularly elected, administratively and fiscally empowered 
PRI institution both for scheduled and non-scheduled areas.  PRI elections have been put on 
hold by a court order because of legal challenges over the state’s reservations policy, thus not 
only aggravating the pre-existing feeling of isolation of previously excluded groups but also 
affecting the institutional performance of development programs on the ground.  As per the 
central Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) law and the 2001 Jharkhand 
24
 On this aspect, see Chapter 2. 
25
 Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 provide greater details of these issues. 
26
 This is already happening in some districts in case of SGSY and SGRY, or in case of social mobilization for agricultural 
programs. While this line of action needs to be advanced further, the scale of NGO operation is presently very limited and that 
too restricted to a few activities such as social mobilization. small-scale agricultural technology, and micro credit. Hence, some of 
the deficiencies in departmental capacities cannot readily be addressed by greater public-private partnership alone, and some 
critical manpower shortage problems in the public sector need to be addressed for improved institutional performance. 
Figure 1. 10: Utilization Rate for Major Anti-
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13 
Panchayati Raj Act, in scheduled areas, the Gram Sabha is to be vested with strong powers, such 
as the right to approve programs and projects (including the overseeing authority over medium 
and micro irrigation, control over minor forest produce, and allocation of small-scale mining 
rights), select beneficiaries, and certify the correct use of funds by the GP in the form of a 
utilization certificate. This is a potentially powerful tool of accelerating development in the state, 
which has remained trapped in the legal imbroglio.27 
1.32. The challenge of administrative governance is also heightened by the presence of 
other factors of natural disadvantage. Relatively low population density, geographic isolation 
of some areas, diverse ethnoscape and no common local language also make governance a more 
acute problem. 
 
Client Satisfaction 
 
1.33. Poor client satisfaction plagues 
most of the economic and social service 
sectors. This may be seen from a range 
of indicators culled out from a recent 
beneficiary survey.28 For economic 
services such as rural roads, only 57 
percent of the respondents rated the 
quality of roads constructed as “good”; 
and 44 percent reported that water supply 
breaks down frequently.29 Only a few 
respondents (4 percent) have reported the 
availability of constructed drainage 
systems, and of those who have such 
access, 44 percent remained dissatisfied 
because of water clogging and water overflows. The primary health sector appears to be very 
precarious with a high level of doctors’ absenteeism: 47 percent of rural respondents reported 
doctors’ absence in the PHC. Client satisfaction indicators tell the same story for rural health 
(Figure 1.11). The reasons for poor client satisfaction include: distance, absenteeism, attitude, 
inadequate provisioning for maintenance, and low local-level participation.  
 
1.34. The factors adversely affecting client satisfaction can be overcome through 
appropriate institutional reform. A striking example is primary education. The sector was 
once characterized by one of the highest incidences of teachers’ absenteeism (43 percent) in the 
world.30 The situation has fast improved since then. Both the User Satisfaction Survey and the 
Baseline Survey carried out in two independent rural samples indicate that primary education is 
27
 Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
28
 The results from the Rural Jharkhand User Satisfaction Survey (RJUSS) carried out in 2005 are used for the purpose of 
illustration. 
29
 The Citizen Report Card Pilot Survey carried out in 2004 also notes the same trend. Reliability of public water sources comes 
across as a major issue; feedback from the majority of respondents using public water sources (72 percent) indicates that the 
water sources supplied by the government are not reliable. Drying up of sources (34 percent) and poor maintenance (27 percent) 
are quoted as the major reasons for the sources being not reliable; a relatively higher proportion (40 percent) quoted poor 
maintenance as a reason for high levels of unreliability (PAF 2004). 
30
 World Bank  (2003); Chaudhury et al (2005). 
Figure 1. 11: Beneficiary Satisfaction with Key Services 
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14 
now mostly satisfactory (Figure 1.11). Around 86 percent respondents send all their children to 
school. Distance is not a major deterrent since almost 77 percent respondents report sending 
children to schools located within one km, while another 15 percent report schools to be located 
within one km and two km. About 57 percent visited their ward’s  
school regularly, with over 95 percent 
reporting parent-teacher interactions when 
they visit. Mid-day meals were provided at 
schools regularly in 75 percent cases, with 
only 6 percent reporting that meals were 
never provided. However, there is further 
scope for institutional improvement. For 
instance, the Village Education Committees 
(VEC) does not seem to be functioning 
effectively, as around 60 percent parents 
were not even aware of the existence of such 
a body.  
 
Insecurity 
 
1.35.  Jharkhand faces unusually high 
micro-risks affecting private investment, 
and everyday security of livelihoods. Two 
indicators -- incidence of extremist violence 
and frequency of bandhs -- can illustrate the 
nature of the problem. The state is susceptible 
to a high level of left-wing extremist political 
violence, as distinguished from a high degree 
of street (or village) level crime rates that 
characterize states such as Bihar. In fact, 
although in terms of incidence of left-wing 
extremist violence it is second to AP, the 
incidence is rising alarmingly (Figure 1.12).  
 
1.36. The impact of a very negative 
“bandh”-culture (strike) arising from the 
fragmented ethno-political situation in the 
state can hardly be over-emphasized. Jharkhand had the highest number of bandhs among all Indian 
states between 2000 and 2005. The estimated annual economic loss to the state due to “Bandhs” 
supported by different political parties is in the range of 3 to 6 percent of GSDP (equivalent to the entire 
fiscal deficit of the state).31 
Corruption 
 
1.37. Corruption appears to be a relatively less important constraint to development in 
Jharkhand compared to Bihar and Orissa. On this measure the state compares favorably 
with the rest of India. The 2006 ICA survey shows that only 26 percent of respondents consider 
31
 Bank staff estimates. 
Figure 1. 12: Left-Wing Extremist Violence in State 
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Figure 1. 13: Share of Households Benefiting from Social 
Protection Schemes  
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15 
corruption to be a major bottleneck to development in Jharkhand compared to 38 percent 
assessed for the rest of India, 62 percent in Orissa and 52 percent in Bihar.32 
1.38. However, for some sectors, like social protection, the question of program leakage 
(however defined) has already become a potential policy concern. Average coverage 
continues to be low despite significant investments in these schemes (about 4 percent in 
2003/04). Many schemes have much lower coverage compared to the rural poor and/or Below 
Poverty Line (BPL) population (Figure 1.13). 
1.39. Even for programs where the 
coverage rate is high there is often larger 
exclusion of the poor compared to the 
rest of India. The Public Distribution 
System (PDS) illustrates the point: a much 
higher proportion of BPL families are not 
able to get ration cards compared to the rest 
of India. Non-availability of the food items 
is another reason for the relative lack of 
participation in the program (Figure 1.14). 
About 75 percent of Fair Price Shop (FPS) 
owners in Jharkhand admitted to having 
paid bribes for lifting commodities from 
godowns, by far the highest of any state.33 
1.40.  In some sectors the extent of leakage, although presently low, can increase in the 
future as the scale of operation expands towards greater population coverage. For instance, 
at first glance, leakage in the power sector with transformation, transmission, and distribution 
(TTD) losses at 26 percent compared to 33 percent for all India looks favorable (Figure 1.15), 
and much lower than that observed for most 
other states. However, as discussed, the per 
capita power consumption is very low 
(nearly half the all-India coverage) and 90 
percent of the rural population remains 
outside the coverage. This indicates that the 
above statistic reflects the currently limited 
coverage of power restricted to urban areas 
only. Once rural power connectivity begins 
to expand, the problem of leakage could 
surface in a major way if an appropriate 
system of power sector governance is not 
put in place (as in the case of other states 
cited above). 
 
1.41. There is widespread perception in 
32
 See Chapter 4 for further details. 
33
 West Bengal was second highest with 60 percent. On these and the broader issue of effectiveness of anti-poverty programs, see 
Chapter 5. 
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Figure 1. 16: Education Status of Working Population 
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Figure 1. 15: System Loss in the Power Sector 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Tamil Nadu Jharkhand Andhra
Pradesh
West Bengal Karnataka Maharashtra Bihar Orissa India
2001-02
2002-03
Source: Indiastat.com 
16 
civil society that corruption in Jharkhand, while considerably lower than Bihar, is a 
growing menace. The 2005 TI-CMS perception survey ranks the state as being 14th among 20 
states in terms of “efficiency and transparency of governance” (Table 1.8). Although the relative 
ranking is better than Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Assam, its position is 
worse than Orissa and another newly created state, Chhattisgarh. 
 
Other Constraints to Growth
Human capital 
 
1.42. Access to human capital is an 
important source of long-term growth. Two 
features are noteworthy. First, distribution of 
education among different segments of 
population for the state as a whole does not 
appear to be very different from the all-India 
pattern (Figure 1.16).  
Second, plausible estimates indicate that returns 
to education are quite modest. At least for rural 
areas, the incremental income enhancing effects 
of attaining different grades of education up to 
the secondary level are quite modest. NSS data 
indicates that the income of those who have 
completed only primary education is 
merely 10 percent higher as 
compared to those who are illiterate, 
while the corresponding effect is 
statistically insignificant as per the 
rural Jharkhand baseline survey.34 
The big jump comes only with the 
attainment of post-secondary (10+) 
education. It is true that for the state 
as a whole the average earning for 
salaried workers (with regular wage 
employment) varies considerably 
with the level of education. In fact, 
for any given level of education an 
average Jharkhandi salaried worker 
earns relatively more than in the case 
of other states (Table 1.9). This 
higher skill premium may not be 
reflective of any serious shortage of educated workers, but rather an expression of intense 
competition for government jobs (i.e. many more aspirants than vacancies), especially under 
conditions of quota and reservation policy for the specific social groups. 
34See Chapter 3. 
Table 1. 8: Efficiency and Transparency of 
Governance 
State 
Composite 
Index Rank 
Kerala 240 1
Himachal Pradesh 301 2
Gujarat 417 3
Andhra Pradesh 421 4
Maharashtra 433 5
Chhattisgarh 445 6
Punjab 459 7
West Bengal 461 8
Orissa 475 9
Uttar Pradesh 491 10 
Delhi 496 11 
Tamil Nadu 509 12 
Haryana 516 13 
Jharkhand 520 14 
Assam 542 15 
Rajasthan 543 16 
Karnataka 576 17 
Madhya Pradesh 584 18 
Jammu & Kashmir 655 19 
Bihar 695 20 
Note: High Score=more corrupt 
Source: TII-CMS Study 2005 
Table 1. 9: Average Nominal Wage Earnings for Salaries 
Workers (15-59) by Level of Education 
 
State Primary Secondary Tertiary Average 
Jharkhand 125.3 162.0 253.3 184.3 
Bihar 69.4 152.4 253.6 184.5 
Orissa 109.8 140.5 189.1 151.4 
West Bengal 91.2 137.9 251.1 169.2 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
70.5 112.4 200.2 136.7 
Tamil Nadu 65.1 117.5 225.6 131.7 
Karnataka 81.3 121.1 216.3 145.7 
Maharashtra 105.3 141.1 240.5 158.6 
Source: Estimated from NSS 55th round, Schedule 10. 
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Financial intermediation 
 
1.43. Lack of demand for credit rather than inadequate access to financial infrastructure 
is probably the key factor underlying the low financial intermediation in the state. As per 
the Reserve Bank of India data (2001), the state has a higher level of per capita commercial bank 
deposits (Rs. 4,866) compared to Bihar (Rs.2,354), Orissa (Rs.3,105), Chhattisgarh (Rs.2,823), 
though lower than West Bengal (Rs.5,874), Tamil  
 
Nadu (Rs.7,658) and Maharashtra 
(Rs.14,802). Poor financial 
intermediation can be seen from the 
low coverage of banking facilities, 
high losses among rural banks 
(indicating poor lending practices), 
and particularly low access to credit 
in rural areas. Not only does the state 
have an insufficient number of bank 
branches per one million of 
population (Figure 1.17), the average 
per capita commercial bank loan is 
lower than that for other advanced 
states35 and the credit-deposit ratio 
has been declining.36 However, these 
indicators may be poor because of the 
low demand for loans in the state in 
the absence of irrigation and other infrastructural investments. 
35
 According to RBI data for 2001,average commercial bank loan per person is only Rs. 122 (in 2000/01 prices) compared to Rs. 
50 in Bihar, Rs.124 in Chhattisgarh, Rs.140 in Orissa, and much lower than in West Bengal (270), 546 in Punjab, and 654 in 
Tamil Nadu. 
36
 Jharkhand Banking Inquiry Committee Report, 2003. 
Figure 1. 17: Number of Bank Branches per 10 Lakh 
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1.44.  This is not to say that the 
credit market is not a constraint; the 
latter may partly explain why 
Jharkhand has the smallest share of 
households with income from non-
agricultural self-employment (Figure 
1.18). However, for industrial 
activities in urban areas the loan/ 
capital (leverage) ratio is 56 percent 
compared with 41 percent for all 
India. Similarly, the cost of the funds, 
interest/ loan ratio, is about 11 
percent compared with an estimated 
14 percent for all India.37 In short, 
lack of demand for loans may be the 
more deep-seated cause of slow 
development of non-agricultural enterprises rather than mere access to credit in the backdrop of 
underdeveloped infrastructure, un-irrigated agriculture, and adverse institutional performance. 
D. How to Make Growth Pro-Poor: Need for Rural Focus 
 
1.45. While there is a rationale for focusing on unlocking Jharkhand’s rural development 
potential, it does not imply retreating from the urban sector. 
 
¾ First, the growth incidence curves 
estimated from the NSS data 
(Figure 1.19) suggest that rural 
growth has been pro-poor, while 
urban growth has been highly dis-
equalizing. Hence, the need for a 
rural focus becomes a compulsion in 
the context of a state like Jharkhand.  
 
¾ Second, high inter-region inequality 
can fuel social conflict and political 
instability. This can be judged by the 
wide variation in the poverty rate by 
district. Thus, poverty head-count varies 
from 85 percent in Pakur, 80 percent in 
Deoghar, 77 percent in Dumka, 74 percent in Palamu to 54-55 percent in Lohardaga and East 
Singhbhum, 43 percent in Ranchi down to 20-21 percent in Dhanbad and Hazaribagh.38 Seen 
from this angle the issue of rural neglect carries with it a certain political urgency, especially in 
the context of a fragile polity. The creation of Jharkhand as a separate state was seen by many as 
a political expression of the self-development aspiration of the tribal and other disadvantaged 
populace who were historically neglected. This suggests the need to focus on making growth pro-
37
 www.indiastat.com 
38
 Preliminary results based on NSS 55th round (Schedule 10). 
Figure 1. 18: Percent Households with Income from Non-
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poor through specific interventions for the inclusion of vulnerable groups. Such a growth process 
is likely to be more sustainable over the medium to long term. 
E. Structure of the Report 
 
1.46. To sum up, weak institutional capacity, poor infrastructural development and lack 
of rural opportunities are the predominant features that characterize Jharkhand’s 
economy and explain its modest development outcomes. For any development strategy to be 
successful in the state, these sets of issues need to be tackled up front. Accordingly, the report is 
organized as follows. Chapter 1 presents macro trends and performance of the Jharkhand 
economy (Sections 1.1 and 1.2) and discusses the key development challenges (Section 1.3). 
This diagnostic exercise leads to the identification of weak institutional capacity and lack of 
infrastructural and rural access as the three factors that are “binding constraints” to growth and 
explain the modest development outcomes in the state. Accordingly, Chapter 2 discusses the 
priority issues within the agenda of building institutional capacity, while Chapter 3 focuses on 
issues that merit consideration within the agenda of improving rural opportunities. Considered 
together they provide the micro-foundations for discussing alternative development paths 
pursued in Chapter 4. Social inclusiveness is an end in itself even if the growth rate is low, 
especially in Jharkhand with its sharp social and regional divide.  The state can achieve higher 
social progress such as basic education and health MDGs even at relatively low levels of income, 
and can improve upon the coverage, targeting and efficiency of the social protection schemes for 
the most needy and vulnerable groups (Sections 5.1 through 5.3).  
20 
Chapter 2: Building Institutions and Improving Performance 
2.1 The centrality of improving institutional capacity of the state to achieve inclusive and 
sustainable growth was highlighted in chapter 1.  While some aspects of institution-building  
(creation of norms and values, efficiency-culture, competitive democratic polity) demand a 
longer time horizon,39 others (creation of new an organizational set-up, rules of business, 
effective system of monitoring and statistical strengthening, public-private partnership, local-
level participation and improved service delivery) can be addressed in the medium term.  In fact, 
certain institutional changes such as those relating to law and order, accountability of public 
administration, and greater involvement of local-level organizations are imperative. To address 
the challenges of institution- building faced by the state, apart from sector-specific governance 
issues, four areas have been identified.  
 
2.2 First, strengthening state finances and linking allocation of resources to improvements in 
the delivery of services is essential for improving human development indicators in the state.  
Second, an efficient and transparent administrative system at all tiers of government is a 
prerequisite for improving service delivery.  Third, the state needs to manage infrastructural 
investments effectively to maximize the growth impact and make it more inclusive.  These are 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4.  And fourth the management and governance of minerals and 
environment assumes heightened importance in a state like Jharkhand, which has a huge mineral 
endowment and large forest cover.  Issues, constraints and diagnostics of these challenges are 
discussed briefly below.  
A. Fiscal and Financial Governance 
 
State’s Fiscal Performance
2.3 There are already some 
disturbing trends in the state’s fiscal 
balances. This is in addition to the pre-
existing structural weaknesses in the 
financial management system that the 
state inherited from Bihar. Since the 
state came into existence in November 
2000, financial figures are available only 
from 2001/02.  The fiscal deficits have 
been rising at an alarming rate (Figure 
2.1).  The state is unlikely to meet most 
of the performance criteria posited by the 
Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) for 
debt relief and may lose out on substantial fiscal receipt on that count. This does not augur well 
as the state faces major challenges in its development strategy, which requires increased public 
sector allocation to infrastructure and human resource development. Thus the need is urgent for 
39
 North (1990). 
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improving resource mobilization, increasing cost effectiveness of expenditure, and rationalizing 
the budgetary processes. 
 
2.4 Except for one year, 2003/04 (when the central elections took place and the model code of 
conduct was in place), fiscal deficits have been rising rapidly in recent years reaching an 
alarming level of 10.1 percent of GSDP in 2005/06 (RE). The biggest increases are evident on 
the expenditure side -- in particular, transfers and capital expenditure -- which may well be in 
line with a desired development strategy but which have not been matched by increases on the 
revenue side.  This is typical of a new state, as observed with other new states, where finances 
are better in the first few years and then deteriorate in the following years as the division of 
assets and liabilities occurs and as new hirings start to take place to fill in gaps in capacity. 
 
2.5 Actual figures show a decline in the fiscal deficit by two percentage points (from 4.2 
percent to 2.2 percent of GSDP) between 2001/02 and 2003/04 (Table 2.1). There was a revenue 
surplus and a primary surplus of 0.6 percent and 0.8 percent of GSDP respectively in 2003/04. 
However, the stock of debt continued to increase from 23 percent to 25.5 percent of GSDP 
during the same period.  The low levels of deficit during this period were largely due to low 
levels of spending, a reflection of the lack of capacity in the government.  This picture changes 
very rapidly from 2004/05, with the fiscal deficit more than doubling from 2.2 percent in 
2003/04 to 5.1 percent in 2004/05. All fiscal indicators show a substantial deterioration with the 
fiscal deficit budgeted at 9.0 percent, revenue deficit at 1.3 percent and primary deficit at 7.6 
percent of GSDP. Debt levels are at 30.8 percent of GSDP in 2005/06. 
 
Table 2. 1: Fiscal Summary of Jharkhand 
(Percent of GSDP) 
State Government 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
Actuals Actuals Actuals Actuals RE BE 
Revenue Receipts 13.7 13.6 14.2 15.2 16.9 18.8 
A. Tax Revenue 9.7 9.5 10.0 10.9 10.6 12.9 
States’ Own Tax 
Revenue 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.5 5.9 5.8 
Share of Central Taxes 4.9 4.6 5.0 5.4 4.6 7.1 
B.  Non-Tax Revenue 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.4 6.4 6.1 
State’s Own Non-Tax 
Revenue 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.9 2.8 
Grants from Center 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.0 3.5 3.3 
Revenue Expenditure 14.7 15.1 13.6 16.0 20.1 20.2 
Salary 6.3 6.5 6.0 6.0 6.7 6.1 
Interest 1.7 3.9 3.0 2.6 1.5 1.4 
Pension 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 
Subsidy 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.1 1.0 0.2 
Transfers 4.8 2.9 2.9 4.8 9.2 10.7 
Operations and Maintenance 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Capital Expenditure (net) 3.2 3.2 2.8 4.3 6.9 7.7 
Revenue Deficit -0.9 -1.6 0.6 -0.8 -3.2 -1.3 
Fiscal Deficit -4.2 -4.7 -2.2 -5.1 -10.1 -9.0 
Primary Deficit -2.4 -0.8 0.8 -2.5 -8.7 -7.6 
Debt 23.0 23.6 25.5 29.6 30.8 36.3 
Total Expenditure 17.9 18.3 16.4 20.3 27.1 27.9 
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Source: Finance Accounts and Budget Documents. 
Note: Rs. 2,234 billion (0.3 percent of total expenditure) of grants-in-aid to local bodies was wrongly classified as 
capital expenditure in 2004-05 in the Finance Accounts. This amount has been reclassified as revenue expenditure in 
this report under transfers. 
 
Revenue Receipts
2.6 Approximately 55 percent of the total revenue receipts are on account of the state’s 
own tax and non-tax revenue collection efforts. This figure remained more or less constant 
from 2001/02 to 2003/04, but declined to 52 percent in 2004/05 and 2005/06 and is estimated to 
decline further to 46 percent in 2006/07.  Total non-tax revenue is likely to increase by 61 
percent in 2005/06 according to the  
revised estimates, with most of the increase 
coming from increased tax through mining and 
doubling of grants from the center.  Being a new 
state, most of the changes introduced in 
commercial taxes focus on providing impetus and 
incentives to different sectors through lower tax 
rates and providing tax rebates to industry and 
exporters.  The abolition of additional tax and 
taxes on several utility items, complete tax rebate 
on 100 percent exports, reduction of entertainment 
tax from 110 percent to 60 percent and increase in 
the limit of gross turnover of sales from one lakh 
to 7 lakh are amongst the changes introduced.  A 
tax rate of 4 percent on mobile handsets and 8 percent on spare parts and accessories of mobile 
handsets has been imposed with effect from September 2005.  The net impact of these changes 
will be known in a year or two as most of these changes are fairly recent. 
 
2.7 Based on a single monitorable indicator, namely, a 5 percent decline in revenue deficit to 
revenue receipts ratio year on year for the five-year period from 2000/01 to 2004/05, the state 
was entitled to an award of Rs. 105.47 crore.  Even though the state did not achieve the target in 
2002/03 and 2004/05, it got the full award from the GoI (Figure 2.2). 
 
Revenue Expenditures
Figure 2. 2: Revenue Deficit/Revenue Receipts 
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2.8 The growth rate of 
expenditures has outstripped that of 
receipts, leading to a worsening of the 
fiscal deficit. After reaching a low of 
13.6 percent in 2003/04, revenue 
expenditure as a percentage of GSDP 
has increased substantially to 20 percent 
of GSDP in 2005/06.  Salaries, pension 
and interest payments accounted for 76 
percent of revenue expenditure in 
2003/04, leaving little head-room for 
other expenditures.  This is expected to 
fall to 44.5 percent in 2006/07.  While 
the proportion of salaries and pensions in GSDP has remained relatively stable,40 interest 
payments, which were high during the period 2002/03 to 2004/05 seem to be stabilizing back to 
the 2001/02 levels.  Subsidies, while low, have fluctuated over time.  Despite the TFC’s 
recommendation to states to start acknowledging their loans to state electricity boards as 
subsidies in the interest of transparency, Jharkhand has not done so as yet.  The proportion of 
transfers has nearly doubled from 4.8 percent of GSDP in 2001/02 to an estimated 9.2 percent of 
GSDP in 2005/06 (Figure 2.3).  This figure is expected to go up further to 10.7 percent of GSDP 
in 2006/07. The operations and maintenance figure has fluctuated between 0.1 percent of GSDP 
in 2003/04 and 0.3 percent of GSDP in 2005/06.  This is a woefully inadequate figure given the 
infrastructure requirements of the state, especially in the light of the new push towards attracting 
capital investment through the various memoranda of understanding (MoUs) that have been 
signed.  
2.9  Salaries have grown rapidly in nominal terms.  The large increase in salary expenditure 
can be attributed to a substantial rise in recruitment since 2002/03.  The state government has 
hired over 6,000 teachers, 2,000 doctors and health workers and 5,000 policemen.  Pending 
promotions, the merging of 50 percent dearness allowance (DA), an increase in house rent 
allowance (HRA) and accumulated salary arrears have contributed to the increased salary bill.  
Even after these appointments, there are several vacancies in the education, health and police 
departments, and if the government continues to fill these, the salary bill can be expected to 
increase further in the coming years.   
 
2.10 In nominal terms, transfers have gone up nearly four times since bifurcation, with large 
increases being registered in 2005/06 and 2006/07 after the state elections.  Transfers increased 
from 4.8 percent of GSDP in 2001/02 to 9.2 percent in 2005/06 and are projected to increase to 
an alarming 10.7 percent of GSDP in 2006/07. Expenditures under this category need to be 
scrutinized and understood in greater depth to enable the government to take corrective measures 
where required as such increases in spending are not sustainable.  Some of these expenditures 
can be attributed to proposed new schemes benefiting mainly the SC/ ST population of 
Jharkhand, such as proposals to issue caste certificates, health cards to all tribal members along 
with other health benefits, provision of jobs to all ST graduates etc. However, these remain 
largely unexplained.  
40
 The Government of Bihar claims that the GoJ is not contributing enough towards the pension liability after the split.  This may 
lead to litigation whereby the GoJ may have to make a large one-time settlement in the future. 
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Capital Expenditure
2.11 Capital expenditure is expected to nearly double in two years as a result of planned 
investments in infrastructure. Jharkhand’s capital expenditure has increased from 2.8 percent 
of GSDP in 2003/04 to 4.3 percent in 2004/05 (Figure 2.4).  It is further expected to increase to 
an estimated 7.7 percent of GSDP by 2006/07 according to budget estimates.  Within capital 
expenditure, the share of social services has increased by 5 percent since 2001/02 with the 
increase going to the education, health and urban development sectors.  The decline in economic 
services is mainly on account of decline in allocations to the rural development sector (which 
had huge unspent balances in 2003/04, due to lack of good projects or proposals) and irrigation. 
 
Figure 2. 4: Composition of Capital Expenditure 
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Debt Management
25 
2.12 The public debt of 
Jharkhand consists of: (i) 
internal debt, that is, 
domestic market borrowings 
from banks and financial 
institutions as well as the 
special securities issued to 
the National Small Savings 
Fund (NSSF) of the central 
government; (ii) loans from 
the central government; and 
(iii) National Small Savings 
collection in the state given 
by GoI as loans and 
provident funds.   The 
composition of public debt 
of the state is given in Table 
2.2. At the time of the 
bifurcation of Bihar into Bihar and Jharkhand, the debt stock of the undivided state was divided 
on the basis of population.  Certain items such as insurance and pension funds remain undivided 
and contested by the two states. As a result Jharkhand, which had a smaller population, inherited 
smaller debt stock relative to its GSDP (23 percent) as compared to post-bifurcation Bihar (61.9 
percent).  
 
2.13 Overall, the debt stock is expected to reach 35 percent of GSDP by 2006/07. Internal debt 
has grown rapidly since bifurcation and is expected to reach nearly 30 percent of GSDP in 
2006/07.  Within internal debt, market borrowings and the special securities issued to the NSSF 
are the major components, while loans from financial institutions are minimal.  
 
2.14 Loans from the central government, which were market loans raised by the GoI at the 
prevailing interest rates and on-lent to the states at higher rates, have declined since bifurcation. 
Based on the TFC’s recommendation, already accepted by the GoI, the central government will 
no longer provide loans to the states and thus with repayments, this component will decline 
further.  
 
2.15 The third group of debt, namely, small savings, provident funds etc., comprises mainly of 
the provident fund of government servants and balances under the state government employee’s 
group insurance scheme and is marginal.   The apportionment of the balance of the latter as on 
November 14, 2000, that is, immediately prior to bifurcation, between Jharkhand and Bihar, 
remains to be done.  
 
2.16 The division of assets and liabilities between the two states, including guarantees, is an 
outstanding issue, disputed at various levels in different sectors.  At the time of bifurcation, the 
division was to be on the basis of a population proportion of 75:25.  However, this ratio was 
often contested in the Supreme Court and alternate arrangements made.  Hence, some of the 
contested liabilities such as the State Transport Corporation (STC) and power losses are not on 
the books of the state government as yet.  Once settled, this settlement may impact the financial 
Table 2. 2: Public Debt of Jharkhand: Stock and Composition 
(in Rs. billion and as a percent of GSDP) 
 
2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
RE BE 
Debt Stock 
75.2 
(23.0) 
86.0 
(23.6) 
101.4 
(25.5) 
129.2 
(29.6) 
146.4 
(30.2) 
188.9 
(35.1) 
Internal 
Debt 
35.3 
(10.8) 
48.8 
(13.4) 
67.3 
(16.9) 
96.5 
(22.1) 
115.2 
(23.8) 
160.3 
(29.8) 
Loans from 
the Center 
40.1 
(12.3) 
35.6 
(9.8) 
31.5 
(7.9) 
29.9 
(6.8) 
28.4 
(5.9) 
25.8 
(4.8) 
Small 
Savings, 
Provident 
Funds, etc. 
-0.2* 
(-0.1) 
1.6 
(0.4) 
2.6 
(0.7) 
2.8 
(0.6) 
2.8 
(0.6) 
2.8 
(0.5) 
Source: Finance Accounts and Budget Documents.  
Note: RE – Revised Estimates; BE – Budget Estimates; Numbers in parenthesis are 
percent of GSDP. 
*: Negative balance is due to non-allocation of balance for insurance and pension 
funds component between Bihar and Jharkhand on bifurcation. 
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position of the state either way.  Actual fiscal outcomes year on year will be subject to one- time 
shocks of settlement till such time that this division is completed.   
 
2.17 The central government formulated the debt swap scheme for state governments in 
2002/03, wherein the participating states were allowed to raise additional market borrowing to 
repay high-cost block loans to the central government.  The GoJ took advantage of this in all 
three years: 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05.41 
2.18 The Eleventh Finance Commission had defined a state to be “debt stressed” if the ratio of 
its interest payments to revenue receipts exceeds 20 percent while the TFC has recommended 
reducing this ratio further to 15 percent.  Interest payments were made on an ad hoc basis in the 
first few years after bifurcation and only stabilized later.  Interest payments as a percentage of 
revenue receipts were at a high of 28.7 percent in 2002/03 and have declined steadily since then; 
they are expected to be as low as 7.7 percent in 2006/07.  
Twelfth Finance Commission Award: Implications for the State
2.19 According to the 
TFC award, Jharkhand’s 
share in the pool of taxes is 
3.36 percent (excluding 
service tax) and 3.4 
percent for service tax.  
This is slightly higher than 
what had been decided 
under the Eleventh 
Finance Commission 
award wherein Jharkhand 
was given 3 percent of the 
14.6 percent for undivided 
Bihar.  The total grants-in-aid to be received by the state over the next five years are shown in 
Table 2.3. 
 
2.20 Apart from taxes and grants-in-aid, a major incentive to all states is linked to the passing 
of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA).  On enactment of the 
FRBMA, Jharkhand will get debt relief of Rs.659.43 crore on account of rescheduling of loans 
(contracted before March 2004 and outstanding as of March 2005) at a lower rate of interest of 
7.5 percent per annum.  Of this Rs. 205 crore is on account of lower principal repayment and Rs. 
454.5 crore on account of lower interest payments.  
 
41
 In 2002/03, two state development loans (SDLs), totaling Rs.2.05 billion with 6.75 percent interest and repayable in 2013, 
were raised and the proceeds were allocated towards repayment of block loans bearing higher interest. Also further repayment of 
Rs.1.16 billion was made under the debt swap scheme in 2002/03. In 2003/04, SDLs totaling Rs.4.23 billion at 5.9 percent 
interest and repayable in 2017 were raised for repaying block loans and also a further Rs.2.56 billion of block loans were repaid. 
In 2004/05 SDLs totaling Rs.2.28 billion bearing average interest at 6.03 percent and repayable in 2014 were raised to repay 
block loans and also further repayment of block loans of Rs.2.47 billion was made. 
Table 2. 3: Grants-in-Aid on the Recommendation of the Twelfth Finance 
Commission 
 (Rs. billion) 
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 Total 
Total 1.71 4.15 4.34 4.54 4.77 19.51 
Non-Plan      
Grants 1.65 3.24 3.43 3.63 3.86 15.81 
Plan Grants 0.06 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 3.70 
Grants to 
Local Bodies 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 5.80 
Panchayats 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 4.82 
Municipalities 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.98 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report. 
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2.21 While the FRBMA has been drafted, it has not yet been passed. Although, the state 
government intended to pass the act during the budget session before the close of the financial 
year 2005/06, political developments led to a state of “sine die” which means that the state 
assembly was neither in session nor adjourned immediately prior to the end of the financial year.  
Therefore, the FRBMA could neither be passed as an Act in the assembly nor through an 
ordinance since the house was not adjourned.  Since the FRBMA will now technically be passed 
in 2006/07, this raises the question of whether the state will be entitled to the interest relief of Rs. 
103 crore for 2005/06. The state may either get the award for two years together or it may lose 
the first year’s award.  Further, the state is unlikely to benefit from the TFC’s debt waiver linked 
to the reduction of revenue deficit (Box 2.1). 
 
Box 2. 1: Will Jharkhand Miss the Boat on TFC’s Debt Waiver?  
 
According to the GoI’s scheme, repayments that are due to central loans from 2005/06 to 2009/10 will be eligible 
for write-off, linked to an absolute amount by which the revenue deficit is reduced year on year from the base level.  
The base level has been taken as the average of revenue deficit for the state from 2001/02 to 2003/04.  This poses a 
major problem for Jharkhand whose base level is very low as the state had a revenue surplus in 2003/04.  According 
to the debt relief formula, Jharkhand is entitled to a debt write-off of Rs. 2.69 for every rupee of reduction of 
revenue deficit, provided the revenue deficit is below the baseline (-2.45 billion) and fiscal deficit is below the level 
in 2004/05 (5.1 percent of GSDP).  Actual figures for 2004/05 show a deterioration of revenue deficit (-3.38 billion) 
from the base level (-2.45 billion).  Therefore the state does not qualify for performance-based debt waiver for 
2004/05.  Revised estimates for 2005/06 show a worsening of the revenue deficit to -15.53 billion.  However, the 
final figure is likely to be much better as this figure does not factor in the FRBMA award and the increased share of 
the state in central taxes.  In order to qualify for the TFC debt relief award in future years, Jharkhand needs to follow 
the fiscal path given in Table 2.4. 
2.22 A reduction in 
revenue deficit from -
1.3 percent to zero in 
two years and a 6 per 
cent correction in fiscal 
deficit may be very 
difficult for the state.  
Even with such a steep 
correction, it is not 
clear whether or not the 
state will meet the 
“consistent 
performance” criteria 
laid out by the TFC.     
 
2.23 The state seems 
to be well on its way to 
meeting the other two 
criteria suggested by 
the TFC, namely 
reducing the ratio of 
interest payments to 
Table 2. 4: Fiscal Correction Path Required to Meet the Targets set by Twelfth 
Finance Commission 
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Baseline 
(as per 
TFC) Actuals RE BE Projected Target 
Revenue 
Deficit (Rs. 
billion) -2.45 -3.38 -15.53 -7.13 -2.4 0
Revenue 
Deficit (% 
GSDP) -0.8 -3.2 -1.3 -0.4 0
Fiscal Deficit 
(Rs. billion) -22.18 -49.18 -48.65 -30.47 -19.9 
Fiscal Deficit 
(% GSDP) -5.1 -5.1 -10.1 -9.0 -5.1 -3.0 
GSDP 436.87 484.93 538.27 597.48 663.2 
Source: Finance Accounts and Budget Documents and staff estimates. 
Notes: 
(i) GSDP estimates for 2004/05 from CSO, others calculated using 11 percent nominal 
growth rate suggested by the Twelfth Finance Commission. 
(ii) In order to fulfill the condition that cumulative reduction in revenue deficit must 
exceed the cumulative interest relief, there must be a revenue surplus of Rs. 0.64 
billion in 2007/08 and Rs. 1.42 billion in 2008/09 (assuming that the state receives 
interest relief for 2005/06).
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revenue receipts below 15 per cent and containing the salary bill as a proportion of revenue 
expenditure less interest and pensions to 35 percent by 2008/09.  
 
Measures for Expenditure Control
2.24 Huge expenditures without commensurate increase in revenues are responsible for rising fiscal 
deficits in the state.  While large increases in expenditures on infrastructure and social development of the 
underprivileged groups in the state are warranted, it is important to ensure that these are within the 
absorptive capacity of the state. A good monitoring mechanism needs to be put in place to ensure that 
there are no leakages in the system. The consolidation of schemes will help cut down administrative costs.  
Some common expenditure control measures for consideration include: (i) restrictions on the creation of 
new posts; (ii) rationalizing of existing posts; and (iii) ceiling on contingent liabilities.   
 
2.25 Improving public procurement should also play an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of 
public spending while at the same time reducing unproductive expenditure. The existing mechanisms by 
which the state purchases goods, works, and services from the private sector are confusing as well as 
inefficient. The relatively poor functioning of the procurement system is especially worrying given the 
vast increase in procurement that is planned during the coming years with the expected doubling of 
investment spending. Experience from other countries, as well as other states in India, suggest that it is 
possible to improve the quality of spending while reducing the cost of procurement by 20-40 percent by 
simplifying rules, adopting standard procedures that incorporate the use of electronic procurement, and 
increasing supervision and monitoring of procurement practices and outcomes. These actions, combined 
with a training program to boost the skills and expertise of officials involved in executing and overseeing 
procurement, could make a major contribution to improving the quality of spending and achieving the 
fiscal responsibility targets. 
 
Measures for Additional Resource Mobilization
2.26 Together with expenditure control some additional resource mobilization measures can be adopted 
to put the state finances back on track.  While the tax cuts that the state has introduced for additional 
investment and income generation may eventually lead to higher tax collection, it cannot be taken for 
granted.  It is advisable to review these tax cuts carefully and retain only those that prove their intended 
efficacy.  Other resource mobilization measures are noted below. 
 
2.27 First, there is considerable scope for enhancing resource mobilization through better tax 
administration and compliance.  The GoJ has taken the first step in this direction through its 
decision to implement the value added tax (VAT) in the state from April 2006.  The Jharkhand 
VAT Bill, 2005 has been approved by the governor and the assembly.  Sixty-two items have 
been listed under the tax-exempt category under the VAT system, of which nine were selected on 
the basis of local or social importance.  The state has taken a number of steps to prepare for 
implementation of VAT, including training of officers and the launch of public awareness 
campaigns covering all major trade unions, chambers of commerce and industry organizations 
which will focus on the rules, laws etc. of VAT.  While this is expected to lead to an increase in 
tax revenues, a clearer picture of the impact of VAT will emerge only by end-2006 depending on 
how well it is administered.   
 
2.28 Second, the GoJ is likely to benefit from enhanced mineral revenues if the central 
government accepts the TFC’s recommendation that mineral royalties to states should be on an 
ad valorem basis.  The initial benefits of this change will depend on the rate at which the royalty 
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is fixed, but over the medium to long run, revenues will go up as prices of metals and minerals, 
especially coal and iron ore, are expected to increase. 
 
2.29 Third, the state should make every effort to get the full benefit of the TFC award 
(discussed above), including passing the FRBMA. 
 
2.30 Fourth, the state should endeavor to get maximum benefit from central schemes targeted 
at underprivileged communities, of which Jharkhand has a large share. 
 
2.31 Fifth, given the high level of poverty, the state could seek support of international donor 
agencies for grant funds for capacity building and put in place an appropriate incentive structure 
to involve the private sector (including NGOs) in funding the infrastructure and social 
development programs in the state. 
Capacity Building for Budget Planning and Execution
2.32 In order to better manage its finances, and enhance accountability and transparency in spending, 
the GoJ needs to focus on the budgeting process. At present, the budget does not reflect a realistic picture 
of the financial position of the state. A lower fiscal deficit and a revenue and primary surplus in 2003/04 
is not reflective of better fiscal management but huge savings of Rs. 3495 crore, of which nearly 50 per 
cent occurred in two departments -- education and rural development -- both of which are priority sectors 
for the government. While the overall level of debt is known, other disclosures such as large outstanding 
pension liabilities and contingent liabilities (committed contracts, guarantees, bad debts etc.) are not 
known.  
 
2.33 The government needs to prepare a medium-term expenditure plan and place its annual budget 
preparation within the context of this plan.  This plan should be prepared in consultation with the line 
departments and be consistent with resource mobilization efforts to ensure fiscal discipline in the medium 
to long term.  Other immediate steps include drawing up of a “Medium-Term Fiscal Reforms Program” 
incorporating incentives outlined in the TFC award. 
 
2.34 The state has taken some initial steps for enhancing financial discipline such as: (i) revision of 
budget construction and allocation procedures to facilitate intensive scrutiny and speed up budget 
execution; (ii) speedy financial approvals; and (iii) a cut in non-plan expenditure. Going forward, the state 
could consider the creation of a finance and accounts cadre that would help meet the requirements in 
specialized departments such as treasuries, the budget division and the internal audit division and would 
enable heads of departments (HoDs) to take the right decisions for better financial management of the 
state’s resources. The state needs to build capacity in the finance department and modernize its treasury 
functions along the lines of states like Karnataka. 
 
2.35 A progressive finance department would like to follow a process of realistic budgeting, which 
involves line departments and reflects policy objectives. This would eventually lead to performance- 
based budgeting. This needs to be backed by a strong internal audit function, which could be outsourced 
to professional audit firms as is being done by some states like AP and Karnataka. 
B. Administrative and Local Governance 
2.36 Jharkhand faces serious challenges in the area of governance stemming from the lack of 
political stability and an inefficient administrative system. The first challenge is to evolve a political 
consensus involving Jharkhand’s disparate parties and factions on key reform issues.  The second is to 
30 
improve the efficacy of the civil service by: (i) rationalizing departments and schemes; (ii) curbing 
premature transfers; (iii) improving performance and career management; and (iv) strengthening the 
presence and quality of block administration.  The third is to encourage more accountability and 
transparency at all levels through greater use of e-governance, full implementation of the right to 
information legislation, and decentralization. Political decentralization will have to be complemented by 
administrative and fiscal measures to devolve real power and resources to PRIs.  A fourth challenge is to 
establish genuine rule of law, which means curbing organized mafias and enforcing the law universally. 
The government should work closely with Jharkhand’s many civil society groups to achieve these ends 
not only through consultation, but also by using their skills.  This will help to implement programs better, 
train PRI representatives after elections, and conduct the evaluation of public services. 
 
Political Governance
2.37 The fact that none of the major parties has a secure majority has allowed small parties and 
independents to control the balance of power. The risks of this delicately poised political situation are 
obvious: policy incoherence, political gridlock, and uncertainty. Clearly, there is a pressing need to 
develop political consensus on key issues important to Jharkhand’s development. One symptom of the 
lack of political consensus is the growing activism of the judiciary in responding to governance 
challenges. Since the creation of Jharkhand, the courts have issued rulings – in response to public interest 
litigation – ordering the state to take action on a variety of fronts including: (i) holding Panchayati Raj 
elections; (ii) unbundling the Jharkhand State Electricity Board (JSEB); (iii) implementing a cooked mid-
day meal program in schools; (iv) curbing leakages in the PDS; and (v) hiring doctors and para-medics on 
contract to fill vacancies. 
 
Administrative Governance
2.38 Jharkhand’s civil service continues to use procedures and systems inherited from Bihar. 
The revision of old manuals could be used to rationalize the structure of departments. 
Jharkhand’s Rules of Executive Business provide for 40 departments; yet Jharkhand has only 12 
ministers. This provides an opportunity to cluster departments in ways that improve functional 
efficiency with a minister and principal secretary responsible for each cluster. Manuals could be 
revised to accommodate the greater use of information technology, and secrecy provisions recast 
to ensure consistency with the recently passed Freedom of Information Act (2005). 
 
2.39 There are ways to tackle the problem of frequent premature transfers that undermine 
service delivery. At lower levels of the civil service, particularly Grade III teacher positions, 
some states, such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, have experimented successfully with 
computerized transfer processes. At higher levels of the system, interference in transfers can be 
curbed by creating a statutory civil services board, an idea endorsed by the Chief Secretaries 
conference as early as 1996 to screen transfer requests. The government would have to furnish 
reasons for transferring an officer prematurely and the Board would have the right to refuse such 
requests. A computerized database could be established to track transfers over time, as Karnataka 
has already done, to monitor compliance with a three-year average tenure norm. Quantitative 
caps can be imposed to limit transfers: Karnataka, for example, has placed a cap of 5 percent of 
total civil service strength on annual transfers. 
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2.40 The government has an option to move towards a merit-based civil service, possibly 
starting with an improved performance management system of Grade I and Grade II officers 
first.  Results expected could be specified at the beginning of the year. Officers could be graded 
on the basis of their ability to achieve these results in Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). 
Negative ACRs can then be used to weed out non-performers through compulsory retirement.  
Promotions would then reflect prior performance rather than being the outcome of serving time.  
At the same time, the government should resist the temptation to create new posts to 
accommodate demands for promotion. The government might consider new pay policies to link 
performance and merit-based salary increases more clearly. 
 
2.41 A zero-based review of all schemes will help to screen out schemes of marginal value, 
curtail unproductive expenditure and make monitoring more effective. For instance, the welfare 
department has approximately 120 schemes operating simultaneously, each receiving little 
attention, with a large proportion of expenditure devoted to salaries and establishment costs.  
Deputationists running welfare department schemes, for example, are less amenable to 
departmental control and often hold additional charges, resulting in a low attention span.  
Scheme administrators also complain of frequent transfers in programs, such as SSA.  At another 
level, the problem reflects a growing vacuum in governance, particularly at the block level. 
Officials, citing insurgency problems, no longer reside in many blocks, visit block offices 
infrequently, and do not travel within their blocks regularly.  
 
2.42 There are serious concerns about leakages. In the PDS, the Supreme Court’s adviser in 
Jharkhand states that the diversion of foodgrains intended for the very poor under the Antyodaya 
Scheme is in the range of 40 percent to 50 percent. It is not clear how accurate the beneficiary 
lists are for most schemes. In the absence of strong PRIs, beneficiary lists are known to have 
been influenced by powerful locals at the expense of the needy.  Several projects have 
experienced corruption in the process of tendering and procurement. Most schemes also lack an 
independent monitoring mechanism. 
2.43 The GoJ has introduced some reforms, including streamlining the approval process, 
selective procurement procedures and third party inspections for a few schemes.  The process of 
securing Cabinet approval for schemes has been streamlined, allowing for expenditure 
immediately after approval by the Cabinet and the State Assembly.  The women and child 
department has revamped the procurement process for nutritional supplements by asking 
women’s self-help groups (mahila mandals) to supply good-quality food from local markets, and 
allowing elected anganwadi workers to procure food from the block or district headquarters as 
well.  With respect to third-party monitoring, the Xavier Institute for Social Sciences (XISS) is 
currently conducting a review of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), while the 
Xavier Labor Relations Institute (XLRI) is doing one for SSA at the request of the central 
government.  Finally, the inspection regime requires reinvigoration.  Senior government officials 
need to visit their districts and blocks regularly. An energetic inspection regime can play a role in 
curbing corruption in schemes in the state’s 211 blocks; the regular presence of government 
officials will fill the administrative vacuum currently exploited by extremists in some blocks. 
 
Enhancing Accountability and Transparency
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2.44 A multi-pronged anti-corruption strategy with preventive and enforcement measures to 
discourage corruption at all levels will send a signal that the government is serious about tackling 
the problem. Such a strategy should be based on extensive consultation with civil society and 
industry.  Orissa has done well in framing a credible anti-corruption strategy and surveys 
indicate that the re-election of the NDA in Orissa was at least partly due to the government’s 
relatively clean image.  
 
Preventive strategies to reduce corruption and strengthen accountability 
 
¾ E-governance combined with business process re-engineering to simplify transactions 
and make them more transparent can play a vital role in reducing opportunities for 
corruption. The computerization of land records in Karnataka, E-sewa centers in Andhra 
Pradesh and the introduction of computerized file monitoring in the Karnataka Secretariat are 
examples of successful e-governance initiatives.  The application of e-governance, along 
with business process changes, such as banning the use of stamp paper, placing guideline 
values on the internet and creating model deeds, have improved the registration department 
in Maharashtra.  
 Jharkhand could consider applying IT solutions to agencies with an extensive public 
interface, particularly the provision of land records, the development of urban and rural 
single-point delivery kiosks (using wireless technology when necessary), and the creation of 
information systems to centrally monitor schemes and the provision of other services.  
Experience from other states shows that e-governance solutions work best when a mix of 
factors prevail, particularly tenurial stability for administrators supervising the project, line 
department ownership, and high-level political support.  A public-private partnership model 
usually works better than in-house efforts by bridging gaps in technical capacity and funding 
as well as injecting new management skills that might not be readily available in 
government.  User fees retained by providers may be necessary to ensure the long-run 
sustainability of such initiatives.  
¾ Access to information can be a powerful tool to demand accountability in government 
programs, especially at the grass-roots level. In Rajasthan, the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti 
Sangathan (MKSS) sought to uncover corruption in local public works by securing 
employment rolls, vouchers, beneficiary lists, and completion and utilization certificates.  
These were turned over to villagers for scrutiny at open public hearings called Jan Sunwais 
in the presence of the media and a panel of eminent persons.  The key irregularities that 
emerged in public hearings were (i) hiring ghost-workers and pocketing the proceeds at the 
expense of real workers; (ii) paying for work not completed or not done at all; (iii) false bills 
and vouchers; (iv) the use of inferior materials for constructing local roads or public 
buildings; and (v) manipulating beneficiary lists for social programs.  In Delhi, Parivartan 
used Delhi’s Right to Information (RTI) law to expose corruption in the state’s PDS by 
insisting on access to stock registers for comparison with household usage.  The GoI has 
recently passed a forceful Freedom of Information (FoI) Act that applies to all state 
governments as well.  This new law needs to be aggressively implemented and publicized in 
Jharkhand to improve accountability at the grass-roots level. Citizens’ charters based on wide 
consultation could be introduced in major public agencies. 
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¾ Decentralization in Jharkhand, can not only reinforce local-level accountability 
mechanisms, but open up new spaces for participation for groups hitherto excluded 
from the system. Decentralization is a powerful tool for enforcing accountability if 
panchayats are empowered administratively and fiscally.  In MP, for example, the state 
government’s decision to place teachers under the supervision of GPs has reduced 
absenteeism to only 17 percent compared to 39 percent in Jharkhand in 2004 (World Bank, 
2005).  The GPs in MP were empowered with the capacity to recruit local teachers, authorize 
and withhold salary payments, and remove teachers in the event of non-performance. 
Madhya Pradesh now has the third lowest rate of teacher absenteeism in India after 
Maharashtra and Gujarat, despite being a low-income state like Jharkhand.  
 
2.45 Jharkhand announced elections for PRIs, beginning September 26, 2005.  The fact that 
this decision was made under pressure from NGOs and the High Court indicates that, unlike in 
MP, Jharkhand lacks strong political support for decentralization.  Now that elections have been 
put on hold by a court order because of legal challenges over the state’s reservations policy, there 
is a danger that elements opposed to holding these elections could seek to delay them 
indefinitely.  If elections are delayed for a long period, Jharkhand will lose a crucial opportunity 
to improve the quality of governance where it counts -- at the local level and in the countryside.  
The key priority is therefore holding elections as quickly as possible. 
 
2.46 When elections are held, a staggering 50,375 representatives will be chosen, including 
13,894 women from a ST, SC, or Other Backward Class (OBC) background.  In scheduled areas, 
the gram sabha will be vested with strong powers including the right to approve programs and 
projects, select beneficiaries, and certify the correct use of funds by the GP in the form of a 
utilization certificate, as per both PESA and the 2001 Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act.  Some 
activists have asked, and with good reason, why these powers specific to scheduled areas cannot 
be extended to all gram sabhas across the state.  Yet, in other ways, the Jharkhand Act does not 
fully implement the provisions of the PESA Act.  If the central PESA Act grants the gram sabha 
and panchayat “ownership” of minor forest produce, the Jharkhand Act vests panachayats with 
the right to “manage, collect, store, and market” minor forest produce, but not own it.  If the 
central PESA Act allows the gram sabha and panchayat the right to prevent land alienation, the 
Jharkhand Act only allows the zilla parishad (ZP) the right to restore land alienated unlawfully.  
Finally, the central PESA Act makes it obligatory for state officials to consult the gram sabha or 
panchayat before granting leases for minor minerals and acquiring land for development 
projects; neither of these provisions finds mention in the Jharkhand Act.  These inconsistencies 
are likely to breed more court battles once PRIs begin to function in the state.42 
2.47 In order to promote the effective functioning of PRIs,  beyond holding elections, the GoJ 
should consider the following steps:  
 
¾ Amending the existing state legislation in different areas that contradicts either the central 
PESA Act or the Jharkhand Panchayati Raj 2001 Act, and within the two acts, to ensure 
compatibility. 
42
 For a discussion of these issues, see PRIA (2004); Ekka (2003); Menon and Sinha (2003). See also, Government of Jharkhand, 
Law Department, Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2001 (Ranchi: Government of Jharkhand, 2005). 
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¾ Clarify the powers of different tiers of the PRI system through an activity mapping exercise 
involving critical line departments, elected PRI representatives, and NGOs.  Jharkhand 
should seriously consider placing teachers, para-medics, and doctors at the Public Health 
Center (PHC) level under the direct control of PRIs with the power to recruit, monitor, and 
remove such staff.  Jharkhand could begin the process by placing 60,000 contract teachers 
and 1,600 contract doctors under PRI control.  
¾ A recent survey by the Indian Social Institute reveals widespread ignorance of the powers of 
panchayats and gram sabhas conferred by the central PESA Act across villages.  The GoJ 
should take action to publicize these powers through training sessions with elected 
representatives, district-level officials, and NGOs, as well as the print and electronic media, 
to equip them to function within the new system. 
¾ The financial basis of the emerging PRI system in Jharkhand remains unclear.  The State 
Finance Commission has begun its work, but currently has only one chairperson and no 
members in harness.   
 
Box 2. 2: Whither Panchayati Raj Elections in Jharkhand? The Legal Imbroglio 
The path leading up to the notification of PRI elections – and the subsequent reversal of the decision to hold them – 
was beset with controversy.  Some tribal interests argued that the Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act (2001) was not fully 
consistent with the central PESA Act designed to extend the 73rd constitutional amendment to scheduled areas, while 
some non-tribal interests objected to elections on the ground that 667 panchayats notified as part of the scheduled 
areas were fewer than 40 percent tribal in population, but subject to tribal reservations as stipulated by the PESA 
law.  Others complained that the Jharkhand 2001 Act had been poorly drafted in the absence of adequate public 
consultation.  In the end the High Court - responding to several public interest litigation suits - blocked the holding 
of PRI elections scheduled to begin on September 26, 2005 because of concerns over the state’s reservations policies 
including:  
(a) The decision of the state government to allow  80 percent reservation of seats for election to the GP in 
scheduled areas to accommodate not just members of scheduled tribes (entitled to 50 percent of all seats under the 
PESA law), but those belonging to SCs and OBCs as well.  The High Court ordered that under the law, reservations 
could cover no more than 50 percent of all seats, as per Supreme Court directives. 
(b) The failure of the Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act (2001) to reserve one-third of all chairperson positions in 
panchayats at the village, block, and district levels for women in general and scheduled areas.  The Act allows for a 
reservation of 50 percent of these posts for members of STs in scheduled areas, but not specifically for women STs.   
In general areas, chairperson posts are open to all under the State Act. 
(c) The High Court’s decision to strike down a provision of the central PESA Act allowing for the reservation of 
all chairperson posts in scheduled areas for ST members on the ground that this violated Article 14 of the 
Constitution, which guarantees citizens equal protection under the law.   
The root cause of the controversy is the fact that Jharkhand’s tribal population is spread out over several districts, 
rather than concentrated in a few, creating the anomalous situation of several areas officially classified as scheduled 
with only a minority tribal population.  De-scheduling these areas is likely to be a highly contentious and time-
consuming process requiring presidential assent.  The High Court’s ruling has now been challenged in the Supreme 
Court; in the meantime, however, the government decided to cancel the decision to hold elections indefinitely, 
despite the High Court’s order asking the government to show compliance with its ruling and hold elections by 
October 31, 2005.   
Enforcement strategies to reduce corruption and strengthen accountability 
 
¾ Strengthening the Rule of Law. Jharkhand, like many other states, has faced serious threats 
to the rule of law in various ways.  One reason for this is the protection afforded by certain 
political figures to local mafias centered around the state’s rich mineral, forestry, and land 
resources, making it more difficult for the police to take action.  A few well-publicized 
actions to enforce the law would send a strong signal that the government is serious about 
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doing so.  Reinforcing the operational autonomy of the state’s police force is therefore a key 
element in the strategy to ensure the rule of law.  The National Police Commission 
recommends several useful steps to enable the police to function in a more autonomous and 
professional fashion, including: 
 
o The creation of an independent state police commission to: (i) establish clear guidelines 
for the functioning of the police; (ii) provide a forum for appeals against arbitrary 
decisions; and (iii) review the performance of the police through an annual report placed 
before the state assembly, for example. 
 
o The Director General of Police in a state should be selected only on the basis of objective 
criteria possibly through the Union Public Services Commission (UPSC) and given a 
fixed tenure of three years by law. 
 
o Appeals to the State Police Commission should be possible against mala-fide transfer or 
suspension orders.  The authorities vested with the right to issue such orders should be 
clearly specified in the state’s transfer policy. 
 
The persistence of insurgency in several parts of the state also poses a danger to the rule of 
law and underlines the importance of developing a coherent strategy for tackling such issues. 
This includes: (i) greater political decentralization to absorb forces currently operating 
outside the formal political system; (ii) cracking down on corruption in government schemes 
and programs that hurt the poor the most; and (iii) bolstering administration in the state’s 
taluqs.   
 
¾ Staffing and providing operational strength to the Lok Ayukta.  While Jharkhand has 
established an office of the Lok Ayukta (ombudsman) to provide an independent vehicle to 
combat high-level corruption, the office has yet to begin functioning properly.  The 
Jharkhand Lok Ayukta Act allows the Lok Ayukta to investigate and recommend action in 
cases involving both corruption and public grievances.  The Lok Ayukta can take suo-moto 
cognizance of such cases even without the filing of a formal complaint on the basis of media 
reports.   Yet, the absence of investigating staff means that the Lok Ayukta has to depend on 
the government-controlled vigilance department to conduct investigations often at its own 
pace.  The Lok Ayukta also claims that the government is slow to respond to their reports and 
has not cooperated fully in investigations involving officers of the Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS).  There is no website to inform the public about the powers of the Lok Ayukta 
or the procedures for filing complaints, as is the case in Karnataka. 
 
¾ Enhancing the effectiveness of the vigilance department. The vigilance department 
operating under the Prevention of Corruption Act (1988) is responsible for pursuing 
corruption cases against officials.  As a government agency, it cannot pursue investigations 
against senior officials or prosecute them without permission from the Chief Minister.  This 
is an important structural weakness not unique to Jharkhand: the freedom to pursue 
investigations is a key element in strengthening institutional capacity to combat corruption.  
The vigilance department has also been short of investigative staff but progress has recently 
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been made in filling vacancies, particularly at the level of deputy superintendents of police 
(DSPs).   
 
The government intends to amend the Vigilance Bureau Manual to set time limits for 
completing early investigations.  It may be useful for the government to set time limits, as it 
has on many occasions in the past, for the completion of departmental inquiries as well as 
monitor compliance closely.  Of the 680 departmental inquiries initiated since the creation of 
the state in 2000, approximately 60 percent are still pending.   Government orders that date 
back to the 1950s assign a maximum time of three to four months to complete an inquiry and 
impose either a minor or major penalty after appeals.43 Officers leading inquiries should as a 
rule always be senior to the officer under inquiry and not hold other responsibilities that 
render them incapable of conducting swift disciplinary proceedings.   
 
Both the vigilance department and the Lok Ayukta’s office could profitably turn their 
energies to focusing on corruption and grievances in government programs and schemes as 
well as service delivery.  Such a strategy is likely to aid common citizens more effectively.  
The Karnataka Lok Ayukta, for example, has played an important role in rooting out 
corruption in drug procurement, urban municipalities, and hospitals and emerged as a key 
channel for resolving complaints relating to service delivery. 
C. Mineral and Environmental Governance 
2.48 The state’s encouraging mix of natural resource endowments makes it an ideal 
destination for investment that could unleash growth and job creation. Jharkhand means the 
“land of forests” and true to its name the state is endowed with vast forests and a rich assemblage 
of floral and faunal biodiversity.  Few states in India can match the scenic landscapes and rich 
biodiversity of Jharkhand.  The state is also home to a large tribal population who are heavily 
dependent upon forest resources for their livelihoods.   Jharkhand has vast mineral reserves, with 
33 percent of India’s coal deposits, 47 percent of its mica and 34 percent of its copper.  Creating 
a diverse and inclusive economic base calls for harnessing not just its comparative advantage in 
mining, but also the untapped opportunities for growth provided by tourism.   
 
2.49 However, the transition to industrialization, particularly mining-led growth 
requires strong government institutional structures to mitigate the associated 
environmental and social risks.  The development thrust of the state emphasizes growth in the 
mining sector, followed by improving agricultural productivity.  A mineral-led growth strategy 
could provide the foundations for development provided the risks are well managed.  Most of 
Jharkhand’s mineral deposits are located in forests that are inhabited by tribals. Mineral 
development has therefore involved the destruction of forests, displacement of a large number of 
tribals dependent on the forests and high levels of pollution that have adverse health effects.  
Ignoring the environmental effects of mineral development has therefore fueled social conflict 
and discontent.  This in turn is known to increase business risk and deter investments that are 
necessary for development.  Agencies involved in environmental issues therefore have a crucial 
43
 See for example, the GO issued by L.P. Singh, I.C.S., Chief   Secretary of Bihar, 1953.  Government of Bihar, Appointment 
Department, “Speedy Disposal of Disciplinary Cases against Government Servants” (Patna: January 9, 1953) reprinted in Bihar 
Board’s Miscellaneous Rules, 1958 (Patna: Malhotra Brothers, 2004), pp. 153-154.  
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role to play in addressing these negative externalities to create social consensus needed for a 
sustainable flow of investment and growth. 
 
2.50 An environmental governance structure is in place with the respective roles of the 
central ministries, state departments and agencies well defined. In Jharkhand the 
environmental regulatory framework is closely aligned with and embodied in the major central 
Acts of Parliament (such as the Environmental Protection Act and the Forest Act).  Most of these 
policies are aimed at defining acceptable environmental standards and strengthening the 
enforcement authority of the state regulatory agencies.  Under the Indian constitution, the states 
and central government share jurisdiction over forests.  The Ministry of Environment and Forests 
is the lead central agency that defines national policy goals and sets the legal framework for 
controlling forest use.  The state forest department is the dominant public agency responsible for 
implementing these laws and managing the state’s forests.  Projects that require clearance of 
forests in excess of 25 ha must undertake an environmental impact assessment.  Application for 
forest clearance is invariably granted, but is conditional upon reforestation of an equivalent area 
of land through a process known as the Compensatory Afforestation Scheme (CAS).  These 
policies are complemented by regulations on pollution levels that are enforced through the State 
Pollution Control Board (SPCB).  The SPCB is charged with monitoring emissions, enforcing 
compliance and providing the legal “Consent to Establish” and “Consent to Operate” permits.   
 
2.51 While the overall legislative framework for environmental protection is well 
established across India, implementation of these policies remains a challenge in many 
Indian states. This is particularly true of the newer states like Jharkhand, where environment 
agencies such as the SPCB are nascent and relatively weak.  Evidence suggests that once the 
license to operate has been granted, there is limited monitoring of compliance levels.  Hence 
numerous studies report that environmental regulations are routinely breached.  Examples 
include forest clearance in excess of sanctioned levels, unsafe disposal of hazardous waste (e.g. 
asbestos at Roroburu), uncontrolled pollution of waterways, adverse health impacts and the 
economic exclusion of communities affected by mining. The CAS has also not lived up to its 
promise with indications that few such schemes have been satisfactorily implemented.44 The 
depletion of forest resources remains a primary development concern in a state such as 
Jharkhand where a substantial proportion of the population relies on forests for their livelihood 
needs.     
 
2.52 The capacity, incentives and institutional design of the environmental agencies in 
Jharkhand need to match the growing demands placed upon these agencies by a mineral-
intensive growth strategy. There are large gaps in staffing the forest department with a 30 
percent vacancy rate at the forest guard level.  At the same time, the present system emphasizes 
top-down approaches that focus on administrative processes rather than environmental outcomes, 
thereby limiting the initiative and effectiveness of the field staff.  A similar situation exists in the 
SPCB.  If the state is to generate broad based-growth it will need to create greater social support 
for investment in the economy.  This will require improvements in the capacity and ability to 
mitigate adverse mining impacts by enforcement of existing regulations.   
 
The key elements of such a strategy would include: 
44
 Kumar (2005).  
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¾ Strengthening the capacity of the Jharkhand PCB to monitor and enforce compliance with 
existing regulations: This  include: (i) developing and implementing a plan to upgrade skills; 
(ii) developing and adopting tools for better and faster evaluation of environmental 
assessment of investments; (iii) rationalizing consent management based on environmental 
risks and re-allocating resources towards more effective inspection and monitoring;  (iv) 
decentralizing responsibilities to regional offices with the respective capacity upgradation in 
staff and equipment; (v)  undertaking full computerization and web-based management of 
application processing and monitoring; and (vi) introducing  greater information disclosure 
and  transparency in decision-making, including getting ready to meet the requirements of the 
new Right to Information Act. 
 
¾ Building knowledge, awareness and capacity of line departments (industry and mining), 
investors and financial institutions to improve environmental performance: Good 
environmental performance is increasingly seen as good business practice and a way to 
maintain competitiveness in global and domestic markets.  There is a need for the line 
departments to provide timely information and technical support to investors on appropriate 
clean technologies.  
 
¾ Improving environmental compliance, performance and risk mitigation, and management in 
the mining sector, which is associated with several issues and challenges, including the 
preparation and operationalization of detailed procedures for: (i) environmental compliance 
for different categories of mines; (ii) mine closure; and (iii) mining legacy issues.  This will 
facilitate a sustainable development strategy for the mining sector, which is needed for 
benefits from investor interest in the state’s mineral resources. 
 
¾ Strengthening capacity and efficiency of forest management institutions: Mining-led growth 
will not gain the necessary public support without substantial improvement in the way that 
forestry issues are addressed in the state.  Greater attention needs to be given to: (i) the 
complex forest clearance process; (ii) improving mechanisms for the accountability of the 
forest department in compensatory afforestation; and (iii) policy guidelines on how to 
economically restore lost ecological and livelihood benefits.   
 
¾ Promoting more effective public participation in environmental management, including: (i) 
raising knowledge and awareness; (ii) a more informed and constructive public hearing 
process; and (iii) the involvement of citizens in monitoring and enforcement. 
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Chapter 3:  Improving Rural Opportunities for Shared Growth 
3.1 This chapter presents the diagnosis for rural backwardness and indicates the 
possible avenues for unlocking rural opportunities for shared growth in Jharkhand. 
Improving economic opportunities in rural areas depends on several factors, such as initial asset 
endowments (household and geographical), market conditions, quality of institutions, and 
development interventions (including infrastructure, access to finance, technology, and social 
policy). 
 
A. Access to Assets 
 
3.2 An average rural household in Jharkhand is in a disadvantaged position with respect to 
access and control of assets. Assets, as defined in terms of the rural livelihoods framework, include 
natural, human, physical, financial, and social assets.45 
3.3 The most important 
physical asset, land, shows 
highly skewed distribution in 
rural Jharkhand. According to 
the 2005 RJBS data the bottom 43 
percent of the rural population, as 
per the landownership scale, has 
only 4 percent of land, while the 
top 8 per cent has 41 percent 
(Table 3.1). The average size of 
landholdings has declined over the 
10-year period from 2.25 acres to 
1.64 acres, which is a very sharp 
drop by any standard.  This has 
been accompanied by growing 
land alienation, as indicated by the 
rising Gini for landownership from 
0.65 to 0.70. The relatively high 
inequality in land distribution is 
surprising given the colonial 
legacy of legal restrictions on the transfer of tribal land ownership in the state. It is quite possible that the 
2005 RJBS data has overstated the inequality of landownership. Estimates based on the 55th round of NSS 
indicate, however, that the concentration of landownership in rural Jharkhand is indeed considerably 
skewed notwithstanding the legal protections of tribal land, as originally envisaged in the Chhotanagpur 
and Santhal Pargana Tenancy Acts. The estimated Gini inequality of rural land ownership for the state in 
1999/00 was 0.64, which is admittedly lower than the all-India average of 0.71, but would still appear to 
be on the high side (given the initial condition of tribal land ownership). More importantly, inequality in 
land distribution is possibly on rise in the recent years through illegal (distress) land transfers.46 
45
 Ellis (2000). 
46Prevention of tribal land alienation is a much discussed public issue in Jharkhand. Unfortunately only anecdotal evidence is 
available in this regard. In case of un-lawful transfer of tribal land in contravention to section 46 of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy 
Act, person can apply against the revenue court. In 2003/04 alone 4263 cases of tribal land alienation were officially registered. 
According to the estimates of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) about 15 lakh acres of adivasi land has been 
Table 3. 1: Distribution of Land and Non-Land Assets 
(in percent) 
Households
Land 
Owned 
Now 
Land 
Owned 
10 Years 
Ago 
Non-Land 
Assets 
Land Ownership Category 
Functionally 
Landless 43.0 4.2 7.7 24.6 
Marginal 21.2 12.0 15.6 19.8 
Small 15.7 17.5 18.0 24.6 
Medium 12.8 25.1 24.4 15.7 
Large 7.5 41.2 34.3 15.3 
Social Category 
SC 11.5 8.5 7.0 8.0 
ST 26.9 34.0 36.6 18.7 
OBC 46.0 38.7 38.6 54.2 
Others 15.7 18.9 17.8 19.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Estimated from the 2005 Rural Jharkhand BaseLine Survey (RJBS). 
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3.4 While other non-land assets are also distributed unequally across the rural sector, 
the extent of inequality appears less dramatic. A case in point is access to physical assets 
such as agricultural and non-agricultural assets (including consumer durables).  The bottom 43 
percent along the landownership scale command only 25 percent of non-land assets, while the 
top 8 percent have 15 percent. This also comes through the prism of the social divide: the tribal 
category, constituting about 27 percent of total households, has a share of about 34 percent of 
land, but owns only 19 percent of non-land assets. 
 
3.5 Human asset endowment in rural Jharkhand is quite low, though not as skewed as 
the distribution of physical assets. Three different measures of the stock of human capital can 
be considered: (i) household heads with some exposure to formal education (54 percent); (ii) 
household heads that have completed primary education (43 percent); and (iii) household heads 
that have completed secondary education (17 percent).47 Even at this low level of human asset 
endowment, the poor and non-poor divide (howsoever it may be measured) is quite pronounced 
at the post-secondary level. Only 15 percent of the poor household heads have attained education 
up till class X and above, while the corresponding figure for the top non-poor is 31 percent. At 
below-secondary level education, however, the poor and non-poor divide is not as sharp: while 
49 percent of the poor household heads did not have any exposure to formal education, the 
corresponding figure is 35 percent for the top non-poor.  This has been the result of historical 
neglect of basic education of the rural population afflicting not just the income-poor.48 
3.6 For the disadvantaged poor, access to favorable market arrangements can improve 
the returns to initial assets. For example: (i) the land-poor can gain access to land through the 
tenancy market; (ii) returns to land can be enhanced through improved access to technology such 
as irrigation; (iii) returns to labor can be higher if the poor have access to jobs with better 
remuneration; and (iv) access to capital through credit markets can help support rural-farm, off-
farm or non-farm diversification. However, this is not the case in rural Jharkhand. 
3.7 Not all markets are discussed here, partly because of lack of information, and partly because of 
prioritization. The size of the land-tenancy market, for instance, is very limited in the context of 
Jharkhand: leased-in land accounts for only 7 percent of cultivated land (much lower than 30-35 percent 
in West Bengal and 23-26 percent in Bangladesh). On the other hand, little information is currently 
available on the structure, level of integration, and value-chain in the output market disaggregated by food 
and cash crops. 
alienated from them during 1950–1990 for setting up industries, mines, large dams, animals sanctuaries, and highways. Another 8 
lakh acres have been fraudulently and illegally snatched from them by “unscrupulous outsiders”. Land alienation resulted in 
large-scale displacement; 36 lakh adivasis have been displaced, and only one-third of them have been rehabilitated (see, for 
example, http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Dalit-tribal/2004/adivasi-jharkhand.htm). 
 
47
 Human educational capital is a “stock” concept, as an embodiment of the threshold level of knowledge and skills, and is to be 
distinguished from enrolment, which is a “flow” concept. There is some debate as to which indicator is to be taken as the proxy 
for human capital—literacy, primary completion rate or secondary completion rate. While the precise measure can justifiably 
vary across country contexts most opinions agree that the focus should be beyond just “literacy”. The other important distinction 
lies in the choice of the demographic group. Since human capital is a direct input into the production process, it is important to 
focus on the labor force segment of the population,  which is why it is important to define literacy or completion rate measures 
for the adult working population, rather than for population aged seven years and above. 
48
 This has been the case until recently. The expansion of basic education (up to class VIII) has been quite rapid in recent years 
after the creation of the new state (more on this in Section 5). 
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B. Access to Labor Market 
 
3.8 The analysis of labor market participation 
reveals five main conclusions. They relate to: (i) 
the subsidiary status of farming; (ii) the 
predominance of non-agricultural casual labor as 
the main form of employment; (iii) a limited role 
for rural non-farm self-employment; (iv) the 
relatively higher incomes of non-agricultural 
(especially salaried) workers; and (v) an 
increasing rate of distress out-migration. First,
farming is largely seen as a subsidiary 
occupation both for the poor and the non-poor 
with 39 percent of the rural working population 
regarding it as their subsidiary occupation and 
only 12 percent considering it as their main occupation (Figure 3.1). In contrast, rural wage labor 
is the main occupation for 61 percent and the subsidiary occupation for 20 percent of the rural 
working population. This is in sharp contrast to irrigated agriculture in the plains such as in West 
Bengal, Bihar and Bangladesh, where farming tends to be the main occupation of at least 40-60 
percent of rural households while the corresponding figure for rural wage labor is in the range of 
25-33 percent. The low variation in this respect across different agro-ecological regions suggests 
that the relatively low share of farming in Jharkhand is not the outcome of agro-ecological 
constraints alone.  
3.9 Second, in the case of traditional 
subsistence agriculture, prospects for casual 
agricultural wage employment are extremely 
limited even for poor households. As per the 
principal status of employment, on average, only 
13 percent of the rural poor are engaged in 
agricultural labor. In comparison, 48 percent of 
the rural poor are employed in non-agricultural 
casual wage employment, mainly in construction 
and transport and less so in mining and 
manufacturing. These activities are characterized 
by very low labor productivity; consequently, 
the rural wage rate in Jharkhand is very low 
(Table 3.2). In fact, the agricultural wage rate 
appears to rank the lowest amongst the Indian 
states along with Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. 
3.10 Third, the development of rural non-agricultural self-employment enterprises has 
been sluggish in Jharkhand. Currently the sector provides employment to 6 percent of rural 
households as per the principal employment status criterion and to 8 percent as per the principal 
income source criterion. This is not unexpected, given the relative absence of consumption 
demand induced linkages in the context of un-irrigated agriculture. 
 
Figure 3. 1: Main Occupation of Rural Working 
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Source: Estimated from the 2005 Rural Jharkhand Baseline 
Survey (RJBS). 
Table 3. 2: Selected State Comparison of 
Agricultural Wage Rate 
2003/04 
Agricultural Wage Rate 
(Nominal) 
States 
Male Female Average 
Jharkhand 48 34 41 
Bihar 53 47 50 
Orissa 51 30 41 
West Bengal 63 50 57 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
51 33 42 
Tamil Nadu 93 42 68 
Karnataka 55 36 46 
Maharashtra 57 36 47 
All-India 63 43 53 
Source: Indiastat.com 
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3.11 Fourth, the low rate of return to agricultural self-employment is specific to 
Jharkhand. The latter is only slightly higher than in the case of casual agricultural wage 
labor, and quite similar to that for non-agricultural wage labor. There is no direct way of 
comparing returns to labor by farm/ non-farm status and by mode of employment. Indirect 
estimates (taking per capita monthly consumption by main employment status of household 
head) show the familiar ranking: the return to regular wage  
labor is higher than the return to casual wage 
labor and the return to non-farm labor is 
higher than the return to farm labor (Table 
3.3). 
 
3.12 Fifth, while the rate of migration has 
increased at a fast pace over the past 10 
years across all social categories, migration 
offers upward mobility only for a third of 
rural migrant households. For others, 
migration does not offer any immediate 
upward mobility, although it provides rural 
poor households access to scarce cash income. 
It is not difficult to understand the motivation 
of distress migration.  The rate of 
unemployment in Jharkhand was one of the 
highest among the Indian states in 1999/2000, 
which was confirmed by a perception survey 
(Chapter 1). Ten years ago, about 66 percent of rural respondents thought that it was harder to 
find employment in rural areas.  This figure dropped marginally to 62 percent in 2004/05, 
indicating that the employment situation has 
improved only marginally since the 
emergence of the state. In such a situation, a 
high rate of out-migration would be 
expected. The proportion of households 
reporting migration has gone up sharply from 
1.5 percent to 5.1 percent according to the 
baseline survey data, indicating a three-fold 
increase over a 10-year period. The rate of 
migration has increased for both poor and 
non-poor (and for tribal/ non-tribal groups), 
but the rate is about twice as high for the 
non-poor group compared to the poor. The 
growing role of migration can also be seen 
from the considerable weight of households 
with dependence on income from migration 
(Figure 3.2).  
 
3.13 An analysis of migration history 
for the sample, however, suggests that as 
Table 3. 3: Relative Return to Farm and Non-farm 
Activities by Modes of Employment 
 
Sectors/Modes of 
Employment 
Relative Return 
(Regular Wage = 100) 
Employment Status  
Main 
Occupation 
Main 
Source of 
Income 
Regular Wage-
Employment 
100.0 100.0 
Non-Farm Self-
Employment 
0.77 0.83 
Casual Non-farm 
Wage-Employment 
0.59 0.66 
Farm Self-
Employment 
0.64 0.61 
Casual Self-
Employment 
0.50 0.58 
Source:  Estimated from the 2005 Rural Jharkhand Baseline 
Survey (RJBS). 
Figure 3. 2: Household with Migration –Income 
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Figure 3. 3: Incidence of improvement due to 
migration 
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many as 60 percent of the households have recorded livelihood migration over the 20-year 
period between 1985 and 2005.49 Of these, about 4 percent moved to a different district within 
the state and another 4 percent to a different state, indicating that most of the migration has taken 
place within the same district. This is not unexpected given that there is a high cost to migration, 
which is marked by risks and uncertainties. Another important constraint may be social 
exclusion, i.e. barriers to entry to urban higher-income jobs, especially for the SC/ ST population 
who would have to compete with both upper caste workers and in-migrant settlers from other 
neighboring states. As a result, since most of the migration takes place within the same district, 
the well-being of only one-third of the migrants has improved (Figure 3.3). The incidence of 
self-reported improvement is proportionately more for the non-poor than for the poor (49 percent 
versus 33 percent).  
 
3.14 Raising the productivity of farm self-employment appears to be crucial in 
influencing labor market dynamics along a pro-poor development path. If the productivity 
of farm self-employment could be increased through the adoption of improved technology and 
better crop practices, it could change the current pattern of utilization of rural labor. This would 
reduce the excessive dependence on casual wage labor, especially non-agricultural wage labor 
and make farming a more remunerative occupation, thus increasing its weight as the principal 
status of employment. Such a development would be beneficial for the growth of rural non-farm 
self-employment through the consumption demand induced linkages arising out of agricultural 
growth. The trigger for such a process could come from the adoption of appropriate forms of 
irrigation technology, access to power, and road infrastructure. 
 
C. Access to Infrastructure 
 
3.15 Bridging the huge gap in the provision of infrastructure services requires large 
investments as well as determined concurrent institutional and policy reforms. 
Infrastructure, particularly irrigation, power and roads, is a critical requirement for accelerated 
and inclusive growth.  While access to these services across the state is an issue, the situation is 
worse in rural areas. 
Access to Irrigation
3.16 Among the key infrastructural elements, appropriate irrigation technology is one of 
the most important. Irrigation-led agricultural growth has been the key trigger of successful 
agricultural transformation over the past thirty years in most regions of South Asia.50 Adoption 
of irrigation technology can have an immediate effect on rural livelihoods by: (i) raising land 
productivity; (ii) increasing household food security; and (iii) enhancing profitability of farm 
operations thereby leading to a rise in real land values. These would eventually lead to the 
revival of agricultural labor and land tenancy markets, reducing the rate of distress out-
migration, and also support rural non-farm growth via favorable linkage effects.  
 
3.17 Other factors can start functioning more effectively once irrigation technology is in 
place. The role of agricultural extension becomes important both for informed crop choice 
49
 Assessment of the annual migration rate is difficult to estimate from the existing data..
50 Mellor 1976 
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differentiated by agro-ecological potential and for the dissemination of improved cultivation. 
With a growing marketable surplus, agricultural marketing becomes important, which in turn 
leads to an increased demand for new road investments and better maintenance of existing roads 
for reducing transport costs. The development of transport infrastructure has a direct 
employment effect for transport operators. Increasing purchasing power of the farm sector also 
raises the demand for goods and services produced by the non-farm sectors. This, in turn, creates 
the scope for increasing productivity enhancing as well as employment generating potentials of 
the rural non-farm sectors. Once the demand side constraints are released, access to power (and 
other inputs) can help release the supply-side constraints in the rural non-farm sectors. 
 
3.18 The rate of irrigation is low and 
distributed extremely unequally—
more unequally than the distribution 
of physical and human assets. The level 
of irrigation remains one of the lowest 
among all the states. According to the 
NSS data, the irrigation rate (defined as 
irrigated land as a percentage of 
cultivated land) is only 23 percent for 
Jharkhand compared to 41 percent at the 
all-India level (Figure 3.4). Besides, not 
only is the rate of irrigation low, it is also 
highly unequally distributed. Nearly all 
the irrigated land classified in the NSS 
data is concentrated in the first two deciles—which indicates a much higher concentration ratio 
than in case of physical and human assets.  
 
3.19 The lack of investment, institutional capacity, user participation and inadequate 
agricultural extension services are some of the reasons responsible for only about 10 percent of the 
total cultivated area receiving some form of irrigation in Jharkhand. First, the irrigation coverage is 
quite low partly due to lack of investment in the past.  A well-prepared investment plan based on a robust 
set of data used in a Decision Support System (DSS) model with appropriate cash flow forecasts is 
required.  If the absorption capacity can be created, feasible investment in this sector over the next two 
decades could be around Rs. 10,000 crore.  Second, the technical skills available in the water resources 
department need urgent improvement in order to design modern irrigation infrastructure and to operate 
and maintain it in a sustainable manner.  At present, irrigation coverage is about 200,000 ha.  With the 
proposed investment, this coverage would expand to 1,000,000 ha.  The present capacity to handle this 
fivefold increase in the magnitude of operation is inadequate.  Third, community participation in 
irrigation operations in Jharkhand has been minimal, contributing to poor services and lack of 
accountability.  Involvement of all stakeholders, especially users, would require enactment of necessary 
legislation.  Finally, up-scaling of irrigation infrastructure must be carried out with improving 
productivity of water and land as the objective.  This objective can be realized only with agricultural 
intensification and diversification to income-earning crops that can be grown with limited water, using 
improved irrigation and agricultural technologies.  It is necessary to go beyond the line agencies and 
reach out to the private sector, including NGOs, to obtain this service. 
 
3.20 It is possible to improve the situation substantially by: (i) completing ongoing schemes as 
quickly as possible in a rational manner; (ii) promoting equity through investment in areas neglected so 
Figure 3. 4: Share of Irrigated Land 
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far; (iii) developing hydropower for increasing irrigation coverage through groundwater exploitation, 
using shallow or open dug wells; (iv) unbundling water resource management from irrigation service 
provision to develop these resources in an efficient manner while addressing various competing demands 
on this resource; (v) introducing new institutional arrangements with a state-level apex body like the State 
Water Resources Agency, and basis and management agencies; (vi) appointing an independent regulator 
(similar to the electricity sector regulator) to encourage public-private partnerships in developing mini 
hydroelectric stations and irrigation systems with specialized agricultural crop zones; and (vii) facilitating 
capacity building of the irrigation service delivery institutions, including improving the technical and 
managerial capacity of the service provider.  
 
3.21 If addressed, irrigation can provide a viable entry point for accelerated rural development.  
This is so for two reasons. First, the technical scope for irrigation expansion exists and needs to be reaped 
in full.  The current low irrigation coverage indicates that there is room to grow at least up to 40 percent 
of cultivable land. While the groundwater potential is limited (only 25 percent of total irrigation potential) 
the scope for surface water irrigation is considerable. Different types of irrigation possibilities, that is, 
major-, medium-, and micro- irrigation systems can be developed. Indeed, different irrigation 
technologies can entail different ownership mix possibilities: while major and medium irrigation systems 
are likely to be public sector led, micro-irrigation through water harvesting is suitable for the tribal upland 
and likely to be community led. In Jharkhand, irrigation coverage did not expand in the past largely 
because of under-investment in major and medium irrigation systems.51 Second, returns to irrigation 
appear to be considerable even in the present context. Based on NSS data it is estimated that the impact of 
adding an extra unit of land under irrigation increases average per capita monthly expenditure by about 17 
percent while controlling for regional effects (Annex Table 3.1, col. 2). 
 
Access to Power and Roads
3.22 The return to initial assets 
can be enhanced through improved 
access to physical infrastructure 
such as electricity and roads. 
Comparable estimates based on NSS 
data suggest that household access to 
electricity at 11 percent is extremely 
low in rural Jharkhand, compared to 
48 percent for rural India (the only 
state that has a lower access rate than 
Jharkhand in this sample is Bihar). 
Similarly, while 80 percent of the 
NSS primary sampling units at the 
rural all-India level have reported the 
presence of electricity, this figure is only 26 percent for rural Jharkhand (Figure 3.5). 
 
51
 More on this in Chapter 4. 
Figure 3. 5: Rural Access to Electricity  
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3.23 With respect to road access, rural Jharkhand is in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis 
the all-India average. Only 36 percent of villages in the state have immediate access to all-
weather roads compared to the all-
India average of 57 percent.52 Bihar 
is the only neighboring state which 
has a lower rate of all-weather and 
metal road access. 
 
3.24 Lack of clarity of roles, 
non-participation by non-state 
government stakeholders, poor 
funding mechanisms and outdated 
business and management 
practices are amongst the 
underlying causes for poor road 
service delivery. There is a lack of 
clarity with respect to 
responsibilities for different parts of 
the network and different aspects of the system (construction, operation and maintenance).  For 
example, rural roads are somewhat arbitrarily reassigned between the Rural Engineering 
Organization (REO) and Road Construction Department (RCD); or constructed under one rural 
development scheme or another only to find itself “orphaned” with no agency to maintain it.  In 
several such areas, including road safety, accountability is unclear. 
 
52
 The corresponding figures for village-level access to metal roads are 25 percent and 45 percent. 
Figure 3. 6: Percentage Respondents Rating Road/Transport 
Attributes as “Good” on 3-point Scale 
41.91%
51.57% 59.11% 43.79%
35.41% 37.67% 38.44% 41.38% 37.54%
Source: Estimated from the 2005 Rural Jharkhand User Satisfaction Survey 
(RJUSS). 
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3.25 However, the findings of 
the User Satisfaction Survey are 
not so bad. A number of 
respondents in the survey rated 
certain aspects of rural road and 
transport services as “good”53 
(Figure 3.6).
3.26 Both electricity and road 
access at the community level 
can make considerable 
difference to average rural 
affluence. This can be measured 
by a range of indicators (Figure 
3.7). Just being located in a village 
with electricity access can increase 
average income (consumption) of 
a typical rural household by about 
22 percent.  When the condition of 
road access is good, it can enhance 
income by about 18 percent.  The 
largest impact is noted when the 
village is directly connected to a 
wholesale market by good road access; the corresponding difference increases over 40 percent 
compared to those communities without such access. The expansion of this basic infrastructure 
tends to result in the clustering of other infrastructural factors such as bus-stops, pharmacies, 
public telephones, post offices and small community-level shops around roads and electricity.54 
D. Access to Credit Markets 
3.27 Access to formal credit is extremely low, even for the non-poor category. Only 20 
percent of the demand for loans is related to productive (farm and non-farm) purposes, 
while the rest is accounted for by consumption and risk-coping. Access to credit (capital) 
markets is an important factor for stimulating both farm and non-farm growth. As per the 
Baseline Survey Data, only 17 percent of rural households had taken credit from any source 
during the year preceding the survey (i.e. 2004/05). A formal/ informal breakdown based on the 
last credit transaction over the past five years shows that only 20 percent of the loan cases can be 
attributed to any institutional source (16 percent are provided by government and commercial 
banks). Moneylenders account for about 39 percent of loan cases while a slightly higher 
proportion of loan cases are accounted for by the “friends and relatives” category. Most loans (81 
percent) were for non-productive purposes (consumption loan-18 percent; coping with risks such 
as health and social/ festival expenses-63 percent). Only 19 percent supported productive 
investments, indicating the nature of demand in the credit market.  
53
 User Satisfaction Survey of Rural Services, ORG for World Bank, 2006, based on a sample of 1400 respondents. 
54
 Bivariate correlation among these factors range from 0.3 to 0.6 in the community level of data of the Rural Jharkhand Baseline 
Survey. 
Figure 3. 7: Impact of Community Assets on Income 
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 Note: These are based on simple bivariate results measuring the average 
household income (consumption) difference between the “presence” and 
“absence” of a particular community asset. 
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3.28 With respect to financial assets, rural Jharkhand is characterized by the lack of 
access to credit rather than inequity. This may be partly explained by the persistence of low 
demand for credit given the aspect of largely un-irrigated agriculture and little rural 
diversification with low returns to assets. But, low access may well be due to the lack of 
financial institutions. According to the 2002 survey carried out by the NSSO, self help groups 
(SHGs) are present in only 5 percent of villages in Jharkhand, as compared to 11 percent in 
Orissa, 23 percent in West Bengal, 28 percent in Chhattisgarh, and 80 percent in Kerala, with the 
all-India average at 24 percent.55 Only 3 percent of Jharkhand’s villages have the presence of 
NGOs. As many as 60 percent of these villages are located at a distance of 5 km and above from 
the nearest bank with 27 percent at a distance of more than 10 km. 
 
E. Risks and Risk-Mitigating Institutions 
3.29  Susceptibility to risks is 
extremely high in rural Jharkhand. At 
the rural level about 35 percent of 
households faced a major crisis-event 
in the past three years with higher 
vulnerability recorded for the poor 
than for the non-poor. The highest 
percentage (38.2 percent) of crisis events 
was experienced by food-deficit 
households in contrast to 30 percent 
observed for the food-surplus category 
(Figure 3.8). 
 
3.30 Idiosyncratic risk such as 
health shocks and covariate risk such as natural disasters constitute the two most 
important categories among the shocks. Health shocks account for about 68 percent of all 
crisis events, followed by natural disaster (22 percent). In the case of rural Jharkhand, almost all 
the natural disaster events are caused by 
drought leading to crop failure (Figure 
3.9). 
 
3.31  The difference between the 
poor and the non-poor living in the 
same community does not manifest so 
much in the overall incidence of crisis-
events as in the case of the varying 
coping methods.  While the poor are 
more vulnerable to the so-called 
negative coping methods such as distress 
sale, drop in consumption or borrowing 
at higher interest, the non-poor can deploy less costly coping methods such as dissaving or 
55
 NSSO (2003). 
Figure 3. 8: Incidence of Crisis in Past Three Years 
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Figure 3. 9: Types of Shocks 
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accessing soft loans. For example, in the case of food deficit categories, the financial cost 
triggered by the crisis was mostly managed through the support of family or friends, in the 
absence of which households were forced to take loans at higher interest rates to cope with the 
crisis. The situation was different for breakeven (no deficit-no surplus) and surplus food 
categories, almost 35 percent of which had family support as the first source to cope with the 
financial cost induced by crisis. The difference between the two categories lies in their relative 
ability to cope through buffer saving. While 30 percent of households in the surplus group coped 
with crisis by spending through the buffer saving, the corresponding figure is 15 percent for the 
breakeven category.  
 
F. Livelihood Outcomes and their Determinants 
 
3.32 Access to household, community and public assets, different factor and product markets, 
availability of infrastructure, and susceptibility to a variety of exogenous shocks with diverse 
methods of coping can influence the occupational choice and rate of return to assets, in turn 
determining livelihood outcomes.56 
Insights from NSS Thick Round Data
3.33 Results from micro-analysis using data of NSS households surveyed in Jharkhand 
under the 55th round highlight some special features of rural Jharkhand.57 First, education 
has an effect on increasing rural household income only after one reaches the post-secondary 
education level suggesting that the incremental effect is rather modest in households headed by 
someone with secondary education while the gains to completing college education are much 
higher.58 The problem is that only a few rural households can take advantage of this, as access to 
human capital is extremely limited both at secondary (18 percent of household heads) and post-
secondary (5 percent of household heads) levels of education.  Second, electricity access appears 
to have strong effects on increasing rural income.59 The income of households who have access 
to electricity is Rs. 188 (amounting to 46 percent of the average per capita monthly expenditure 
in rural areas) more than those without such access. The quantitative importance of electricity 
access is second to having post-secondary education. Unfortunately, only 10 percent of the rural 
households currently have access to electricity.  Third, only 22 percent of the cultivated land is 
irrigated at present.  Quantitative analysis indicates considerable effects of irrigation access on 
increasing rural household income.60 Fourth, households who have temporary or seasonal access 
to work in nearby towns have higher incomes than those who lack that access.61 Unfortunately, 
56
 In this section the term “income” and “survey- based consumption expenditure” has been used interchangeably. This is because 
although we are interested in the analysis of household income the survey data for India is typically available for consumption 
expenditure only. 
57
 Detailed results are presented in Annex Table 3.1. 
58
 While the incremental income effects of households with someone with college-level education are in the range of Rs. 248-266 
(about 60-65 percent of the average per capita monthly NSS expenditure in rural areas), it is only about Rs. 40 higher compared 
to the reference category of heads with no formal education (about 10 percent of average per capita monthly expenditure). 
59
 NSS data have limited information about household access to infrastructure. Connectivity to all-weather rural roads is one 
important missing variable. However, it is possible to assess the impact of access to electricity and irrigation. 
60
 Addition of an extra unit of land under irrigation coverage will increase per capita income by about Rs. 35 (about 9 percent of 
average per capita monthly expenditure). The marginal effect increases to Rs. 65 (about 17 percent of average per capita monthly 
expenditure) if one controls for the regional effects. 
61
 The matched difference is Rs.70 (equivalent to 17 percent of average monthly expenditure). 
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the pace of urbanization has been rather slow in the state.62 Fifth, participation in non-farm and 
non-agricultural activities increases rural household incomes indicating the importance of rural 
diversification. Compared to the reference category of construction, households that derive their 
main source of income from these sources have considerably higher household income.63 The 
key problem is that only a few rural households currently participate in these growth promoting, 
non-farm and non-agricultural activities,64 because entry into formal services requires access to 
human capital, entry to the trade and transport business requires access to financial capital, entry 
to rural manufacturing requires artisanal skills and proximity to markets, and mining (as has been 
seen earlier) owing to its capital-intensive nature currently offers limited job openings. Sixth, the 
results also suggest the need for addressing regional imbalances, as there is statistical evidence of 
considerable regional disparity in rural income, adding an important dimension to any inclusive 
growth strategy in Jharkhand.  The rural parts of Godda, Sahibganj, Dumka, Deoghar appear to 
be significantly poorer while Ranchi and East Singhbhum are significantly richer compared to 
the reference category of Pakur. Last, results show that, controlling for all other characteristics, 
the SC/ ST and OBCs 65 have much lower income (with ST being the most disadvantaged) 
compared with the more privileged groups. This is not only due to the fact that they are relatively 
more asset-deprived, but also possibly because the return to their assets is lower. 
 
3.34 One limitation of the NSS rounds data is that it does not contain any community 
module and hence cannot capture the independent effects of community assets on rural 
consumption (income). Jharkhand’s baseline survey carried out during 2005 in connection with 
this study can be used to explore the relative importance of various community- level factors. 
Additional motivation of using this new survey data is to check the robustness of the previous 
NSS-based findings along with new household-level factors not captured earlier. 
 
Insights from Rural Jharkhand Baseline Survey Data
3.35 Some striking similarities between the NSS and the baseline survey data relate to 
the following: (i) low returns to un-irrigated cultivation practices; (ii) very low returns to 
land; (iii) greater importance of non-agricultural regular wage labor and/or skill 
demanding jobs; (iv) disadvantaged position of the female worker; (v) lower income 
earning status of the tribal and lower caste population (followed by OBCs and SC/ST); and 
(vi) strong favorable effects of household access to electricity and access to post-secondary 
education. Annex Table 3.2 presents regression results in three groups: (i) results with only 
household-level factors; (b) results with both household and community-level factors; and (iii) 
results with household, community and region-level factors. The focus will be on the second set 
of regression results involving household and community-level factors. 
 
62
 Annual urban population growth was 2.9 percent between 1991 and 2001, compared to 3.1 percent at all-India level.  The 
matched pace is similar to Orissa and Bihar (2.9 percent in both cases), but was much higher in the newly created states such as 
Chhattisgarh (3.6 percent) and Uttaranchal (3.3 percent), and in advanced states such as Punjab (3.8 percent), Tamil Nadu (4.3 
percent), and Maharashtra (3.4 percent). 
63
 The incremental difference is Rs.57 for mining, Rs.58 for trade, and Rs 62 in manufacturing. The highest incremental effects 
are noticeable in case of transport business (an addition of Rs.121), followed by formal service (an addition of Rs.100). 
64
 2 percent in mining, 3 percent in formal services, 7 percent in manufacturing, 16 percent in trade, and 17 percent in transport 
business. 
65
 The above three groups considered together constitute as many as 83 percent of the rural households (and 75 percent of all 
households in the state) as per the NSS data for the 55th round. 
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3.36 While most results based on the NSS round have been vindicated by the new survey data, 
some additional aspects are noteworthy. First, as expected, farming appears to be a residual 
employment category in the current context of rural Jharkhand, constrained by techno-economic 
factors. The most promising occupations are specific activities in non-agricultural sectors such as 
salaried job, informal service, and non-farm self-enterprise. Access to all of these activities 
requires human capital (some degree of prior skill formation), entrepreneurship, and access to 
finance. Second, migration to non-agricultural sectors when it is driven by pull-factors can be an 
important income-augmenting source and can contribute approximately 20 percent of per capita 
monthly consumption expenditure. Third, while both female and male workers contribute to 
household income, the degree of gender inequality is quite high. Thus, controlling for other 
demographic, household and community characteristics, an average male earns an income that is 
twice as high as an average female worker. Fourth, as in the case of NSS round data, it is only at 
the post-secondary level of education (those who completed Class X and above) that the return to 
human capital becomes significantly positive. Household heads who have attained this level of 
education can contribute an amount equivalent to 12-15 percent of per capita average monthly 
consumption. The corresponding figure for electricity access is also of similar magnitude (about 
15 percent). 
 
3.37 The rural baseline survey clearly establishes the independent importance of 
community- level assets over and above the demographic and household-level factors. 
Access to market-connecting roads, the quality of approach roads, financial access through 
alternative channels as mediated through NGOs and vibrancy of the local economy all 
appear to contribute favorably to increasing average rural income. Market connectivity 
appears to be an important factor, especially when the village is in close proximity to a main road 
connecting to a large growth center such as a wholesale market. This factor alone contributes an 
amount equivalent to about 20 percent of per capita consumption. It is noteworthy that the 
presence of SHGs in the village is not a statistically significant factor of income-determination. 
Part of the reason for insignificance may lie in the quality of Jharkhand’s SHG movement.66 
Although SHGs are present in 22 percent of villages as per the baseline survey (up from just 5 
percent as per the NSSO data for 2002), their quality may have deteriorated with the rapid pace 
of expansion post-bifurcation. However, microfinance and other programs supported by NGOs 
can have an important effect on income (the matched contribution is about 11 percent of average 
per capita consumption expenditure). The most important factor is, perhaps, vibrancy of the local 
economy (captured here via the presence of community shops).  This factor alone will augment 
average rural affluence by an amount equivalent to 17 percent of per capita consumption 
expenditure. 
 
3.38 Cross-sectional analysis of income can only give an idea about the relative importance of 
various proximate factors that determine rural income.  It also intuitively suggests the major 
areas of possible rural investment strategy.  However, the rural sector does not persist in isolation 
from the rest of the economy. Some of the constraints to rural growth may lie elsewhere, that is 
in the non-rural part of the economy, which requires extending the analysis to a broader inter-
sectoral framework where the choice of various development paths can result in very different 
outcomes for rural growth and poverty reduction.  
66
 The quality of microfinance mediated through the Bank-SHG channel varies considerably across the states. See, Basu and 
Srivastava (2005). 
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Chapter 4: Strategies for Growth: Assessment of Options 
A. Alternative Development Paths: Issues and Concerns 
 
4.1 Two extremes of the development debate are represented by the opposing views that attach 
different degrees of importance to mining and agriculture. One view contends that the development 
of the mining sector can usher in a new decade of development in Jharkhand as the natural launching pad 
for growth acceleration and financing of broad-based social development. This view states that since the 
state has the largest share of mineral Gross Domestic Product (GDP) amongst all Indian states, it should 
capitalize on this strength, towards mitigating its weakness of crop agriculture that is almost totally 
dependent on rainfall.  This focuses on potentially substantial fiscal gains, through mobilizing rents as 
mineral revenue, and spending the additional gains on rural and social development, thereby providing 
win-win approaches to both growth and equity.  
 
4.2 In contrast, the second view is that potential risks associated with the mining sector are high 
and that agriculture has shown great potential through impressive growth in recent years, 
contributing significantly to poverty reduction and human resource development.  This view 
recognizes the emerging evidence of high risks in unregulated development of the mining sector under 
relatively poor governance, apart from the risks of flouting social and environmental safeguards. Without 
a capital development fund supported by mineral revenues, and exclusively earmarked for rural and social 
development, the prospects for more than off-setting compensation are uncertain as untargeted funds get 
used for less important purposes, besides encouraging corruption. All these can lead more to livelihoods 
destruction than creation. Hence, the natural launching pad is not all that natural after all, and agriculture 
provides a much safer option, given the adverse governance conditions.  
 
4.3 The present study suggests a third alternative for a state like Jharkhand, namely, achieving 
an inter-temporal balance between the two strategies.  While mining and broad-based industrial 
progress will lead growth over the medium to long-term and on to resource mobilization, it is the 
agricultural and rural sector, which needs to be continuously addressed in the short to medium term. This 
requires several things to move in tandem.  First, there is a need to focus on institution building, 
especially those dealing with risks, risk-perception, and risk-mitigating measures, central to the growth 
and poverty reduction agenda. Second, there is the diagnostic analysis in Chapter 1 leading to a key two-
sector message that is, increase in labor productivity in the agricultural and rural sector which has high 
employment, and increase in employment in the non-rural sectors, which has higher labor productivity, 
especially through development of SMEs. Third, each of the economic sectors should be able to grow to 
its long-term potential, including mining and mineral-based industries. However, efforts to “force in” 
development of a particular sector without addressing sector governance constraints can backfire in the 
context of a rather sharp rural-urban “dualism”, and the socially and spatially polarized economy of 
Jharkhand.
B.  Low Risk-Low Return: Can Subsistence Agriculture Lead the Way? 
 
4.4 During the period between 1993/94 and 2003/04, rural growth has been more pro-poor as 
compared to urban growth, and agricultural growth has been considerably higher than the all-
India average (Chapter 1).  Two questions arise in this context: (i) What have been the sources of 
agricultural growth during this period; and (ii) Can modernizing subsistence agriculture lead the way for 
overall revitalization of the rural economy through linkage effects.  
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Opportunities for and Limits to Technological Progress in Crop Agriculture
4.5  A considerable increase in food production over the past three decades was largely 
supported by rainfed agriculture.  The decade of the 1980s was largely one of stagnation in agricultural 
production, while improvement became pronounced from the early 1990s.  Crop agriculture is largely 
restricted, however, to rice, which is cultivated mainly during the kharif (rainfed) season. The state has 
done well in increasing foodgrain production during the period 1973/74 to 2003/04 as reflected 
in higher growth rate (3.27 percent) than the national average (2.4 percent).  Improvement in 
yields has significantly contributed to this increase (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4. 1: Annual Growth Rate in Area, Production and Yield of Principal Crops 
(Percent) 
1983/84 to 1993/94 1993/94 to 2003/04 1973/74 to 2003/04 
Crops Area Production Yield Area Production Yield Area Production Yield 
Rice -1.29 0.76 2.08 0.13 3.85 3.71 0.42 3.71 3.28 
Wheat -1.29 0.34 1.65 1.44 2.86 1.40 2.06 4.17 2.07 
Maize -2.38 2.14 4.63 4.11 4.19 0.08 1.19 2.34 1.14 
Jowar -5.59 -3.97 1.71 1.06 12.79 11.61 -1.94 4.09 6.15 
Bajra -5.18 -6.28 -1.16 -17.26 -0.71 19.99 -6.96 -1.75 5.59 
Ragi -4.44 -4.84 -0.42 -9.31 -8.60 0.79 -4.83 -4.21 0.65 
Barley -9.89 -6.70 3.54 8.04 11.61 3.31 -1.19 1.32 2.54 
Foodgrains -1.49 0.71 2.24 1.27 3.14 1.85 0.65 3.27 2.61 
Sugar -6.70 -4.46 2.40 7.18 2.92 -3.97 -0.54 -3.26 -2.74 
Arhar -2.72 0.00 2.80 12.90 7.68 -4.62 2.75 4.20 1.41 
Ground Nut -2.11 -2.84 -0.74 3.38 5.96 2.50 3.14 6.68 3.43 
Sesame 0.20 -8.81 -8.99 -5.17 -4.29 0.93 -2.56 -2.28 0.28 
Linseed 0.54 1.53 0.98 7.92 0.62 -6.76 2.66 1.66 -0.97 
Niger seed 4.27 6.46 2.10 -13.16 -23.31 -11.69 -7.37 -9.83 -2.65 
Source: Agriculture 2005- CMIE report. 
4.6 The yield level as well as cropping intensity are much lower than the national 
average for both rice and non-rice crops. With largely untapped opportunity for winter 
cultivation, due to lack of irrigation facilities, the cropping intensity is low (114 percent 
compared to the national average of 134 percent).  There is significant scope for area expansion, 
given the large share of fallow land (17 percent of the total cultivable land). 
 
4.7 The factors that contribute to agricultural growth are fertilizers, chemicals and seeds. Over 
the last decade there has been tremendous growth in the use of fertilizer and seeds.  Crop responsiveness 
to these inputs is, however, highly dependant on the availability of water, which is available only during 
the kharif (rainfed) season. So far, there has been negligible expansion of irrigation during the rabi 
(winter) and summer seasons. As a result, the crop sector in Jharkhand has been largely monocrop (that is, 
paddy) in nature.  
 
4.8 The major thrust for agricultural development has to come from the development of 
irrigation. Given the insufficient rainfall, very low area under irrigation, poor productivity and drought 
conditions, water resources need to be developed urgently. The policy for developing water resources 
should include major, medium and minor irrigation prospects. Larger multipurpose projects would be 
very important in view of the power shortage.  Increased power supply to agriculture will help to reduce 
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the cost of irrigation. Minor irrigation could be developed, along the lines of the Gram Bhagirathi Yojana. 
Participatory irrigation management should be emphasized in all these schemes. Groundwater 
exploitation should be done through dug well and shallow tubewells and should not be more than the 
recharge. The current move to enact legislation in this regard is a step in the right direction. 
4.9 However, there is scope for bringing additional area under cultivation, which is currently 
fallow. The strategy should be to develop agriculture by focusing on increasing the production of non-
rice foodgrains, horticultural production as well as animal husbandry and fisheries.  Increase in 
productivity of land under rice production is the key to crop diversification as productivity gains can 
release land for other food and cash crops.  Moreover, an increase in rice productivity can lead to better 
acreage for producing high value-added crops. 
 
4.10 The state’s conditions are well suited for horticultural production.  Productivity levels are 
high in crops such as onion, mango, litchi and guava, which should also be linked with market and 
infrastructure development such as cold storage facilities.  One reason for poor agricultural income has 
been the absence of cash crops such as cotton and sugarcane (there is no sugar factory in the state).  With 
the development of water resources, sugar cultivation can be experimented with in a few pockets.  With 
judicious crop planning, different categories of land can be used for remunerative crop production.  There 
is also potential for producing flowers, medicinal and aromatic plants. In the case of livestock products, 
emphasis should be to increase the production of milk, eggs and meat.  Cross-bred cows and better 
availability of fodder can raise milk production.  Piggery can be emphasized as there is high consumption 
of pork and excellent breeds are available. Food processing units including those for fruit and vegetable 
preservation, milk and meat preservation and processing minor forest produce would enable farmers to 
get better prices. The role of agencies such as ATMA and KVKs is important in developing effective farm 
plans while also ensuring adoption of appropriate technology to improve farm income and the marketing 
chain. These prospects are still at the initial stage of development and will require substantial 
technological and institutional development. 
 
4.11 To the extent that technological progress is dependent on the expansion of irrigated 
agriculture, especially during the winter season, agricultural growth prospects in the state will be 
modest. Even if investment in irrigation schemes enables expansion of the acreage under irrigation to its 
potential, it will remain restricted to only 40 percent of the state’s irrigable land.67 This can be compared 
to 70-80 percent irrigable land in the neighboring regions of the erstwhile Bengal Presidency that is, 
Bihar, West Bengal, and Bangladesh where groundwater irrigation potential is huge.  
 
4.12 Crop sector growth, even with full expansion of irrigation acreage every year would remain 
restricted to the trend growth rate of 3 percent per year and 4 percent per year for agriculture overall, 
taking the standard achieved in West Bengal and Bangladesh in the best possible agricultural growth 
scenario. If the state is realistically aiming at a 6 percent growth rate over the medium term, from the 
current trend of 4 percent per year, it will have to focus on sectors outside agriculture.  With agricultural 
value-addition of only 22 percent, agriculture’s direct contribution to the overall growth rate under the 
best possible scenario cannot exceed 15 percent; the remaining 85 percent would have to be generated in 
other sectors. 
 
4.13 In view of the limitations to agricultural growth, the question that arises is whether the forestry 
sector can play a lead-sector role in the rural growth process. 
 
Forestry as a Subsidiary Source of Employment and Growth 
67
 World Bank/ Government of Bihar, Bihar Plateau Irrigation Project, 1994. 
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4.14 The importance of the forestry sector in Jharkhand’s economy can be judged both by its 
initial high share in total land and by its recent growth performance. Land under forests, for instance, 
constitutes about 30 percent of total land, with wide district-wise variation, ranging from 9 percent in 
Dhanbad to 43-45 percent in Garhwa, Palamu and Hazribagh (Annex Table 4.1). Besides, during 1993-
2003, while the overall share of agriculture and allied sectors has dropped from 23 percent to 17 percent 
the share of the forestry sector has doubled from 1.9 percent to 3.4 percent.  The growth in the forestry 
sector accelerated, particularly after the emergence of the new state and was in the range of 15 percent per 
year, compared with 4 percent for other agricultural sub-sectors from 2001-03. 
 
4.15  Jharkhand’s forest resources, which at present contribute to rural livelihoods on a 
subsistence level, could play a much bigger role in economic growth and poverty alleviation.  
Forests not only cover about 30 percent of the land area but are dominated by economically valuable SAL 
species68 Shorea robusta. Nearly half the forest area is at least partially degraded and the remaining 
forests face growing pressure from encroachment caused by chronic rural poverty.  A majority of the 
forests, constituting 81 percent, is classified as protected.   Forest productivity in the state is at present 
approximately half the national average despite excellent natural conditions for growth.  This represents a 
significant opportunity to expand forest productivity and attain growth potential through investments and 
institutional arrangements. 
4.16 During the lean season, many people’s livelihoods depend critically on forest products for 
subsistence or supplementary income. The most destitute gather wood for sale. A major part of the 
wood that head loaders and bicycle loaders carry is meant for the urban markets.  The degree of 
dependence on forests for subsistence or cash income varies from place to place and depends on the state 
of forests, access and presence or absence of other income- generation opportunities.  Preliminary results 
from the recent Citizen’s Report Card survey (PAF, 2004) suggested that in the 400 households surveyed, 
about 12 percent depend totally on the forest during times of unemployment.  Also, the survey reported 
that most forest products are collected for personal use.69 In all the six villages surveyed by the Tata 
Energy Research Institute (TERI), the results showed that   fuel-wood, fodder and wooden poles were 
gathered for household use and construction.  Estimates of fuel-wood collection ranged from 2 kg per 
household per day to 30 kg per household per day.  This large range is due to the fact that some of these 
households sell fuel-wood in the market.  At least 70 percent of fodder requirements come directly from 
the forest.  The villagers also depend on poles from the forests for construction and maintenance of their 
houses.  On an average a household extracts around 6-10 poles from the forest in a period of three years. 
4.17 Although public expenditure on forest resource development and management has been 
increasing in accordance with new priorities, this has not yielded the expected returns. The annual 
budget for forestry programs from state and central sources is just under Rs. 2 billion (less than 0.5 
percent of GSDP), and represents a significant increase from the situation in undivided Bihar.  
Approximately half of this is meant for operational programs, with approximately 70 percent spent on 
forest management, mainly to establish plantations on degraded lands and in association with new 
community-based forest management approaches. While average expenditure (Rs. 407 per ha) is nearly 
26 percent higher than the national average, the average revenue per ha of forest cover is significantly 
lower (Rs. 71 per ha) than in many other states and one-third the national average.  
4.18 Hence, while there is ample scope for increasing efficiency in the forestry sector, given that 
it contributes only 4-7 percent of employment, and has low productivity (approximately half the all-
India level), it cannot be the lead sector for rural growth.  On the other hand, its critical importance 
68
 Shorea species are valued for timber and for pole production. 
69
 It is important to note that, due to security reasons, forest villages in Naxalite areas were not included in the survey. These 
may have a higher dependence on forests. 
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for the rural poor and the tribal population lies in providing access to ecological reserves in times of crisis 
to supplement food consumption. 
 
Potential of Rural Non-Farm Sectors
4.19 The rural Jharkhand baseline survey household data suggests that approximately 48 
percent of the workers are engaged in non-agricultural wage labor.  The performance of the rural 
non-farm (RNF) sector, that is, self-employment and wage-employment in service, trade, 
transport, and rural manufacturing depends on two factors in this sector: (i) whether labor 
productivity is higher; and (ii) whether employment is poverty-reducing as distinguished from 
poverty-sharing.70  
4.20 The rate of return in rural non-farm self-employment is higher compared to the casual 
wage labor engaged in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.71 The route to upward 
mobility for agricultural wage labor lies not in the transition to casual non-farm wage-
employment but in non-farm self-employment and salaried wage-employment.  Further, analysis 
based on the NSS round shows that the transport business, formal service, trade, and rural artisan 
activities lead to significant increases in income compared to unskilled construction or 
agricultural labor. A switch to informal service and mining activities appears to be poverty 
driven with no clear welfare enhancing effects (Annex Table 3.1). 
 
4.21 Although there are activities within the RNF sector, which could provide upward 
mobility for rural unskilled wage labor, this has no automatic entry. On the supply side, such 
movement is restricted by limited access to financial capital and vocational skills (for self-
employment) and by poor access to human capital (for salaried wage-employment). In addition, 
there are demand-constraints to the expansion of the RNF sector as well. Growth in RNF 
activities is likely to be constrained by slow crop-sector growth, especially for un-irrigated areas.  
When the scope for agricultural employment is limited, survival compulsions can lead to search 
for employment in non-farm and non-agricultural sectors, as reflected in the high proportion of 
non-farm sector employment in the rural labor force. Such mass exodus of farm labor to non-
farm jobs takes place at the lower end of the productivity scale and represents an act of 
desperation, that is, push effects rather than the pull effects of a growing and dynamic sector, at 
present. 
70
 Osmani (1990). 
71
 Table 3.3; Chapter 3. 
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C. Medium to Long-Term Potential of the Mining Sector 
 
4.22 Jharkhand, with its favorable geology and rich mineral endowment, can benefit by 
strengthening its 
institutional 
capacity to 
manage and 
regulate the 
development and 
commercial 
operation of the 
minerals sector.
Mining and 
metallurgical 
downstream 
activities in the state account for more than 14.6 percent of GSDP; 7.4 percent of India’s mineral 
production in 2002/03 or Rs. 53.3 billion,72 mainly from coal (91.2 percent), iron ore (6.3 
percent) and bauxite (0.6 percent); and contribute Rs. 8 billion per annum or about 15 percent of 
Jharkhand’s total fiscal receipts, second only to sales tax (Table 4.2).  Consequently, any growth 
strategy should include sustainable development of the minerals sector as one of its key 
components. 
High Investment and Growth Potential        
4.23 Many developing 
countries in Latin America 
and Africa have taken 
advantage of the 
increasingly global mining 
industry that competes for 
the limited amounts of 
exploration and 
development capital, 
seeking the best risk-
adjusted returns. Over the 
last 20-30 years these 
countries have successfully reformed their mining sectors and attracted significant private 
investment flows, technology and modern management to develop their natural resources.  In 
Latin America, Chile, Peru, Mexico and Argentina have introduced the most comprehensive 
reforms that have produced impressive results (Table 4.3).  In Africa, Ghana, Tanzania and 
Madagascar have followed suit with similar results.  While some established Asian mining 
countries like Indonesia have experienced declining fortunes, PNG, Mongolia and China have 
enacted reforms and enjoy considerable investment interest. 
 
72
 Central Statistical Organization. 
73
 The figure for Peru includes the value of Antamina, which began production in 2001 valued at about US$ 650 million. 
Table 4. 2: Mineral Resources of Jharkhand 
 (Tonnes million) 
Reserves Production  (2002/03) 
Jharkhand India Proportion ( percent) Jharkhand India 
Proportion  
(percent) 
Iron Ore 3,758 10,052 37.4 13.7 97.0 14.1 
Coal 691 2,111 32.7 78.6 341.2 23.0 
Copper 
(contained) 
112 441 25.4 0.02 0.78 2.6 
Bauxite 70 2,462 2.8 1.2 9.8 11.8 
Fireclay 50 518 9.7 0.05 0.46 10.9 
Limestone 511 75,678 0.7 2.3 145.6 1.6 
Table 4. 3: Impact of Selective Mineral Sector Reforms 
(US$ million) 
 
Country
Level of 
Exploration  
Industrial Output Exports  
Before After Before After Before After 
Argentina <3 150 340 1,310 70 700 
Chile 15 250 2,400 7,500 2,300 6,900 
Peru 10 200 2,000 3,900 1,900 3,60073 
Tanzania <1 35 53 350 53 350 
Ghana <1 n.a. 125 700 125 650 
Mali <1 30 <1 242 <1 230 
Source: Bank Staff estimates
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4.24 International experience also suggests that not all mining-based growth strategies 
will be growth enhancing in the long run. The positive impact of mining reforms on growth 
and poverty depends mostly on competent institutions to manage mineral wealth, taking 
the unique characteristics of the sector into account. Indeed, sustainability of a mining-based 
growth strategy will depend greatly on how the dividends from such growth are managed, as 
indicated by the classic example of Nigeria’s boom and bust story.74 Successful mining laws 
need to be designed to: (i) minimize corruption and rent-seeking, as well as the duration of the 
permit process, by eliminating discretion in the implementation of the law; (ii) reduce 
speculation and encourage active exploration, by the use of properly structured license fees, 
which also serve to finance an independent and efficient mining cadastre; and (iii) provide 
environmental and social safeguards and rehabilitation.  These successful reforms are built 
around the key principles of ease of access strictly on a “first come first serve” basis; standard 
conditions applicable to all investments; transparent access to minerals, through a modern and 
open mining cadastre and title registry; free transferability of mining title; simple financial 
maintenance requirements; competitive royalty obligations; and proper environmental 
management, rehabilitation and community development. 
 
Mineral-Dependent Development: The Risks of “Resource Curse” Scenario 
4.25 In a survey of international mining companies,75 India, including Jharkhand, ranks 
extremely poorly as an exploration destination because mining development faces major 
regulatory, environmental and social obstacles.  The cornerstone of reforms in this field 
generally includes re-defining the role of the state; easy and transparent access to minerals under 
standard conditions for all investors; security of mining title; freedom to operate on a commercial 
basis; competitive and stable fiscal provisions; comprehensive social and environmental 
protection and mitigating measures and benefit sharing mechanisms, which address most if not 
all externalities of mineral production, and are used to convert minerals to productive assets, 
thereby catalyzing broader regional development. 
 
4.26 There are already some signs of developing the “resource curse” syndrome. The 
state is yet to develop appropriate institutional, regulatory and safeguard conditions for 
embarking on a fast-paced mineral-based growth strategy. In fact, without having such 
institutional safeguards in place, an unregulated mineral-based growth strategy can bring in more 
risks than rewards. This can be judged by several examples. One relates to the manner in which 
institutional safeguards of local communities directly affected by mining activities are being 
addressed, that is the equity aspect of mining-based growth. Other examples relate to the 
institutional hurdles that genuine private investors face in undertaking new investments in the 
sector, that is, the efficiency aspect of mining-based growth. 
 
4.27 Mining localities often get inadequate attention in the rush for mineral development 
and end up suffering in economic, social and environmental terms. One would expect that 
with large benefits of mineral development accruing to societies, the localities affected by 
mining could be compensated fully with the other sections of society still reaping large net 
“producers’ surplus”.  However, in practice, this is often not the case. While many factors 
74
 Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2005); Kanbur and Venables (2005). 
75
 Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2003/4, Fraser Institute. 
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contribute to that outcome, one crucial factor is “governance”, broadly including the institutional 
and policy framework for the use of mineral income and for compensating the localities 
adversely affected. 
 
4.28 Jharkhand’s experience over the last fifty years bears no exception to the general 
rule of poor performance of resource-rich developing countries. In spite of a significant 
increase in the extraction of minerals, the per capita income of the state remained one of the 
lowest in the country and localities affected by mining faced acute poverty and environmental 
problems. Once again, the institutional framework for utilizing the revenues from mineral 
development, and for addressing the welfare of the localities affected, has been an important 
contributory factor. The challenge before policy makers in Jharkhand is to break away from past 
practices and utilize the mineral wealth for truly broad-based development.  
 
4.29 The existing legal framework that regulates land for mineral leases is weak and 
leaves ample scope for unfair losses to those whose land is acquired. The legal opinion in 
GoJ appears to be that the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894, which allows acquisition of 
land for “public purposes”, is the preferred route for acquiring land for mining leases. However, 
this route is fraught with practical difficulties. First, it needs to be seen whether commercial and 
profit-making activities like mining can be classified as “public purpose”. The LAA stipulates 
that notifications for acquisition of land should be published in two regional newspapers, at least 
one of which should be published in the local language, and also put up at a public place in the 
local area, besides being published in the official gazette. However, in practice, the information 
does not reach the local community in time for them to raise objections within the specified time 
limit.  
 
4.30 The LAA does not provide any real space to the affected parties for protest, negotiations or 
even discussion.  Compensation is determined on the basis of the market value of land taken as the 
average of three cases of recent land transactions in the area and based on the value on the date of first 
notification, rather than the date of taking possession that may be years later.  As the recorded market 
price is often a fraction of the actual price, and land prices rise quickly over time, the current procedures 
amount to heavy and unfair losses to the local community whose land is thus acquired. 
 
4.31 These kinds of inequities are no longer acceptable to the people adversely affected by leases 
for mining development. Jharkhand has a long history of agitation politics and the recent events in 
Orissa concerning mining leases have further sharpened the political consciousness to the need for 
making land acquisition legally sound and politically acceptable. 
 
4.32 There are also institutional and legal barriers to attracting private investment into the 
sector.  The most important bottleneck stems from the archaic mode of state control.  Thus, although the 
central government has opened the mineral sector to private investors,76 easy and transparent access to 
minerals remains difficult.  State control and operation of coal resources, the major output of the sector, 
and to a lesser extent the operation of the Jharkhand State Mineral Development Corporation, creates 
ambiguities regarding the role of the government, and conflict of interest, thereby restricting transition of 
the state’s role from owner or operator to manager or regulator of the minerals sector.  Coal, which is the 
predominant mineral produced in the state, is reserved for development77 by the central government under 
76
 With the exception of the 11 atomic minerals and coal. 
77
 As part of the overall liberalization of the sector, certain coal blocks have been made available to private developers of captive 
collieries whose production is tied to specific steel and power projects. 
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the provisions of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition & Development) Act of 1957.  Some 80 million 
tons of coal are produced in Jharkhand by Coal India Limited’s (CILs) three wholly-owned subsidiaries, 
National Colliers Limited (NCL), Bhartiya Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) and, to a lesser extent, Eastern 
Coalfields Limited (ECL).  In the absence of central budget subsidies, they are ill equipped to expand 
capacity to meet the rapidly rising demand for coal in India.  The proposed amendment to the act, which 
remains stranded in the Economic Standing Committee of the Lok Sabha, would allow for unrestricted 
access to the coal sector by private investors.  This amendment would also transform the role of 
government, create much needed competition within the sector, increase productive capacity to meet the 
needs of the economy and accelerate growth within the state. 
 
4.33 Despite the limitations in the mineral policy of Jharkhand, private investors have shown 
great interest in investment in the mineral sector in the state. This has, in part, been stimulated by the 
prospect of the large increase in demand for steel and cement due to the construction boom in India and 
other parts of Asia. The new atmosphere is reflected in the current spate of MoUs between the GoJ and 
some major Indian and foreign corporate giants. It is therefore highly plausible that the pace of mineral 
development in the state over the next ten years will be dramatically different from that in the last ten 
years. The total value of investments promised by the MoUs is over Rs. 1 trillion which is several times 
the current GSDP of the state.
4.34 However, making mineral development environmentally sustainable and socially 
just is a challenge. Mitigation of the environmental impacts of mining and progressive 
rehabilitation of the affected surface area is fundamental to modern sustainable mining 
development and retention of the “social license to operate” implicitly conveyed by the impacted 
local communities. Enforcement of environmental impact assessments and agreed environmental 
management plans is an essential part of this social compact, especially in Jharkhand with its 
high population density and intense competition for rural agricultural land. Reputable mining 
companies recognize this and now take their environmental stewardship seriously by adopting 
good environmental practices. This is reinforced by balanced environmental legislation, 
adequately funded mine closure plans, and major international financial institutions who 
condition their loans in adherence to the World Bank environmental guidelines.  
 
4.35 Significant reforms are required at both the central and state levels and include 
amendment of the national legal, regulatory and fiscal legislations that govern mining 
activity at the state level, improving the permit process, and strengthening the institutional 
and administrative capacity of public mining institutions. These are discussed in greater 
detail in Annex 4.1. Besides, promotion of mining-led growth in Jharkhand will be greatly 
facilitated by: (i) providing guidelines for environmental impact assessments, environmental 
management plans and community development plans; (ii) a consultation framework to facilitate 
rational land-use planning, community development and sharing of benefits between local and 
indigenous communities; and (iii) the dual use of designated forest areas with progressive 
rehabilitation and afforestation.  
 
Developing Mines within Indigenous Communities 
4.36 Working with indigenous communities requires “beginning with the end in mind”, 
conveying to them that mining is a temporary land-use, that lands will be reclaimed and 
reverted to other uses, and that sustainability comes from leaving lasting human capital and 
infrastructure after mine closure. Human capital is best fostered through education, either job-
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training directly for the mine or the many innovative enterprises that may be needed locally to 
support the operation. Beginning with the end in mind also relies heavily on leaving shared 
infrastructure that can revert to other uses. In forest-based economies, this may include roads 
and bridges that connect larger markets, clean water systems, and the technology and capacity 
to monitor spatial and temporal changes of other natural resources.  The Whitehorse Mining 
Initiative in Canada (Box 4.1) is a good example of prior informed consultation with tribal 
communities to agree on a framework for development of mineral resources in tribal areas for 
the benefit of the community, the state and the investors. 
 
4.37 In the event that an indigenous community needs to be resettled, some important actions 
should be anticipated. Information through consultation is the key aspect. If residents do not 
clearly understand their predicament and the options available to them, they will not move. An 
inventory of homes and structures, regardless of titles, will complement an analysis of customary 
land-use in the surrounding forest. Good community consultation yields accurate information 
about household composition, alternative housing and compensation or relocation preferences.  
Criteria and norms for compensation, based on values in nearby rural locations must be 
established. Land swaps for replacement of agricultural or forestlands can often be arranged with 
the mine, taking advantage of aggressive reclamation and reforestation programs.  
 
4.38 It is essential that options be provided to allow individuals to choose between alternatives 
based on cash and/or replacement of buildings and land. Those affected would want to know the 
level of compensation provided and how real the proposed options are.  This requires offering 
reasonable alternatives, compensating at reasonable rates and also for interim hardships of 
moving.  Two general principles follow: (i) indigenous communities must have an active role in 
the planning process and not have the planning pre-determined for them; and (ii) no option be 
offered to the community for which funds or lands are not available. 
 
4.39 Finally, indigenous communities share an intense relationship with their land. The mine 
should prepare enough land to re-settle the community on either new lands or reclaimed mine 
lands, ensuring that swaps are acceptable. With the company actively engaged in the resettlement 
process, shared interest in success is more likely as companies do not thrive in tattered 
communities. 
 
Box 4. 1: Whitehorse Mining Initiative (WMI) 
An Early Implementation of Sustainable Mining Supported by Political and Community Consensus. The 
Whitehorse Mining Initiative Leadership Council Accord was created in response to varied and complex challenges 
facing mining in Canada, including a fractured dialogue with Canada’s indigenous people.   Against this 
background, the industry sought support within a non-adversarial framework to develop a new strategic vision for 
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mineral development for the 21st century. The WMI started in 1992 with a multi-stakeholder consultation during 
which the nation’s mining ministers agreed to co-sponsor the process, and mining industry representatives, senior 
government officials, labor unions, indigenous peoples, and the environmental community agreed to participate. 
The initiative culminated into an 18-month program to develop a strategic vision for a viable mining industry, and 
preserve diverse ecosystems, which was built upon shared opportunities with indigenous peoples. The accord 
improves regulatory efficiency and ensures the participation of indigenous peoples in all aspects of mining.  Central 
to the accord is sound environmental stewardship, recognition and respect for indigenous people’s treaty rights.  
Informed land-use decisions are supported by mineral resource assessments undertaken by the government.    
The process leading up to the accord relied on a diverse set of stakeholders addressing finance and taxation, 
environment, land access, and workforce, workplace and community issues. Each working group produced guiding 
principles and objectives that included over 150 recommendations. Implementation proceeded in stages marked by 
progress reports from the national and regional levels.    
The WMI represents an early implementation of sustainable mining supported by political and community 
consensus.  Through effective consultation and inclusion of indigenous peoples in the mine development process, 
Community Mining Agreements, also called Impact Benefit Agreements, have become commonplace in Canada. 
Community Mining Agreements. These agreements establish the formal relationship between a mine and its local 
communities.  These development agreements increasingly adopt the principles of sustainable development and thus 
bring to a project many of the responses needed for mining in the twenty-first century.  The benefits of these 
agreements are distributed across several stakeholders including an empowered community, companies benefiting 
from a consultative process that defines rational expectations, and host governments who view such agreements as 
buy-in at the local level.  Civil society, including non-governmental organizations, plays an active role in ongoing 
monitoring of the project, capacity building and ensuring good stewardship of resource lands. 
Community mining agreements with indigenous peoples serve to: 
(i) address the adverse effects of commercial mining activities on local communities and their environments, culture, 
way of life, natural environment, and economic activity;   
(ii) ensure that the communities share in the benefits of mining from which they might otherwise suffer only 
negative impacts and receive nothing or only token benefits. 
Community mining agreements increasingly lead to the development of downstream economic development plans in 
which mining serves as an engine of growth for training, formal education, and the creation of SMEs. Successful 
agreements begin with incorporation of end-in-mind strategies that enable transition of the community to a diversity 
of other economic activities well before mine closure. 
Source: Bank staff  
4.40 While governance problems in the mineral sector are serious, GoJ is fully aware of them 
and is actively developing an institutional and policy framework for tackling them.  Specifically, 
GoJ is at an advanced stage of preparing its policy for mineral development and resettlement and 
rehabilitation of communities adversely affected by mineral development and related industrial 
activities. While the policy is still under preparation, the overall approach puts emphasis on 
“partnership” between the affected communities, the state and the mining companies. The 
objective is to offer terms, which should in principle enable voluntary surrender of land by the 
affected communities.  
D. The Middle Option: Sustainable and Inclusive Growth 
 
63 
4.41 The foregoing review of the strengths and weaknesses of the two options suggest a 
middle course, namely, an inter-temporal balance between the two strategies.  While mining and 
broad-based industrial activity will lead growth over the medium to long-term and enable resource 
mobilization, it is the agricultural and rural sector which needs to be addressed in the short to medium 
term through increased investments in irrigation, rural connectivity, health, education, and non-
farm rural activities.  The secondary and tertiary sectors, which account for more than 50 
percent of GSDP, could become the principal source of growth over the medium to long term 
with appropriate institutional interventions.  Besides meeting the prerequisites of development,
this option requires an investor-friendly climate to counter the negative developmental image of 
the state while encouraging private investment through decentralization and de-regulation. Labor 
absorption must increase in non-rural sectors, to the extent technologically permissible, especially 
through the development of SMEs.  
 
Fostering Labor-Intensive Manufacturing and Services 
4.42 The pattern of growth in Jharkhand suggests that there is significant potential for 
dividends from a broad-based industrial growth strategy. Unlike the fast-growing states 
where the services sector continues to boom,78 Jharkhand’s successes are predicated on industrial 
growth clusters and on dynamic Indian industry leaders, in both the private and public sectors.79 
While the development of mineral-based industries can catapult the state on a high growth 
trajectory across the medium to long term, excessive reliance on this sector as a source of growth 
has risks as seen earlier.   
 
4.43 A more balanced strategy over the medium to long term would require broadening 
of the manufacturing base beyond mineral-based industries. Jharkhand’s excellent 
manufacturing base for small-scale industries (SSI) covering auto, steel plant, rubber 
components, recycling and downstream industries, among others,80 vindicates the claim of many 
experts that many more industrial clusters could be established.81 Spin-offs in terms of ancillary 
industries from mega-projects and industrial clusters such as Jamshedpur and Bokaro are 
evident. Entrants like Timken and Cummins have also helped introduce best practices, including 
state-of-the-art operating procedures, in the local production environment. Lastly, the existence 
of good quality educational and technical institutions is an additional advantage to the state.82 
4.44 Despite the promises, actual investments in Jharkhand are not impressive (Figure 4.1).  
The Investment Climate Survey (ICS) suggests a need for substantial improvement in the 
investment climate (IC) which, in comparison to other states is deficient, and does not provide 
adequate incentive to investors, from both within Jharkhand and outside.  
 
78
 The performance of manufacturing sector is a mixed bag; the agriculture sector is lagging across India, including Jharkhand. 
For details, see India, DPR, Report No. 34580-IN, World Bank, 2006. 
79
 They include Damodar Valley Corporation, Power Grid Corporation, Tenughat, Patratu and Bokaro thermal power stations, 
Bokaro Steel, Tata Steel, ACC, Central Coalfields Ltd., TELCO, Hindustan Copper Ltd., ICI, Indo-Asahi, Bharat Refractories, 
Dabur, Lafarge, Timken, Tata Cummins etc to name a few. 
80
 Other key SSIs include: heat treatment, forgings, metal presses, castings, rubber components, machine shops, and fabrication 
units. 
81
 Particularly in and around Bokaro, Jamshedpur, Hazaribagh, Ranchi and Dhanbad, using raw materials in the form of by-
products of industries located in these districts. 
82
 For instance, Birla Institutes of Technology at Mesra and Ranchi, Indian School of Mines at Dhanbad, XLRI at Jamshedpur, 
and Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Limited. 
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Constraints to Investment
4.45 Identification of the bottlenecks 
that deter investment and productivity 
growth in SMEs and large enterprises in 
Jharkhand is based on a combination of 
primary and secondary sources. 84 
4.46 Central to the problems in 
Jharkhand’s investment climate are 
poor governance and weak 
institutions.  As a first step, the ICS 
asked the private entrepreneurs to rank 
the IC bottlenecks faced by them, in 
order of importance.  Figure 4.3 refers 
to the percentage of firms that have 
identified a given factor as a major or 
severe obstacle. The results are not 
surprising. Firm managers ranked the 
lack of adequate and affordable 
infrastructure, particularly electricity 
and transport, as the most critical IC 
bottleneck, followed by high tax rates, 
and regulations, corruption and access 
to finance as the third. Complexities in 
83
 Actual investments have been measured in terms of IEMs implemented. Data for 2005 is till March, 2005. 
84
 An investment climate survey (ICS) of firms in Jharkhand was conducted in 2005/06, as part of the All India ICS, to identify 
the main factors constraining the growth of Jharkhand’s firms. This survey included around 120 firms in Jharkhand, across 4 
industrial clusters (Ranchi, Jamshedpur, Dhanbad and Bokaro). The sectors included: metals and mining, wood and wood 
products, garments, leather and leather products, machine tools and machinery and parts, mineral processing, paper and paper 
products, auto components, electronics and electrical appliances, chemicals and plastics, and agro and food processing.  
Additionally, in-depth interviews of potential investors in the area of metals and mining industry, ITES and agro-processing were 
conducted to understand constraints faced by out-of-state investors.  The choice of the sectors was driven by GoJ who considers 
these as priority sectors. 
Figure 4. 1: Proposed and Actual Investments83 in Various States 
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Figure 4. 3: Managers in Jharkhand Identifying Factor as 
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the tax administration regime, skill shortages and problems in accessing land were also ranked as 
major impediments. 
4.47  An analysis in 2004 and 2005 ranked Jharkhand 19th out of 20 states, slightly ahead of 
Bihar based on eight parameters, namely investment scenario, budget and prosperity, 
infrastructure, health, education, law and order, agriculture and the size of the consumer 
market).85 It is noteworthy that the two other newly-created states, Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal, 
have higher rankings than Jharkhand.  
 
4.48 An analysis86 of constraints perceived by potential investors in Jharkhand has further 
highlighted its key IC bottlenecks. These include access to land, infrastructure, regulation and 
governance, law and order, labor laws, access to finance, and the negative “image” of Jharkhand. 
Most of these issues resonate with those raised by firms operating in other states in India. 
However, the prioritization and severity of the IC constraints in Jharkhand differs. 
 
Infrastructural Access for Manufacturing Growth 
 
4.49 Availability and quality of 
infrastructure is a critical constraint faced by 
firms operating in Jharkhand and equally for 
potential investors not choosing the state as an 
investment destination. Table 4.4 reveals that 
Jharkhand lags behind the India average on most 
infrastructure availability indicators, such as road 
length per 100 sq km, power availability per 
capita, net irrigated area and tele-density.  
 
4.50 The picture is starker in relative 
terms. Among 28 states, Jharkhand ranks 
22nd on the aggregate infrastructure index which covers the power, communications, and 
transportation sectors87 . Competing states such as Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and West Bengal rank 
17th, 14th, and 11th respectively (Table 4.5).  Sectorally, the state is ranked 21st in 
communications infrastructure, 18th in power and 14th in transport infrastructure. 
 
4.51 The findings of the survey of firms in Jharkhand, as part of the Third Investment Climate 
Survey -2005/06, corroborate this as well. On average, firms in Jharkhand face over 38 power 
outages a month compared to less than 18 per month for the rest of India88 (Figure 4.4). Further, 
85
 “State of the States: India’s Best and Worst States,” India Today, 2004 and “The Best States to Live In,” India Today, 2005. 
86
 Inputs for this note are based largely on primary data from a “potential investors” survey, combined with field interviews of 
existing firms and other stakeholders.  Preliminary results from sector policy notes on IT, agro-processing (tomato processing); 
and NTFPs (choice governed by client demand) have also been incorporated. Lastly, the note has relied on secondary 
publications and data. 
87
 An aggregate “infrastructure index” is defined as the degree of cost disability that states suffer in providing public services 
because of their underdeveloped infrastructure. Based on this definition, the top-ranked state is one that has the least cost 
disability, because its infrastructure is best developed. The index is developed on the basis of “enabling (network capacity) 
factors” and “network use factors” for three sectors: power, communications, and transportation. Enabling factors determine the 
usability of the network, while network use factors reflect the extent of infrastructure use. The enabling factors and network use 
variables differ from sector to sector. The index is based on a study of state infrastructure (Mohanty) carried out at the behest of 
the Twelfth Finance Commission to make a broad and systematic comparison of infrastructure development in various states. 
88
 ICS 2003-04, as discussed earlier. 
Table 4. 4: Infrastructure Indicators 
2004 
Infrastructure   
Measures 
Jharkhand All -India 
Road Length per 100 sq 
km 
21.4 km 74.2 km 
Power Availability Per 
Capita 
225 kwh 450 kwh 
Irrigated Area (percent) 10.2 40 
Tele-Density (percent) 3.0 10 
Source: Annual Plan 2005-06, GoJ. 
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over 39 percent of the electricity needs of firms in Jharkhand are met through their own captive 
generation versus 27 percent for the rest of India. 
 
Table 4. 5: Infrastructure Index: Ranking of Indian States 
HIGH 
Goa, Maharashtra, Punjab 
HIGHER- MIDDLE 
Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Tamil Nadu 
MIDDLE 
AP, Karnataka 
LOWER-MIDDLE 
Himachal Pradesh, MP, Orissa, UP, Uttaranchal, West Bengal 
LOW 
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Jharkhand, Mizoram, Nagaland, Assam, 
Chhattisgarh, Sikkim, Tripura, J&K, Bihar, Rajasthan 
Source: “Study on State Infrastructure,” by Nirmal Mohanty, Report to the Twelfth Finance Commission, 
Government of India. Note: An aggregate “infrastructure index”, is defined as the degree of cost disability 
that states suffer in providing public services because of their underdeveloped infrastructure. 
Figure 4. 4: Burden Imposed by Inadequate and Unreliable Power Supply 
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4.52  Similarly, on the road 
network, Jharkhand fares poorly 
when compared with most other 
states in India (Figure 4.5).89 
Access to land   
 
4.53 Private sector investors face 
several legal, policy, regulatory, 
process and institutional constraints 
in land acquisition. These cause 
inordinate delays in land acquisition, 
thereby discouraging potential 
investors.90 Each of the issues is 
discussed in greater detail below. 
 Policies and laws related to changes in designated use of tribal and forestland: The GoJ does not 
have a well-defined land policy.  There is lack of clarity in land zoning or designation for specific 
uses, as city and regional master plans are either not available or need to be redesigned. In many 
cases, the small size of land holdings makes it difficult to obtain continuous tracts of land. Lastly, the 
lack of clear and consistent guidelines on valuation norms paves the way for informal side-payments.  
 
 Lack of clarity of title, ownership and tenure: Irrespective of whether land is owned by the state 
government or by private owners, it takes a very long time to obtain a clear title deed as land records 
are poorly maintained. In many instances, land revenue receipts are often not enough to ascertain 
clear title and various informal means are employed to ascertain whether the land title is clear. In 
addition, land is usually obtained on a leasehold basis for 30 years, a time period not always 
considered sufficient by lenders for using the land as collateral.  
 
 High transaction costs of buying and selling land: The need for clearances from both the district 
collector’s office and the revenue department often leads to delays and wastage of investor resources. 
Bureaucratic hurdles also provide an opportunity for rent seeking behavior. High stamp duties and 
registration charges create further distortions by way of reducing declared transaction values and 
corresponding revenue to the state. Stamp duty and registration charges in Jharkhand (6-8 percent) are 
comparable with other states in the country but are higher in comparison with other Asian developing 
countries. Aside from stamp duties, there is an additional service charge of about 10 percent levied 
for land transactions on the private sector even if the land is acquired by the private sector outside 
industrial areas. 
 
Governance and Business Regulation 
89
 The findings of the survey of firms in Jharkhand (as part of the Third Investment Climate Survey -2005/06). 
90
 In-state firms, mainly SMEs, surveyed did not rank this issue as highly as out-of-state investors did. This is so because projects 
from out-of-state investors are usually larger, having larger land requirements and is likelier in sectors such as mining in which 
Jharkhand has significant comparative advantage. But this also requires more complex approvals and is associated with socio-
political and economic issues: tribal land rights and location of mining land in designated forest areas. 
Figure 4. 5: Inter-state Comparison of Road Networks 
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4.54 An overview of regulatory issues regarding 
business entry and quality of governance in 
Jharkhand, referring specifically to general 
governance, including law and order and corruption 
is provided here. Regulations and corruption are 
ranked in the top three constraints that firms face 
(Figure 4.6). Interviews with potential investors have 
highlighted governance, perceived or experienced, as 
one of the principal constraints, possibly even more 
than that felt by in-state firms. Within regulations, 
corruption, and tax and custom administration have 
been identified as greater hindrances (Figure 4.6). 
 
4.55 Both entry and exit regulations are a 
deterrent to private investment. Across India, it 
takes a long time to register a business as firms are required to seek several permits and clearances both at 
the central and state level. A number of states have set up a “single window” system for the large number 
of clearances required to be obtained at the state level. In Jharkhand too business entry regulation 
compliance is required in several areas and from multiple state government bodies, but each of these has 
to be separately obtained.  Table 4.6 provides a brief review of the clearances required in Jharkhand. It is 
seen that business entry regulation compliance is required in several areas and from multiple state 
government bodies. 
 
4.56 Exit regulation for the private sector in India concerns both bankruptcy procedures that govern 
disposal and restructuring of assets as well as labor laws governing severance.  Most of these issues are 
within the purview of the central government except for retrenchment. At present, exit barriers arise out 
of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act91 and the Sick Industries Companies Act.92 The Industrial 
91
 Need to seek state permission for closure of units employing more than 100 persons. 
92
 Winding-up tasks are to be performed by the courts and revival has to be assigned to BIFR, which is a long and complex 
process. 
Figure 4. 6: Percent of Jharkhand Firms 
Identifying Regulations as Severe or Very Severe 
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Source: Staff estimates based on ICS 2005-06. 
Table 4. 6: Business Entry Regulation Compliance 
Clearances required Department responsible 
Allotment of Land/Acquisition of Land/Change of 
Land use 
Industries Department, GoJ and District 
Collector 
Approval of Building Plan Industrial Area Development Authority and 
Local Bodies 
Release of Power Connection and Consent for Setting 
up Captive Power Plant Jharkhand State Electricity Board 
Release of Water Supply State Water Supply Board and Industrial Area 
Authority 
Registration as a Factory Chief Inspector of Factories 
Sales Tax Registration Revenue Department, GoJ 
Registration under Trade Union Act Labor Department, GoJ 
Registration under Shops and Establishments Act Labor Department, GoJ 
Registration under Industrial Disputes Act Labor Department, GoJ 
Registration under Minimum Wages Act/State 
Employee Insurance Act Labor Department, GoJ 
Source: IMaCS Research 
69 
Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2002, proposes to increase the limit from 100 employees to 1,000 
employees, for units to seek government 
permission for closure of units or further 
retrenchment of workers.  
 
Access to Business Finance 
 
4.57 Access to finance remains another key 
constraint, particularly for small-scale units. 
Access to adequate and timely finance on 
competitive terms is a problem for SMEs across 
India, and was identified by the firm-level 
survey as a key bottleneck to growth and 
productivity. Problems in credit access are 
attributable to a combination of factors rooted 
in: (i) weaknesses in the legal framework for 
loan recovery, bankruptcy, and contract 
enforcement, together with inefficiencies in the court system, with the latter largely accounting for inter-
state variations in the time and cost of loan recovery and bankruptcy; (ii) institutional weaknesses, such as 
the absence of good credit appraisal and risk management and monitoring tools in banks that increase 
transaction costs in dealing with SMEs; (iii) the absence of reliable credit information on SMEs; and (iv) 
lack of sufficient market credibility in the SME sector. It is difficult for lenders to assess risk premiums 
properly, creating differences in the perceived versus real risk profiles of SMEs and resulting in untapped 
lending opportunities to SMEs. These issues are largely outside the purview of the state government; the 
central government, on the other hand, can play an important role in improving the policy, regulatory and 
legal framework to support more efficient financial market functioning. 93 
4.58  However, the problem of access to finance for entrepreneurs appears more severe 
for Jharkhand’s firms than those in most other major states. The ICS 2005/06 survey reveals 
that far fewer firms in Jharkhand had active bank credit lines as compared to firms in other states 
(Figure 4.7). As an additional indicator of the level of access to finance for firms based in 
Jharkhand, the per capita credit to deposit ratio is considerably lower in Jharkhand than in states 
like Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and AP, the all-India average and even some of the 
other “lagging states” like UP, Rajasthan and MP.  
 
4.59 As seen from the results of the survey, Jharkhand’s IC is deficient compared to other states in 
India and will require substantial improvement.  Moreover, the IC does not provide adequate leeway to 
investors, both from within Jharkhand and outside it to invest in the state.  In order to realize its full 
potential, the GoJ is framing a new industrial policy,94 aimed at creating an investor-friendly regulatory 
93
 Key measures by the central government would include: (i) legislative changes in mortgage registration to make the process 
more customer friendly; (ii) simplification of the legal framework for collateral enforcement and loan recovery by introducing 
alternate, out-of-court, methods of dispute resolution; (iii) establishing a bankruptcy framework that would facilitate the easy exit 
of small firms, given their relatively high mortality rate. Recent estimates show that it is entirely common for bankruptcy 
proceedings in India to take more than two years, and over 60 percent of liquidation cases before the High Courts have been in 
process for more than ten years. Not surprisingly, when looking at the share of firms that go bankrupt, India has a much lower 
share (0.04 percent) than other emerging markets, such as Thailand. This may be changed, once the recently enacted amendments 
to the Companies Act are put into effect; this will provide a new framework for the liquidation of firms outside the court process.  
94A Committee under the chairmanship of the development commissioner is being notified for drafting the new industrial policy. 
The 2001 Industrial Policy expires next year in March. The government has not been able to fully deliver on the last policy as it 
was considered “unrealistic” due to its emphasis on providing fiscal incentives as opposed to creating an enabling environment 
for private sector growth. 
Figure 4. 7: Access to Credit in Jharkhand 
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70 
environment, combined with effective institutional arrangements. An improvement in the IC is likely to 
have wide-ranging positive externalities and an economy-wide impact in terms of growth and social 
development that is not just limited to the private sector development.  What follows is a brief assessment 
of the state’s strategy and performance till the present for promoting broad-based growth.  The next 
section suggests specific policy and regulatory options and recommendations for each of the IC 
constraints highlighted here. 
 
4.60 A cursory review of GoJ’s progress in its ongoing reforms, as articulated in the Industrial Policy 
2001, reveals that it lacks strategic focus, and the “thrust” sectors identified by the policy are far too 
broad, including almost every economic activity. More importantly, on most aspects, implementation of 
the industrial policy has been slow and ineffective.95 Some reform momentum was recently built since the 
state’s chief minister initiated the process for expediting the proposed investments (MoUs) into actual 
investments. The focus, nonetheless, seems to be on the larger projects, with facilitation of SMEs 
remaining on the back burner.  
 
Improving Access to Quality Infrastructure Requires 
 
 Formulating an infrastructure development policy, creation of an infrastructural 
development board or corporation and an enabling act along the lines of the Andhra 
Pradesh Infrastructure Development Enabling Act would facilitate private investment in 
infrastructure.  
 Improving and modernizing Ranchi airport in consultation with the Airports Authority of 
India and in line with the present GoI policy. 
 Creating a state road development corporation with the mandate of developing state and 
district roads and connectivity to the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) road 
stretches. 
 Assigning clear responsibilities for different parts of the transport network and different 
activities along the recently passed Jharkhand Highways Bill, awaiting the governor’s 
consent, along functional lines.96 
 Developing an Inland Container Depot (ICD) or dry port where all customs formalities 
can be completed for both imports and exports, and which can provide direct connectivity 
to Kolkata and Haldia ports.  
Power Sector Aspects 
 
 Commercial performance: regularizing financial reporting and internal controls, and 
developing business turnaround strategies for each company. 
 Restructuring: Operationalizing the restructuring, including: (i) competitive recruitment 
of managers; (ii) development of human resources in the accounting and audit functions; 
95
 For example, the following measures mentioned in the policy five years ago still remain to be acted upon: IIDB has not been 
constituted; Jharkhand Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. (JIIDC) has not yet been formed   and only the 
Memorandum of Association has been formulated while one of its mandates is to create, develop and maintain infrastructure 
facilities for systematic growth of industrial units in Jharkhand; and the legislation underpinning the establishment of the single 
window system was considered but has presently been put on hold. 
96
 The core highway network can be formally assigned to a semi-autonomous State Highway Authority and the core rural road 
network to the existing SRRDA. Over time, in line with the 73rd amendment in the Constitution, the rural road network would 
need to be gradually transferred to district-level road agencies as their capacities increase. For the larger cities, transport 
authorities may be required to integrate the various elements of a sustainable urban transport regime. 
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(iii) new financial management systems; (iv) establishment of commercial transactions 
between the new companies; and (v) separate licensing and tariff regulation for each new 
company.   
 Corporate governance:  Increasing representation of independent non-executive directors 
on the boards of power companies and reduction of cross-directorships. 
 Subsidy:  Undertaking as a first step a valuation of subsidy flows and their effects, 
including an analysis of the distribution of the benefits of power subsidy.  Develop an 
institutional mechanism to work out cross indebtedness.  Design a targeted, efficient, 
subsidy mechanism for BPL households. 
 Creating opportunities for new lower-cost entrants to provide power generation and 
electric service in rural areas: these should include (i) notification of areas as de-regulated 
for the purposes of rural electricity supply in accordance with the provisions of the 
Electricity Act; (ii) implementation of rural electricity franchises; (iii) policy for the 
development of private green-field power plants; (iv) development of rules for open 
access to the transmission network as required by the Electricity Act; and (v) issue of 
second distribution licenses by JSERC.
Improving Access to Land 
 Computerizing and updating all land records. 
 Creating an industrial land acquisition and facilitation agency for development and 
management of industrial parks in the state. 
 Creating a land bank for industrial purposes, at least for urban areas. 
 Developing industrial parks and SEZs, with well-developed infrastructure. 
 Offering land identification services to investors. 
Improving Governance and Business Regulation 
 
 Setting up a single window clearance facility empowered by legislation and able to act in 
coordination with district authorities. 
 Making the process of approvals transparent by setting standards and timeframes for issuing 
clearances, with provisions for deemed approval if such clearances are not obtained within 
declared timeframes.  
 The Contract Labor (Regulation and Abolition) Act to be eligible for amendment at the state 
level, as in AP, in order to allow contract labor to be employed in non-core activities, as also in 
core activities subject to certain conditions, by a business organization.  
 Enabling easy exit options for industries, Jharkhand can consider adopting the amendment to the 
Industrial Disputes Act in line with the proposed central bill amendment. 
 Improving the law and order situation in the state, strengthening the capacity of the industries 
department, introduction of VAT and a transparent mining policy are other important steps to 
improve overall business regulation in Jharkhand. 
 
Improving Access to Finance 
 
While a number of policy recommendations concerning access to finance are dealt with at the 
center, particularly with regard to the policy, regulatory and institutional framework for SME 
financing, several enabling policies at the state level can create a more conducive environment 
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for market-based financing of SMEs by the formal financial sector.  Some of the medium to 
long-term actions could involve:   
 
 Improving the credit evaluation and risk management skills of banks and other financing 
institutions to improve lending practices.  This will involve building institutional capacity to 
reduce transaction costs, reduce and manage risks related to SME lending. A risk sharing facility 
to accelerate commercial bank lending to SMEs could be explored wherein the facility could 
provide partial credit guarantees for commercial bank loans to SMEs. 
 Improving credit information on SMEs, both positive and negative, through assistance to 
commercial banks and financial institutions, to verify and collate historic data on SMEs. 
 Addressing the problem of collaterals through improving and updating land and property records, 
which currently impede the use of land as collateral, and promoting the use of collateral 
substitutes.  
 Strengthening business development services and market linkage programs for SMEs thereby 
helping SMEs improve profitability and competitiveness, and become more credit-worthy. 
 
The Way Forward
4.61 It is thus seen that while the development of the agricultural sector cannot by itself be the 
driving force for Jharkhand, it remains vitally important for growth and employment generation 
in the medium term.  Although the mining sector has huge potential for growth over the long 
term, it has high risks that need to be carefully managed.  The solution lies somewhere in 
between, with the crux of the overall strategy aimed at reducing risks associated with growth, 
especially in an economy with high levels of poverty and inequality.  Building institutions, 
increasing the productivity of labor in agriculture and employment in the non-farm sectors 
through development of SMEs, is a possible way forward in the short to medium term.  A 
balanced strategy would call for broadening the manufacturing base beyond mineral-based 
industries and establishing forward and backward linkages leading to employment generation.  
To promote sustained mining development, a strong governance framework and institutional 
capacity is essential for mitigating   social or environmental impact.  
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Chapter 5: Promoting Social Inclusiveness for Effective Citizenship 
5.1 Social inclusiveness is an end in itself and a powerful tool for effective citizenship.  
Inclusiveness can be fostered through several routes.  
 
5.2 First, health, nutrition, and education are important ingredients of “human capital”, a 
critical input in the production process and long-term growth acceleration. Health and nutrition 
are also important   risk mitigating measures. However, their social significance goes beyond 
their economic relevance.  In a society divided by caste, religion, and ethnicity, equal 
opportunity of access to “primary goods”97 such as health, nutrition, and education can create the 
basis for social mobility and social cohesion. 
 
5.3 Second, expanding the reach of social protection schemes engenders security, and 
establishes the legitimacy of the new state, because it cares about the poorest and this goes 
beyond its importance as a vulnerability reducing measure. 
 
5.4 Third, social inclusiveness has additional importance in Jharkhand where tribals 
constitute a significant minority (28 percent of the total population).  For the sustenance of 
democracy, effective citizenship must be ensured for the tribal population, which has been 
historically left out of the development process and remains the most disadvantaged.  This 
cannot be done through economic and social service delivery programs alone as these continue 
the perception that the tribals merely receive handouts, and are not empowered citizens realizing 
their rights.  
 
5.5 Mainstreaming the tribal population requires their civic and political empowerment 
(recognizing their civic as well as traditional rights), integral to economic growth projects and 
social service delivery programs. There is no single "best way” to attain these rights.  These can 
be addressed through bonding that is forging horizontal links among themselves through social 
movements; bridging or promoting linkages between them and pro-tribal local elites; and 
advocacy and lobbying at the local, block, district, state, and national level. 
 
A. Reach of Priority Health Services 
 
97
 Rawls (1971). 
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Adverse Initial Health Conditions
5.6 Jharkhand’s initial health 
status indicators are unfavorable 
as compared with the all-India 
average and the major Indian 
states. This can be measured by both 
health outcome and health service 
indicators. 
 
5.7  The limited sample size of 
Jharkhand in the National Family 
Health Survey (NFHS)-II data 
poses serious problem in 
estimating some of the health 
outcome indicators. Two examples illustrate this.  Total Fertility Rate (TFR), a measure of 
reproductive health, appears to be lower than the all-India average (2.8 versus 3.2), and much 
lower than that observed for Bihar, Orissa, MP, UP and Rajasthan (Figure 5.1). The pattern of 
TFR is consistent with the relatively low Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) in Jharkhand (67 as against 
96 in Orissa, 88 in MP, 83 in UP and 79 in Rajasthan).98 However, the level of TFR and IMR 
may be underestimated, given the small size of bifurcated NFHS-II sample of undivided Bihar. 
Input-based indicators may provide a more realistic assessment.  In fact, the prevalence rate of 
contraception among married women in Jharkhand is about half the all-India average (25 percent 
vs. 48 percent), which contradicts the reverse trend for TFR noted above. Similarly, the 
proportion of children with full vaccination is assessed at an abysmal 9 percent compared with 
the all-India average of 42 percent--suggesting a pattern that is inconsistent with the relative 
prevalence of IMR.  As in other states in the country with a similar level of infant mortality, neo-
natal deaths comprise a large proportion of total infant deaths. In Jharkhand it is estimated that 
about 60 percent of all infant deaths occur in the first week after birth.  
 
5.8 For most health service indicators relating to maternal and child health care, 
Jharkhand has adverse initial figures vis-à-vis the all-India average and other states. The 
proportion of institutional deliveries was a low 14 percent, presence of skilled birth attendants 17 
percent, and proportion of women who received at least one ANC contact just 42 percent.  These 
are close to coverage levels in undivided Bihar, but much lower than the all-India average 
(Figure 5.2.). 
Figure 5. 2: Initial Comparison of Health Service Indicators 
Indicator 1 Indicator 2 
98
 Various studies on cross-country, cross- state, and cross-district data for developing countries indicate the statistically 
significant negative relationship between the level of TFR and IMR (for instance, Murthi et al, 1995 for evidence on India). 
Figure 5. 1: Initial Comparison of Key Health Outcome 
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5.9 With respect to child malnutrition, the state was relatively disadvantaged, possibly 
due to the higher incidence of income-poverty. Thus, the proportion of underweight children 
(under three years) is assessed at 54 percent in Jharkhand compared to 47 percent for all India 
and almost identical to that for undivided Bihar, Orissa, and MP, and slightly higher than in UP 
and Rajasthan.99 As is known, child nutritional outcomes are determined both by food and health 
access indicators. The higher incidence of income-poverty (food-poverty) in Jharkhand vis-à-vis 
the rest of India appears to drive its relative disadvantage in child malnutrition. 
5.10 Poor child nutritional status is further confirmed by high levels of anemia among 
children as well as women of reproductive age. Approximately 56 percent of children (aged 6 
- 35 months) and 28 percent of women (aged 15 - 49 years) suffer from moderate to severe 
anemia. This compares with 17 percent of women in India as a whole.  While there are no 
reliable measures of the Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR), it is estimated to be roughly in the 
region of 504 per 100,000 live births.100 This is well above the all-India figure of 407 per 
100,000 live births.
5.11 Jharkhand had a very high initial burden of communicable diseases. This relates to 
TB, malaria and other vector-borne diseases. At the time of formation of the new state, TB 
afflicted nearly 57,000 persons every year, of which almost one-fourth died. Frequent outbreaks 
of malaria were common in most rural districts of the state. 
 
Recent Progress in Priority Health Service
99
 The NFHS-III round for 2005/06 shows that the matched figure for child malnutrition has actually deteriorated to 59% in 
recent years. 
100
 Health Policy, GoJ. 
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5.12 Notwithstanding the adverse 
beginning, Jharkhand has made 
steady progress in nearly all priority 
health service indicators. Coverage of 
reproductive and child health (RCH) 
related services improved during the 
period 1999-2003 (Figure 5.3). The 
proportion of safe deliveries increased 
by 9.7 percent, proportion of 
institutional deliveries by 7.2 percent, 
and proportion of pregnant women 
receiving at least one ANC check-up by 
14.4 percent. 
 
5.13 Impressive progress has been 
made in child vaccination. The newly 
instituted “catch up rounds” (since 
2002/03) has led to a dramatic improvement in child immunization, and vitamin A and iron 
supplementation.  The UNICEF has recently verified that immunization coverage is now almost 
50 percent compared to 9 percent in 1998/99. This is the most rapid rise in coverage recorded in 
India for a five-year period.101 
5.14 Considerable progress has also been made in expansion of services related to 
communicable diseases such as TB and, to a lesser extent, malaria. The Revised National TB 
Control Program (RNTCP) was introduced in 2000 with support from the Global Fund for AIDS, 
TB and Malaria (GFATM) in three districts.  By end 2004 it had expanded to all 22 districts. In 
the third quarter of 2004/05, Jharkhand achieved an impressive treatment success rate of close to 
90 percent, compared to the national average of 85 percent.  Case detection rate, however, is still 
only 52 percent, well below the national average of 70 percent.  Even today malaria is still 
endemic with frequent outbreaks. More than half of the reported malaria cases are due to 
Plasmodium Falciparum and are often fatal. Confirmed and suspected deaths from malaria 
totaled 61 in 2004.102 
5.15 The state has made remarkable progress in reducing the prevalence of leprosy. In 
2001, leprosy prevalence was three times the national average at 10.9 per 10,000. By 2005, it had 
dropped to 2.69 per 10,000. Multi-drug treatment was introduced in undivided Bihar in 1994/95, 
and special leprosy campaigns undertaken in 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004 to detect new 
leprosy cases. Another effective strategy was the integration of the vertical leprosy program into 
the routine health delivery system.103 
Factors Influencing Progress in Priority Health Service
101
 The NFHS-III round for 2005/06 also shows considerable improvement in full immunization, though less dramatic than the 
above claim, the matched figure being 35%. 
102
 GoI, RNTCP Quarterly Performance Report. 
103
 The proportion of blood slides collected in the state relative to population increased from 3.6 percent in 2000 to 4.78 percent 
in 2004. However, it still remains below the nationally recommended minimum Annual Blood Slides Examined (ABER) of 6 
percent.  The Slide Positive Rate (SPR) fluctuated over the four- year period between 11- 17 percent. 
Figure 5. 3: Changes in Key RCH Service Indicators 
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5.16 Progress in expanding the reach of priority health services has been brought about 
by both supply and demand factors. Among the supply-side factors, increased budgetary 
allocations for health, reorientation within the health budget towards priority services, tapping 
synergies among different health and anti-poverty programs, and partnership with NGOs in 
implementing the programs are some of the important steps. Among the demand-side factors are 
the development of region and culture-specific behavior change communication strategy, 
enhanced access to media, and favorable effects through greater health awareness in recent years 
by expanding basic education across gender and social groups. However, not all these factors 
have been fully tapped for expanding the reach of health services in Jharkhand. However, even 
partial implementation of these initiatives is likely to result in significant improvements against 
the backdrop of highly adverse initial health conditions. 
 
5.17 Jharkhand has one of the 
highest budgeted shares for health 
expenditures in the country. Over 
the period 2001/02–2003/04 public 
health expenditure fluctuated from 
Rs.377 to Rs.440 crore per year, 
translating to an average per capita 
spend of Rs.150 in nominal terms. 
This was slightly more than Orissa’s 
level during the same period 
(Rs.134) but less than the average 
per capita spend in 15 major Indian 
states (Rs.174).104 The situation has 
changed considerably since 2003/04 
with the public health budget (plan 
plus non-plan) increasing from 
Rs.377 crore to Rs.666 crore in 2004/05, and projected to increase further to Rs.839 crore.  As a 
result of these increases, public health allocations in 2005/06 accounted for 6.25 percent of the 
revenue budget in Jharkhand, compared to an average 4.71 percent of revenue budget on health 
in 15 other major states, as estimated for 2004/05 (Figure 5.4). This indicates the high budgetary 
priority being accorded to health. Much of the increased spending went on paying salaries of the 
newly contracted 1,500 doctors (80 percent) and on drugs (5 percent).105 
5.18 However, lack of institutional capacity impedes implementation.  The shortfall in 
“realized” as against the “budgeted” amount is an important indicator of the governance capacity 
of the state (Chapter 1). Much of the increase in health budget allocations are “on paper” with 
little implications for explaining the outcomes. In the preceding year, the Jharkhand health 
department could spend only 68 percent of the funds allotted. This was due largely to delays 
104
 See, Dave Sen and Berman (2005). 
105
 Fund flows through the budget represent only a part of total health spending. Much of the funding under the national programs 
(e.g. RCH, TB, malaria and HIV/AIDS) flows through the Jharkhand Health Society. Once these off-budget funds are included, 
resources available for health in 2005/06 rise by 25 percent. In 2004/05, total health spending represented 1.15 percent of the Net 
State Domestic Product. 
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caused by an over centralized financial system, lack of willingness to take responsibility for 
spending and issuance of utilization certificates, and finally, inability of the health system to take 
on new activities. Unless these constraints are addressed and there is an improvement in the 
capacity to access and utilize budgeted funds in a timely manner, the full benefits of the recent 
increase in the health budget will not be realized. Moreover, increased allocation of budgetary 
resources for health is only one precondition for improved health outcomes. 
 
5.19 One of the most important factors underlying the recent improvements in priority 
health service indicators is related to the adoption of a campaign style approach, termed 
“the catch-up round”. Initiated in December 2004, this approach was quite effective in rapidly 
improving immunization and nutritional outcomes. Comprising a two-month long activity, it 
galvanizes support and involvement of all district-level personnel (including anganwadi workers, 
Auxiliary Nurse Midwives (ANMs), doctors etc), local NGOs, international donors, and the 
community to provide a core package of priority health services. To begin with, the package 
included routine immunization, micro-nutrient supplementation (including vitamin A and iron 
folate tablets) and de-worming. The package of interventions was expanded during the last 
“catch-up round” to also include TB and malaria screening, and ANC. This approach has been 
successful in dramatically improving select key service indicators over a very short period. 
Another key strategy has been to increase availability of doctors and paramedical workers.  
 
5.20 Public-private partnerships, especially with NGOs, have been one of the key 
ingredients of recent improvement. The state government has several ongoing partnerships 
with private providers including: (i) contracting NGOs under RCH and the HIV/AIDS program 
largely for social mobilization efforts and delivering targeted interventions to high-risk groups; 
(ii) social marketing for family planning and other commodities for the delivery of subsidized 
family planning through private sector channels such as shops and retail pharmacists; (iii) 
contracting of health staff; and (iv) providing equipment and supplies to private facilities. 
 
5.21 Better planning and coordination among different actors also contributed to 
improved institutional performance in the health sector. A new institution called the 
Jharkhand Health Society, registered in 2003, currently plays a vital role in supporting the 
department in policy development and planning, coordinating donor support to the sector, 
forging partnerships with NGOs and faith-based groups, design of innovative schemes, 
monitoring and evaluation and channeling funds. 
Neglected Concerns for Social and Spatial Equity
5.22 The average progress discussed above masks the stark inequalities in health status 
that exist across districts, between different ethnic and social groups, and the poor and 
non-poor.  Hence, NFHS-II found the crude birth rate (CBR) varying from a high 36 per 1000 in 
Hazaribagh district to a low of 20 per 1000 in East Singhbhum. Such disparities are noticeable 
with respect to other indicators as well (Figure 5.5). 
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5.23 One of the reasons behind the stark 
disparities in health outcomes is that the 
reach of most health service providers is 
limited to a few districts, excluding the 
remote areas where most of the socially 
disadvantaged groups reside. This is true for 
the NGOs as well. A recent USAID study 
mapped the location of NGOs, their size and 
the type of health work that they undertake. 
Out of the 143 NGOs engaged in health care 
provision in the state, 80 percent are located 
in just 10 districts out of a total of 22 new 
districts.  This is also confirmed by the second 
round of RCH data. The proportion of 
pregnant women receiving at least one ANC 
check-up is highest in Lohardaga (77 percent) 
and East Singbhum (75 percent), compared with only 35 percent in Godda and Deoghar. Even more 
striking differences are seen in the case of child vaccination. The proportion of children with full 
vaccination varies from as high as 44-47 percent in Ranchi and Lohardaga to as low as 6 percent in 
Godda, 10 percent in Deoghar, 14 percent in Dumka, and 18 percent in Sahibganj. 
 
5.24 Social disparity in health and 
nutritional indicators is equally striking. The 
nutritional status of children from Scheduled 
Caste and Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) groups 
was found to be much worse as compared to 
socially advantaged, groups (Figure 5.6). 
Sixty-one percent of children from ST groups 
were underweight, compared with 38 percent 
from non-SC/ST/backward groups.106 
5.25 A recent econometric study carried out 
in the three newly created states, Jharkhand, 
Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal, indicates the 
relevance of socio-economic characteristics in 
health care access.107 The positive association between education of women and delivery illustrates the 
importance of social development through education for achieving 100 percent institutional deliveries. 
More importantly, the state-specific logistic models for Jharkhand showed that women belonging to SC, 
ST or lower economic strata tend to utilize lesser delivery care. Hence, the RCH program should address 
the needs of these women and create a conducive environment for them to utilize delivery care.  
 
Concerns over the Quality of Health Care
5.26 The quality of rural primary health care services seems to be inadequate. The results of the 
Jharkhand User Satisfaction Survey, although restricted to primary health facilities, show the magnitude 
106
 NFHS-II noted disparities on basis of living standards (as defined by household ownership of various assets): 78.6 percent of 
women with a low standard of living suffered iron-deficiency anemia compared to 57 percent of women with a high standard of 
living. 
107
 Pandey et al (2005). 
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Figure 5. 6: Social Disparity in Health 
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of the problem. Over 65 percent of respondents reported that they visit Primary Health Centers (PHCs) in 
the case of ailments; about half reported the availability of doctors at the PHC; and over 75 percent of the 
households prefer to get prenatal check-ups outside of the PHC, with private providers being the main 
alternative source.  Though ANMs visited households in 56 percent of the cases surveyed, 52 percent of 
respondents who had been visited by ANMs felt the visits were infrequent and 42 percent felt that ANMs 
did not impart proper health care. Respondents who did not visit PHCs cited reasons such as distance, 
preference for private doctors or traditional healers, improper medical care, or non-availability of 
doctors.108 Clearly, if the quality of PHC services is any indicator, it is likely to be even worse in the case 
of secondary and tertiary health care.  
 
B.  Achieving Health MDGs 
 
5.27 The GoJ has identified and prioritized interventions that address health MDGs within the 
health sector strategy. These include services related to maternal and reproductive health care, child 
health, TB, malaria and other communicable diseases, and HIV/AIDS. The strategy of continuing with the 
“catch up” approach as an interim measure for scaling up provision of priority services, and at the same 
time building a sustainable routine health delivery system, is a sensible one. However, the manner in 
which the routine system is built up will determine how effectively priority interventions are scaled up.109 
5.28 Despite the recent progress towards health MDGs, the overall health sector performance is 
far from satisfactory. If Jharkhand maintains the current pace of improvement in health outcomes 
and coverage of priority services, it will not reach the health MDG targets.110 There are many 
impediments to attaining the health MDGs, with the key ones being poorly functioning and under-
developed health systems, lack of public-private partnerships in the delivery of priority interventions, 
poor accountability of public health services, and the problem of overcoming the barriers of social 
exclusion for improved access to priority services.111 
5.29 The state needs to address the problem of poorly developed health systems.  Building new 
institutions remains the biggest challenge. While a new health directorate has recently been created, it 
still remains on paper. Staff is yet to be recruited. The directorate is to have one director-in-chief, and 
seven directors (one each for health, family welfare, medical education, training and research, planning 
and administration, AYUSH and vector-borne and infectious diseases). Once the directorate is up and 
running, the Jharkhand Health Society can function more effectively as a strategic policy and planning 
unit, as well as a forum for coordinating donor inputs and public private partnerships. The village health 
committee (VHC) is another new institution, which can potentially play an important role. Participation in 
local planning, supervision of Sahiyya activities and generating awareness of and demand for priority 
services will be among the responsibilities of the VHC. 
 
5.30 Other elements of the health system that need strengthening include: the drugs 
management system; the Health Management Information System (HMIS); and Human Resource 
Development and Management (HRD). The RCH Program Implementation Plan (PIP) recognizes the 
108
 The average distance of the respondent’s resident from the PHC was about 3.8 km. 
109
 Three new policies have been developed - a Health Policy, a Population and Reproductive and Child Health Policy, and a 
Drug Policy. In addition to these, a detailed Program Implementation Plan (PIP) for the second Reproductive and Child Health 
(RCH II) program has also been developed. Collectively, these documents provide strategic policy direction to the sector, map 
out priority health outcomes and outputs to be achieved, and outline specific interventions to achieve them, including institutional 
requirements.  
110
 The child immunization target would be reached if the current pace of expansion was maintained; however the mode of 
delivery through “catch up rounds” is not a sustainable one.   
111
 There are other barriers such as inadequate financial insurance to unanticipated health shocks, maximizing inter-sectoral 
impact on health, but arguably they can only be addressed effectively once these bottlenecks are removed. 
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need for an integrated and more useful health MIS that provides a complete picture of all activities at the 
PHC level. Planned HRD-related activities include development of job descriptions and introduction of 
performance-based management systems. 
 
5.31 Health services cannot be delivered by the public sector alone as the “public sector model of 
health delivery” faces significant challenges on two major counts. First, due to under-funding, the 
network of public facilities has not been developed to fulfill GoI population-based norms in any Indian 
state. Where they do exist, their performance is sub-optimal because staff is unavailable, drugs are 
insufficient, equipment is not in place or not working, or facilities are poorly maintained. Second, in the 
absence of effective accountability mechanisms at the local level, there is a high incidence of absence of 
doctors in many states in India, with Jharkhand ranking third after Bihar and Tamil Nadu.112 
5.32 Poor accountability of public health services is reflected in the high rate of absenteeism 
among service providers and poor client satisfaction, indicating a serious failure in service delivery 
in the state that affects the quality of curative health services. Such service delivery failures can be 
linked to a breakdown in the chain of accountability between the providers and clients, as well as the 
policy makers and providers.113 As priority services are scaled up in Jharkhand, the government will need 
to address these accountability failures. In strengthening the chains of accountability, examples of other 
Asian countries may be instructive. These include greater use of performance-based incentives, 
decentralization and local supervision of health services, provision of vouchers and the use of contracts.  
 
5.33 Addressing the demand-side constraints is crucial for the success of health policy in 
Jharkhand. These include costs (related to transportation, opportunity costs of lost work when seeking 
health care, unofficial fees etc), lack of knowledge and awareness of health needs and availability, and 
socio-cultural beliefs and practices. As noted earlier, there are wide disparities in health status and service 
coverage across districts and population groups in the state. The exclusion of particular groups such as 
STs is particularly striking. The health department has no systematic strategy for improving performance 
of lagging districts and population groups, such as SCs and STs. Some recognition is given to a special 
approach in tribal areas; however, this is not backed up by the concept of resources being allocated on the 
basis of need. There is a need for greater use of incentives for providers to serve target populations, as 
well as greater use of demand-side approaches, such as provision of vouchers for overcoming social 
exclusion. 
 
C.  Health Sector: The Way Forward 
 
5.34 Recent health sector development in Jharkhand can benefit from the experience of other states 
and developing countries and international best practice.  The GoJ seeks to develop public health 
infrastructure as per GoI population norms. The population-driven approach to planning infrastructure 
and staffing has not worked well over much of India. Other equally important criteria that need to be 
considered while planning infrastructure and staffing for Jharkhand relate to terrain, population density, 
presence of roads, availability of transportation, and doctors and health staff.  The GoJ is also 
aggressively forging partnerships with private providers. This could result in a health system that 
comprises public finance and plural provision; in the present context, such a system would best meet the 
112
 The fact that doctors’ absence has little correlation with per capita income of the state shows that the problem with the public 
sector model of health delivery is much more deep rooted. 
113
 Unlike the private market transaction when the seller or provider is directly responsible to the customer or client, in 
government the accountability between the client and provider is an indirect one intermediated by the government (World Bank, 
2003).  
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state’s health needs. The GoJ may consider implementing the following five-point approach, which will 
speed up the development of such a system and deliver health outcomes for the poor: 
 
• Prioritizing the use of new resources: Even the recently doubled health budget falls far short of 
that required for universal provision of health care.  Available resources would be best used on: 
(i) priority health services (PHS); (ii) focusing PHS on the poor; and (iii) extending financial 
protection to the poor against major illnesses. 
 
• Scaling up of the PHS delivery by public and private providers. While priority 
interventions need to be financed from the public budget, they can be delivered either by 
public providers or by private providers or by a judicious mix of both. The main 
approach for promoting access to basic as well as specialist care in Jharkhand, as in the 
rest of India, has been to develop a network of government owned and staffed health 
facilities on the basis of GoI norms.  So far there has been limited use of partnerships 
with the private sector as a strategy for enhancing access. For example, some NGOs have 
been contacted to provide care under several of the national health programs, such as 
RCH, TB and HIV/AIDS.  Going forward, GoJ will need to: (i) agree on the contents of 
the PHS; (ii) review infrastructure, staff and drug norms most suited for delivering PHS; 
(iii) decide on comparative advantage of public and private provision for different 
priority services; (iv) conduct a survey to map out existing public and private providers; 
(v) contract private providers or develop public health services depending on comparative 
advantage; and (vi) undertake local planning for integrated provision of priority services. 
Social marketing of health goods (contraceptives, impregnated bed nets for malaria, etc.), 
social franchising and demand-side vouchers that can be redeemed at accredited private 
providers, are other attractive approaches for scaling up service delivery. 
 
• Developing and strengthening organizations and systems: The GoJ has just begun the process 
of forming new institutions, such as the health directorate, Jharkhand Health Society, and the 
department for health and family welfare. Organizational structures and staffing should reflect the 
required roles and functions under a system of public financing and rural service provision. 
Human resources, planning and budgeting, financial management, quality assurance, monitoring, 
procurement and, finally, regulation and accreditation would all need strengthening.  
 
• Making greater use of demand-side approaches: In addition to behavior change 
communication to overcome demand-side barriers, demand-side approaches, such as 
demand-side financing (DSF) should be used. DSF is defined as a means of transferring 
purchasing power to specified groups for the purchase of defined good and services. 
Purchasing power can be in the form of vouchers, stipends, grants or loans, and 
scholarships. Certain health services, such as maternal care, STI treatments are 
particularly suitable for DSF support. Additionally, strategies that give voice to and 
strengthen participation of excluded groups in health care planning and management 
would promote use of services by the poor.  
 
• Promoting local oversight of public health services: Mechanisms to strengthen the chain of 
accountability between government providers and clients should be developed. 
Representation of the poor on village health committees is one way. While Panchayati 
Raj has yet to develop in Jharkhand, supervision and responsibility for public service 
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delivery by local elected bodies should be a long-term strategy for increasing 
accountability.    
 
5.35 Once the medium-term strategic objectives of priority and basic health services are met, it would 
be easier to tackle the challenges of secondary and tertiary curative health care, especially hospitalized 
and specialized services.  The state of the latter is extremely precarious with limited coverage of the rural 
poor by both public and private institutional health facilities.  In particular, the high incidence of health 
shocks, including emergency and catastrophic diseases, is a major barrier to upward mobility of the rural 
poor. The public health system needs a threshold level of basic health infrastructure, human resources, 
management capacity, skill, and the experience to effectively administer activities across districts and 
blocks in both rural and urban areas, with greater or lesser accessibility.  Only then will it become easier 
to design effective delivery mechanisms for the hospital-based and specialized curative services.  Public-
private partnership will enlarge further in that context, with greater attention to innovative health 
insurance products. Greater attention needs to be paid to the inter-sectoral impact on health status as well. 
D.  Expanding Access to Primary and Secondary Education 
5.36 As with health, the education scenario in Jharkhand was in an adversely affected condition 
at the time of bifurcation. As per the census (2001) figures, the literacy rate of the state is the second 
lowest in the country (after Bihar) at 54.1 percent against the national average of 65.4 percent. With the 
male literacy rate at 67.9 percent and female literacy rate at 39.3 percent, the state has the second highest 
gender disparity rate in the country after Rajasthan. In rural areas, one-third of the men and two-thirds of 
the women cannot read or write. The literacy rates of the SC and ST population are as low as 37.6 percent 
and 40.7 percent respectively. 
 
5.37 Another important feature in the 
education sector was the high initial 
spatial disparity. Literacy rates also 
varied across districts – with a low of 30 
percent in Pakur district to a high of 69 
percent in East Singhbhum (Figure 5.7). 
The task of improving educational 
outcomes was thus complicated by the fact 
that most children were first-time learners 
from households with illiterate parents. 
Given the low literacy rates, the average 
duration of schooling of an adult (aged 
above 14 years) as per the NSS 55th round 
stood at 4.25 years. The latter, although 
somewhat close to the all-India average of 
4.5 years showed high differences across 
districts. 
 
Recent Trends in Primary Education
5.38 There has been an impressive increase in enrolment in the 6-14 year age-group. The age- 
specific enrolment rates for the 6-11 year age-group improved from 56 percent in 1993/94 to 58 percent 
in 1999/2000 (as per the NSS data) and further to 95 percent in 2005 (as per the SSA Household census).  
Around 87.6 percent of the 11-14 year age-group children are also currently enrolled in schools. Around 
Figure 5. 7: Education Indicators 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
B
o
ka
ro
C
ha
tr
a
D
e
o
gh
a
r
D
ha
n
ba
d
D
u
m
ka
G
a
rh
w
a
G
ir
id
h
G
o
dd
a
G
u
m
la
H
a
z
a
ri
ba
g
K
o
da
rm
a
L
o
ha
rd
a
ga
P
a
ka
u
r
P
a
la
m
u
P
a
sh
c
hi
m
i
Si
n
gh
bh
u
m
Pu
rb
i
Si
n
gh
bh
u
m
R
a
n
c
hi
Sa
hi
bg
a
n
j
Literacy Rate
Gross  Enrollment Ratio
Pupil T eacher Ratio
Source: Population census 2001. 
84 
18 percent of all children in the 6-14 year age-group are enrolled through the Education Guarantee 
Scheme (EGS)/AIE/ Bridge course or in some residential camps.114
5.39 Impressive increase in enrolment has been accompanied by greater gender and social 
equity.  The GPI for primary grades in the state is 0.98 and for upper primary, 0.97.  Similarly, as far as 
the social equity in enrolment is concerned, SC/ST enrolment shares were close to their shares in 
respective age-group population. However, there is considerable variation in the GPI across different 
districts. 
 
5.40 Not withstanding progress in enrolment in primary education, a few concerns such as large 
numbers of out-of-school children, poor student attendance, low internal efficiency, and poor 
learning achievement stand out. The number of out-of-school children in the state has declined slightly 
from 1.9 -1.8 million in the 6-10 year age- group, and from 0.64 - 0.2 million in the 11-13 year age group 
between the 2001 census and the 2005 SSA census. Of all out-of-school children in the 6-11 year age-
group, 54 percent were girls, 28 percent belonged to SC category (as against their population share of 12 
percent) and the rest belonged to the ST category. Districts with some of the lowest literacy figures, like 
Pakaur, Palamu, Godda, Giridih and Hazaribag, accounted for the maximum number of out-of -school 
children in the state.  
 
5.41 Student attendance is a key concern, as the attendance rate appears to have changed little 
over the recent years. A few years ago only 43 percent of students in government schools and 68 
percent in private schools attended classes regularly in primary schools.115 Recent data shows that, on an 
average, only 58.4 percent of the children enrolled in Grades I-V and 58.5 percent of the children enrolled 
in Grade VI-VIII attend schools regularly.116 Around 30 percent of the primary schools and 32 percent of 
the upper primary schools registered an average student attendance of less than 50 percent. 
 
5.42 With a very low 
completion rate, internal 
efficiency of schooling is a 
major issue in the state. The 
primary completion rate was 
around 56 percent as per the 
NSS 55th round estimates. The 
transition rate from the primary 
to the upper primary stage was 
78 percent for boys and 74 
percent for girls. Overall, these 
figures varied from 50 percent 
for girls in Pakaur to 95 percent 
for boys in West Singhbhum and 
Chatra, highlighting wide spatial 
variations (Figure 5.8). 
 
114
 These are, however, gross enrolment rates as distinguished from age-specific enrolment rates. Though most of the 6-14 year 
age- group children are enrolled in schools now, the enrolment rates in the primary stage is highly “grossed” given that many of 
these children are late entrants to the education system.  On the other hand, those enrolled at the upper primary stage also 
included children who are above 14 years, due to the same reason or due to repetition. 
115
 World Bank (2003). 
116
 Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2005 by Pratham. 
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5.43 The state has one of the poorest learning scores in the country. As the District Information 
System for Education (DISE) data for 2003/04 
reveals, less than one-fourth of the children in 
primary and less than one-fifth of the children 
in upper primary grades in the state pass their 
grades with more than 60 percent scores. 
However, the SSA Baseline Assessment Study 
shows that the average achievement level in 
Class II is 62 percent for language and 65 
percent in arithmetic while in Class VII, it is 
41 percent and 33 percent respectively for 
language and mathematics. The ASER 2005 
by Pratham looks at learning achievements 
from a different point of view. It reveals that 
only 58 percent of children in the 7-14 year 
age-group could read a small paragraph with 
short sentences of standard I difficulty levels; and only 42 percent could read a story text. The arithmetic 
ability of Jharkhand’s children is worse with 70 percent of children in the 7-14 age-group, and half of the 
children in the 11-14 age-group are unable to divide. 
 
Factors Affecting Progress in Primary Education
5.44 Both the supply and demand-side factors have affected progress in primary education. Among the 
supply-side factors, the three key constraints are accessibility, quality of facility, and availability of 
teachers. 
 
5.45 While access is improving, there is a need to expand it further to meet the growing demands of 
the states’ diverse and dispersed child population. As per the Seventh All India Education Survey (AIES), 
61 percent of the habitations in the state did not have primary schools within them (as against 47 percent 
for all India).117 However, 77 percent of the habitations had access to schools within the prescribed norm 
of one km (compared to 87 percent for all India). Similarly, 61 percent of the habitations had an upper 
primary school facility within 3 km in the state in 2002 as against 78 percent for all India.118 The latest 
survey conducted by the Jharkhand Education Project Council (JEPC) under the SSA program in 2005 
suggests that the state still has around 8,000 habitations that are eligible for primary schools but do not 
have one (Figure 5.9). However, there are around 14,000 EGS and 9,500 Alternative Learning Centers 
(ALCs) and bridge courses in the state, which provide access to education facilities in those habitations 
that do not have primary schools. However, EGS and ALCs are basically transitional arrangements and, 
hence, unless converted to regular schools, are not sustainable substitutes for schools in the long run. 
 
5.46 A key factor constraining primary education is the lack of minimum school-level facilities such as 
classrooms, blackboards, and teaching learning materials (TLMs). Addressing the lack of facilities could 
ensure some enabling conditions for students to attend schools regularly.  Statistics from DISE show that 
around 45 percent of the schools have less than three rooms to conduct classes for five grades, 48 percent 
of the schools do not have toilets, and 72 percent of the schools do not have girls’ toilets. The Annual 
Survey of Education Report (ASER) 2005 by Pratham looked at the facilities available in the government 
schools in the state and reported that a little less than 40 percent of the primary schools in the state do not 
have water facilities and approximately 10-12 percent have the facility, but not in usable condition. 
117
 NCERT, September 2002. 
118
 Within the state, habitations in East Singhbhum district have better access and coverage of both primary and upper primary 
schools. 
Figure 5. 9: Habitations without Primary School and 
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Similarly, around 70 percent of the primary schools have no toilet facilities while around one-tenth of the 
schools have the facility, but not in usable condition. The Pratham study shows that the share of schools 
where most (75 percent) children in standard V have textbooks is only around 40 percent.119 However, 
more than 60 percent of primary schools and around 80 percent of upper primary schools have midday 
meal provision. 
 
5.47 Despite teacher shortages, most of the running costs were still on account of 
teachers, and hence both the numbers and training of teachers is a huge task. Moreover, 
the quality and availability of teachers together help build an efficient education system. 
According to the DISE data, the average Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR) was 52:1 in 2002/03 and 
worsened to 57:1 in 2003/04 as the pace of teacher recruitment remained below the growing rate 
of enrolments, and far below the required rate to  
achieve the target PTR of 40:1. Around one-tenth of the primary government schools in 
Jharkhand are single-teacher schools, which makes multi-grade classrooms and teaching an 
inevitable necessity. However, in March 2005, only 68 percent of regular teacher vacancies 
could be filled due to lack of adequate funds.120 Under these circumstances the state has resorted 
to the appointment of para-teachers to bridge the gap between teacher needs and availability. 
Approximately 15 percent of total estimated teacher vacancies consistent with the PTR norm 
have been filled through the hiring of para-teachers, but far more needs to be done.121 
5.48 In many states, including Jharkhand, not only is the availability of teachers, but 
their regular attendance and actual teaching, which is a problem. One of the major issues 
related to teacher management in the state is the teacher absentee rates, which were as high as 39 
percent.122 There has been some improvement in recent years. The Pratham study points out that 
on average the share of primary school teachers attending schools was 76 percent while that of 
upper primary teachers was 75 percent. However, on average on a single day, only 50 percent of 
primary schools and a shocking 27.8 percent of upper primary schools had all teachers present. 
 
119
 ASER 2005. 
120
 The fiscal crunches faced by the state, where teachers’ salaries constitute more than 95 percent of non-plan expenditure, do 
not facilitate expansion of the regular teachers’ cadre. 
121
 While the proportion of graduates and above is higher in the regular teacher cadre, para-teachers mostly consist of secondary 
school graduates. However, there is no evidence to show that there is any significant difference in the effectiveness of regular and 
para-teachers in terms of outcomes measured as learning achievements of students. 
122
 World Bank (2003). 
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5.49 While absenteeism is a governance issue, not all issues of quality interactions are 
related to accountability failure alone. This can be illustrated by the amount of time that a 
teacher spends on teaching and learning activities, especially given the multi-grade situations in 
both regular schools and EGS and ALCs. The average number of teachers per primary schools 
with five grades range from 1 to 2.3.  In many districts, the share of single-teacher schools is as 
high as 40-50 percent (Figure 5.10). An important aspect that influences the schooling outcome 
of girls is the presence of female teachers. In most districts of Jharkhand, the share of female 
teachers in the total teacher workforce is less than 30 percent (Figure 5.11). Clearly, there is a 
need to appoint more teachers, but there is also a need to use teacher deployment as a tool to 
favor appointments in those districts where the average number of teachers is low as well as in 
schools with single teacher. 
 
5.50 Demand-side factors are equally responsible for poor educational output and 
outcome indicators. For instance, while there are many reasons for being out-of-school, poverty 
appears to be the most compelling factor as shown by: (i) household work (25 percent); (ii) 
earning compulsions (23 percent); (iii) lack of interest (14 percent); (iv) migration (9 percent); 
Figure 5. 10: Primary Schools with Single Teacher  
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Figure 5. 11: District-wise Female Teachers  
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and (v) lack of access (8 percent).123 The Pratham study (ASER, 2005) estimated that out-of-
school children amount to 9.8 percent of the total population in the 6-14 age-group, 7.7 percent 
in the 6-10 year age-group and 13.7 percent in the 11-14 year age-group. 
 
Access to Secondary Education
5.51 The importance of secondary education can be judged by two parameters.  First, the 
income effects of education are considerable with the completion of secondary education. 
Second, given the current emphasis on the expansion of primary education there will be a huge 
demand for secondary education in the next 5-10 years for which the state needs to be prepared. 
 
5.52 Since the state was struggling with the issues in the elementary education sector, the 
cascading effect in terms of development of secondary education is yet to show its results. 
This can be judged by the enrolment data. The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) for secondary 
education is very modest. In 2002/03 it varied from 13.5 percent (as per the Ministry of Human 
Resource Development statistics) to 18.3 percent (as per the 7th All India Education Survey). 
Gender inequity is sharper in the case of secondary education, with the GER for boys at 22 
percent as against 14 percent for girls. The accessibility to secondary school, especially in rural 
areas, is a major constraint to the expansion of secondary education. According to the NSS 
survey of village facilities, only 36 percent of the villages in the state had access to secondary 
education facility within five km.124 
5.53 For a predominantly rural state, secondary education seems to be an urban 
phenomenon. Currently, for every 11 primary schools and every three upper primary schools, 
there is one high or higher secondary school in the state. The Seventh All India Education 
Survey (AIES) shows that between 1993 and 2002, the secondary education facilities increased 
by 13 percent in rural Jharkhand and by 17 percent in urban Jharkhand. Moreover, secondary 
GER is as low as 9 percent in rural Jharkhand, compared with an estimated 18 percent for the 
state as a whole. Thus there is a need to focus on the development of secondary education 
facilities in the rural areas. 
 
5.54 Vocational education as judged by the number of Vocational Higher Secondary 
Education (VHSE) institutions is in a dismal state. VHSE has never been a major part of the 
strategy for higher secondary education in the state. It is alarming that Jharkhand has only 20 
VHSE institutes compared to 622 in Maharashtra, 560 in AP, or 469 in Kerala. Half of them are 
in the government sector and the other half in the private sector. Eight of these are located in 
Ranchi itself. It is imperative the quantity of vocational institutions in Jharkhand be increased 
and spread more towards the backward districts where the youth can be trained to meet the needs 
of the industrial sector.  
 
E. Medium-Term Sector Strategy in Education 
 
5.55 While impressive progress has been made in the state in expanding the net of primary 
education, strategic initiatives are required in several areas, particularly with regard to quality 
123
 SSA Household census 2005. 
124
 NSS 58th round, 2002. 
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and broad-based access. Clearly, to reach universal primary completion rates by 2015, Jharkhand 
needs: (i) a much faster growth rate in enrolment as compared to its historical trends; and (ii) 
better internal efficiency of the education system by reducing drop–outs and repetition rates and 
by improving transition and primary completion rates. The state is close to achieving gender 
parity in primary education. In the SSA program, Jharkhand is moving in the right direction, but 
needs further rigor and speed. Secondary education needs attention and general education at the 
secondary level needs to be modified to suit the labor market requirements. Other areas of 
concern include quality and learning levels.  Overall policy, sectoral management and 
governance must be strengthened in order to achieve goals in the education sector. Some of the 
key areas relate to:  (i) strengthening existing provisions and improving access; (ii) addressing 
the demand-side issues and formulating policies to ensure equity and social protection safety 
nets; (iii) teacher management and accountability for improvement in service delivery; (iv) 
management, support structure, capacity building and monitoring at the district and sub-district 
levels; (v) improvement in the efficiency of resource use both in elementary and secondary 
education; and (vi) partnership with the private sector at the post-elementary and secondary 
levels and in vocational training. Each of these issues is discussed below. 
 
5.56 Strengthening existing provisions and improving access: The state needs to address 
issues related the status of EGS and AIEs, especially since they were originally conceptualized 
as transitory arrangements which should not be treated as substitutes for regular schools. The 
upgrading of EGSs into primary schools in a phased manner is a major challenge, which the state 
should undertake with utmost care. Secondary education is clearly an area that needs attention as 
it prepares children to either enter the workforce or proceed for higher education. However, the 
expansion of secondary sector education needs careful planning aimed at expansion in the rural 
areas to balance the current urban concentration.  There is an urgent need to expand the 
vocational education sector; especially given the existing and upcoming industrial clusters in the 
state.  All these recommendations point towards strengthening the implementation of the existing 
schemes in elementary education and the need for increased attention to other areas of education. 
 
5.57 Addressing demand-side issues and formulating policies to ensure equity: Jharkhand 
is predominantly a tribal state and the expansion of the education sector needs to address the 
requirements of the tribal population. While there is a need for systemic reforms within the 
education sector, some issues can only be addressed from the demand side, by providing 
incentives to households to send their children to school. For instance, conditional cash transfers 
and residential schools schemes could be effectively used to target the children and retain them 
in school. On the supply side, provision for care of younger siblings through ICDS and pre-
schools may help in releasing the elder siblings from duties involving the care of the younger 
ones.  There is also a need to strengthen community involvement in planning and monitoring 
these issues. 
 
5.58 Teacher management and accountability for improvement in service delivery:
Addressing teacher-related issues in the state requires well thought out strategies. The state needs 
to fill vacant positions and ensure that teachers without formal teacher’s training receive the 
minimum pre-service and regular in-service training. Moreover, there is a need to ensure 
adequacy of teachers with subject- specific knowledge in upper primary and secondary sectors. It 
is also important to ensure that all single-teacher schools receive additional teachers at least to 
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ease the burden of handling multi-grade teaching and learning. It is also important to ensure that 
adequate female teachers and those who understand the local tribal language and are sensitive to 
the contextual culture are selected.  As in the case of EGS and AIE, the tenure, qualification 
requirements, standardization, selection and appointment by the local committees and pre-service 
and in-service training of the state’s large group of para-teachers needs to be thoroughly 
analyzed.  
 
5.59 Management, support structure, capacity building and monitoring at district and 
sub-district levels: Setting up of the State Institute of Education Management and Training 
(SIERT) and strengthening the links between all these support systems are important for effective 
sector management.  The BRC and CRC structures should be made effective by periodic evaluation of the 
impact of their training and support. These institutions should be molded to play important roles in 
providing technical support: SIERT and State Institute of Educational Management and Training 
(SIEMAT) in curriculum revision, textbook development, and training of trainers at the district levels, 
research and evaluation. The state depends on the National Council for Education Research and Training 
(NCERT) textbooks because of which children are deprived of learning local-level issues. 
 
5.60 Improving the efficiency of resource use in elementary and secondary education:
Both the amount of resources and the efficiency with which resources are spent determine the 
quantity and quality of service delivery. The state should seriously address the issue of under-
spending of SSA allocations. Since the money under innovative activities in SSA is aimed at 
introducing state-specific interventions, the state should identify activities that it could carry out 
in each of the districts using the innovative grants. It is important to step up the spending under 
community mobilization since the community could be used for better monitoring of the 
education process.  
 
5.61 Partnership with the private sector at the post-elementary and secondary levels and 
in vocational training: Since the state has around 10 percent of its total schools under grants-in-
aid, it could think of public-private partnerships in providing education, especially at the 
secondary level. One possibility is to increase the private institutions under grants-in-aid. The 
other could be to get NGO support to supplement the interventions in the education sector, 
especially among vulnerable groups. However, the options regarding grants-in-aid support to 
private schools in the present forms need to be re-examined to plug the loopholes in the system. 
The private unrecognized sector cannot be allowed to function without ensuring quality. For this 
purpose, legislation for regulating unrecognized schools in terms of quality, teacher management 
and other issues needs to be examined in a broader reform framework. 
 
F. Access to Anti-Poverty Programs 
 
5.62 An attempt is made here to answer three broad questions relating to the GoJ’s programs 
specially targeted for the poor: (i) the main elements of the social protection strategy for the 
estimated 24 lakh families living below the poverty line (BPL); (ii) the reach and effectiveness of 
these programs from an administrative and beneficiary perspective; and (iii) based on the above, 
the adjustments needed in the current strategy to improve the impact of public policy. The state’s 
programs125 cover the traditional mix of social protection interventions that promote livelihoods 
125
 Social protection programs in Jharkhand can be broadly classified as follows: self-employment programs (formerly IRDP and 
now SGSY); wage-employment programs (formerly JGSY and EAS, and now SGRY and which  is NREG from February 2006); 
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(income generation) or provide safety nets and transfers, and focus either on the chronically poor 
or those who fall temporarily into poverty due to shocks.  
 
Budget Allocation and Execution
5.63  Jharkhand’s 
investment in social 
protection programs has 
gradually increased to about 
4 percent of GSDP in 
2004/05. As a share of revenue 
expenditures, these programs126 
have accounted for 18-24 
percent in recent years (Table 
5.1).  Both as a share of GSDP 
and of revenue expenditures, 
Jharkhand appears to be an 
above-average spender on 
social protection programs 
among Indian states.127 The 
expenditure per BPL family is 
quite considerable at about Rs. 
5,025 (2004/05).  
 
5.64 Wage employment programs and food security interventions, (mainly the PDS) 
traditionally accounted for two-thirds of the social protection budget. However in 2004/05, 
Area Development Programs, including both central and state-funded schemes, the Rashtriya 
(RSVY) and Zila Yojana respectively, as well as the Member of Parliament (MP) and Member 
of Legislative Assembly (MLA) managed welfare programs128 accounted for the largest share of 
the expenditure (44 percent).  Housing programs are significant, accounting on average for more 
than 10 percent of the investment. The share of self-employment programs has fallen and is now 
less than 5 percent of total expenditures, while pensions are insignificant at 0.05 percent of 
GSDP.129 
food security programs (TPDS, Antyodaya Anna Yojana, Annapurna Yojana, Midday Meal, ICDS); housing programs (formerly 
PMGY, now IAY); pensions and income transfer programs (National Social Assistance Programs including NOAPS, NFBS and 
NMBS); and area development programs that include several of the above strategies (DPAP, IWDP, PMGSY, RSVY, Zila 
Yojana, MLA and MPLADS).  
126
 This analysis only reviews the major programs listed in the previous footnote.  A plethora of other programs exist, mostly 
Centrally Sponsored Schemes, but they account for a very small share of the budget. The only exception is the Tribal Welfare 
Sub-Plan, which is significant in Jharkhand.   
127
 Central spending on safety net programs was estimated to be 1.7 percent and 9.8 percent of GDP and revenue expenditures 
respectively in 2001 (Srivastava, 2004). 
128
 All these programs are implemented through the district administration. 
129
 It appears that the state has been allocated a far lower share of pensions than warranted if the formula adopted by the center is 
correctly applied (2.92 lakhs rather than the current 1.5 lakhs).
Table 5. 1: Social Protection Expenditures by Program Type 
(Rs. crore) 
2001/
02 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
A. Food Security 
Programs 
272.7
5
348.39 396.37 281.83 
B. Wage-Employment 
Programs 
285.9
3
325.55 402.81 423.73 
C. Self-Employment 
Programs 
48.92 39.37 47.12 55.87 
D. Housing Programs 78.12 120.89 132.53 159.43 
E. Area Development 
Programs 
296.4
9
320.89 323.91 536.56 
F. National Social 
Assistance Programs 
15.59 21.75 n.a. 46.13 
Total Expenditures 997.8 1176.84 1302.74 1503.55 
Total as Share of 
Revenue Expenditures 
(%) 
20.7 21.3 24.0 18.1 
Total as Share of GSDP 
(%) 
3.2 3.5 3.7 4.1 
Source:  Government of Jharkhand administrative data. 
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5.65 While the majority of the 
programs are mandated and funded by 
the center, the state’s share of 
expenditures is growing. Centrally 
funded programs typically involve co-
financing by the state of approximately 25 
percent.  Moreover, the state’s increasing 
investment on state initiated and funded 
programs such as the MLA welfare 
programs and the Zila Yojana has resulted 
in a growing state share of the investment, 
currently more than one-third of the total. 
 
5.66 The district-wise allocation for 
several major programs has varied widely and does not appear to have a correlation with 
backwardness in recent years.  The average per capita allocation per district over a three-year 
period (2001-2004) varied from a low of Rs.173 to a high of Rs.616.  When compared with the 
district poverty index, the per capita 
allocation showed little correlation with 
poverty (Figure 5.12). 
 
Program Awareness, Coverage and 
Targeting
5.67 There is a clear divide in the level 
of awareness between public works 
programs, i.e. Annapoorna and 
Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana 
(SGSY) on the one hand - where less 
than half the population is aware of the 
programs - and PDS, Indira Aawas 
Yojna (IAY) and social pensions on the 
other hand, where awareness is generally 
high. While the high knowledge of PDS is 
not surprising, the differentials between 
social pensions and Annapoorna for 
example (which have substantial overlap in 
target groups), and between IAY and other 
programs operated by the rural development 
department are noticeable.  The relatively 
low awareness of public works is a 
particular cause for concern, given the 
intention of scaling-up of spending under 
the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
(NREG) scheme (Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2: Familiarity with Social Protection Programs 
by Program Type 
(2005) 
Program Share of HH 
Familiar with 
Program (%) 
Wage Employment Schemes 45.1 
Food-for-Work Schemes 44.5 
Annapoorna 36.6 
SGSY 40.6 
PDS Foodgrains from FPS 97.0 
IAY/Rural Housing 89.3 
Social Pensions for Destitute 
Elderly, Widows and Disabled 
85.5 
Source: Rural Jharkhand Baseline Survey, 2005.
Table 5.3: Estimated Coverage by Program, 
Administrative and NSS data 
(Rs. crore) 
Program 
Average 
Benefit 
Rs./Year 
Maximum Share 
of Eligible BPL 
Households 
Covereda (Admn 
data) % 
Estimated 
Coverage 
(NSS data
99/00)% 
SGRY 7300 11.4 5.5 
SGSY 8000 3.6 6.0 /b 
IAY 20,000 3.4 Na 
TPDS 780 70 64.3 
NOAPS 1200 27 Na 
Source:  Government of Jharkhand administrative data; NSS 55th 
round. 
a Optimistic estimate assuming entire expenditure was received by 
BPL households, and using 1997 estimates of number of BPL 
households. 
b Number of families reporting an IRDP benefit in the past 5 
years.
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5.68 All sources indicate that, despite significant investment, only a small percentage of 
BPL families benefit from these programs. First, using administrative data (Table 5.3), even 
in the best case scenario, program coverage is low, at around 3 percent for the self-employment 
and housing programs, 11 percent for wage employment, and 27 percent for old-age pensions for 
the elderly living below the poverty line. These estimates are very optimistic, as they assume that 
only BPL families benefited from the programs and that there was only one beneficiary per 
family per program.  Survey-based data allows for a clearer picture.  For example, according to a 
recent PEO evaluation of TPDS, only 57 percent of BPL families were able to avail of TPDS 
benefits and a similar evaluation commissioned by the Department of Food and Public 
Distribution130 found that those who received benefits still depend on market sources for more 
than half their rice requirements.   
 
5.69 Program coverage is even lower if estimated from the results of two government 
surveys – the National Sample Survey (NSS rounds 43, 50 and 55) and a Planning 
Commission Evaluation131 (2000).   The NSS data (1999/2000) shows that only about 5.5 
percent of families in Jharkhand were covered by a wage employment program, although this is 
likely to be an underestimate since it only covers those families which received more than 60 
days of work in the preceding year.  However, coverage appears to be decreasing over the 
successive NSS rounds despite an increase in the number of man-days reported in the 
administrative data.  For self-employment programs (SGSY), NSS data also shows that about 6 
percent of the population was covered (that is, lived in a household which received Integrated 
Rural Development Program (IRDP) or SGSY assistance in the five years preceding the survey).  
Coverage under PDS is relatively high (63 percent), but about 27 percent of eligible families 
reported not having a ration card, and 38 percent reported that they could not avail of PDS 
commodities due to non-availability of the items in the ration shop. The NSS data showed 0.4 
percent coverage under the midday meal program against a national average of 3.2 percent. 
5.70 While the NSS data is useful, the 
2005 RJBS provides a more updated 
picture of coverage for a wider range of 
programs, indicating a very high degree 
of leakage once again. It also provides 
precise estimates of benefits actually 
received by households, which the NSS 
does not allow except for PDS.  The survey 
asked about the share of the population that 
had benefited from or participated in the 
scheme in the past three years.  This is a 
generous estimate of program coverage and 
the results are presented in Table 5.4, with 
beneficiary coverage estimated across the 
whole respondent population.  With the exception of PDS, no program covers more than 10 
percent cent of all households.  However, this needs to be interpreted with some caution, as the 
130
 ORG Centre for Social Research: Evaluation Study of the Targeted Public Distribution System and Antodaya Anna Yojana, 
September 2005. 
131
 Planning Commission: Survey of Poverty Alleviation Programs, Bihar-Jharkhand. 2000. 
Table 5. 4: Share of Households Benefiting from 
Schemes in the Past Three Years 
2005 
Program Share of HH 
Benefiting in Past 
Three Years (%) 
Wage Employment Schemes 9.7 
Food-for-Work Schemes 4.4 
Annapoorna 1.0 
SGSY 1.55 
PDS Foodgrains from FPS 73.0 
IAY/Rural Housing 9.3 
Social Pensions for Destitute 
Elderly, Widows and Disabled 
4.1 
Source: Rural Jharkhand Baseline Survey, 2005.
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potential target share of households is much less than all households.132 Nonetheless, the figures 
indicate the relatively low coverage of the major anti-poverty programs across the entire 
population. 
5.71 The NSS and Planning Commission sources indicate that public works programs 
are relatively well targeted, but all the programs had some leakages. The concurrent 
evaluation for SGRY confirmed that more than 80 percent of the wage employment program 
beneficiaries in Jharkhand belonged to BPL households, more than 90 percent lived in kutcha 
houses and that 70 percent of beneficiaries had been through primary education or less.  Early 
rounds of the NSS also confirm that the poor benefit significantly more than the non-poor in 
wage employment programs.  
 
5.72  However, in the most recent (55th 
round), this difference was more muted in 
Jharkhand probably due to the fact that the 
SGRY wages (which cannot be lower than 
the statutorily fixed minimum wage) are 
higher in many areas than the market wage 
rates. Approximately half the IRDP 
beneficiaries were estimated to be non-
poor from the NSS data, while the 
Planning Commission evaluation put the 
non-poor at 39 percent of the IRDP 
beneficiaries in Jharkhand.  This is also 
visible in the cumulative density functions 
of beneficiaries in both programs in 
1999/00, as shown in Figure 5.13.  A 
surprisingly high percentage of old-age 
pensioners (36 percent) were reported to be 
ineligible to receive the benefit while 23 percent of the housing program beneficiaries (IAY) 
were also estimated to belong to households above the poverty line.133 
132
 The official number of BPL households in Jharkhand is just under 24 lakh. 
133
 Planning Commission (2000). 
Figure 5. 13: Cumulative Benefit to Households for 
IRDP and Public Works 
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5.73 Initial results from 
RJBS also indicate mildly 
progressive targeting of social 
protection programs, with the 
apparent exception of SGSY. 
The analysis is ongoing, but 
some initial results are presented 
below.134 Table 5.5 presents 
monthly per capita expenditure 
between beneficiary and non-
beneficiary households of major 
programs.135 Two points 
emerge: 
• Beneficiary households are 
notably poorer than non-
beneficiary households for 
nearly all programs, with the 
exception of SGSY.  The 
average per capita expenditure of beneficiary households is between 12 percent and 21 
percent lower than for non-beneficiaries, though for SGSY, beneficiary households are 
actually 5 percent better off than non-beneficiaries.  This may indicate selection bias among 
more entrepreneurial households (though this should in principle be more than offset by the 
requirement of BPL status for most swarozgaris). 
• Self-targeted workfare programs perform best in terms of largest expenditure shortfall of 
beneficiary households, though BPL-based IAY also does relatively well.  In contrast, both 
SGSY in particular and PDS to a lesser extent have relatively lower (negative in the case of 
SGSY) expenditure shortfall among beneficiary households. 
134
 Further analysis will allow a more disaggregated profile of beneficiaries relative to the non-beneficiary population, as 
averages among the two groups are not useful for getting a sense of distribution among both groups, for example, how many non-
beneficiary households are in the lower bounds of the expenditure distribution, and what share of beneficiaries have above 
average expenditure levels. 
135
 Expenditure is generally considered a more robust indicator of household welfare than income as it tends to be less subject to 
short-term fluctuations, and also tends to be reported more reliably.  See Deaton (1997). 
Table 5. 5: Average Per Capita Expenditure of Beneficiary and 
Non-Beneficiary Households by Program 
2005 
‘ Beneficiary 
Household (Rs. 
per month) 
Non-
Beneficiary 
Household 
(Rs. per 
month) 
Per capita 
Expenditure of 
Beneficiary /Non-
beneficiary 
Households (a) 
Wage 
Employment 
221.6 280.8 78.9 
Food-for-
Work 
220.3 280.9 78.4 
Annapoorna 223.5 285.7 78.2 
SGSY 296.9 282.3 105.2 
PDS 
Foodgrains 
248.1 283.9 87.4 
IAY 211.9 265.3 79.9 
Social 
Pensions 
230.5 264.5 87.1 
Source: Rural Jharkhand Baseline Survey, 2005.  Note (a): percentage of less 
than 100 percent indicates that beneficiary households are poorer than non-
beneficiaries and vice versa. 
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5.74 Another key dimension in assessing 
impact is the level of benefit received by 
those households who participate in 
different anti-poverty programs.  The 
survey asked about benefits received over 
the past 12 months among households who 
reported participation at any time in the 
previous years.  The results are presented by 
program in Table 5.6 (for PDS items in 
Table 5.7), with median and mean benefits.  
The following points are noteworthy:  
 
• The benefit reported from IAY is 
around Rs.5, 000 less than the official 
amount per household, which is 
consistent with field reports of a 
required bribe of Rs. 4,000-5,000 for 
a household to secure an IAY benefit. 
 
• Social pension receipts in contrast 
appear to have minimal leakage, 
given that the monthly average benefit in 2005 was Rs.100.   
• The total number of workdays 
received from public works was 
considerably less than the stated 
target in both SGRY and National 
Food for Work (NFFW) of 100 days 
per rural poor household.  Even 
assuming that the same households 
access both food-for-work and wage 
employment schemes, the median 
number of workdays per household 
was only 25, and the mean less than 
40 days.  In terms of wage rates, the 
average daily wage rate received in 
wage employment schemes appears 
to be quite close to the state’s official agricultural minimum wage at the time, which was 
just under Rs. 65 per day.  However, the average wage rate in NFFW beneficiaries was 
considerably lower than those in other wage employment schemes, closer to Rs. 40 per 
day. However, there are larger measurement issues here due to the need to value food 
received, and the result needs to be interpreted with caution. 
• Grains received under Annapoorna appear to be significantly below the quota allocation, 
which was 10 kg of rice or wheat per beneficiary per month. The survey results indicate 
that grains received were just over 60 percent of the official allocation per beneficiary. 
Table 5. 6: Median and Mean Benefits in Past 12 
Months for Beneficiary Households for Various 
Programs 
Program Median Benefit Mean Benefit 
Wage 
Employment 
Schemes 
10 days work 
Rs. 600 
20.3 days work 
Rs. 1,390.8 
Food-for-Work 
Schemes 
14 days work 
Rs. 535 
equivalent 
19.2 days work 
Rs. 762.6 
equivalent 
Annapoorna 76 kg rice 
0 kg wheat 
66.1 kg rice 
6.1 kg wheat 
SGSY Rs. 10,000 credit Rs. 13,400 credit 
IAY/Rural 
Housing 
Rs. 20,000 Rs. 18,200.2 
Social Pensions 
for Destitute 
Elderly, Widows 
and Disabled 
Rs. 1,200 Rs. 1,260.7 
Source: Rural Jharkhand Baseline Survey, 2005.
Table 5. 7: Median and Mean Benefits in Past 12 
Months in Beneficiary households for PDS 
Item Median 
Amount 
Received 
Mean 
Amount 
Received 
Amount 
Received by 
75th 
Percentile 
Rice 0 kg 38.8 kg 24 kg 
Wheat 0 kg 35.3 kg 45 kg 
Cooking 
Oil 
0 litre 1.1 litre 0 litre 
Kerosene 36 litre 32.2 litre 36 litre 
Source: Rural Jharkhand Baseline Survey, 2005. 
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5.75 Given that several different items are available in principle from the fair price shops, 
which distribute PDS items, results on benefits received from PDS are presented in Table 5.7. 
The results for the general population are somewhat difficult to interpret (with the exception of 
kerosene), due to the low offtake by Above Poverty Line (APL) households, and those without 
ration cards.  The amount received by the 75th percentile households has also therefore been 
added. Nonetheless, several points emerge: 
• The median household in Jharkhand was only using FPS for purchasing kerosene and not 
foodgrains or cooking oil in 2005.  This figure itself is a cause for concern, given that 
around half the Jharkhand household population is considered to be BPL. 
• Focusing only on the 75th percentile (ranked according to amounts received from PDS), 
the annual amount of total grains received comes to only 69 kg of rice and wheat 
combined.  This compares to an allocation for BPL households of 35 kg per month or 
420 kg per year, indicating a major shortfall in grains actually delivered to the poor. 
• Even for kerosene, the average allocations appear to be well below the official norm.  
Annual official allocation is 276 liters per year in rural areas.  A median actual amount of 
36 liters is therefore well below the quota for the large majority. 
 
5.76 Seasonal targeting of 
anti-poverty programs seems to 
be quite inadequate. An 
additional aspect of 
implementation, which is 
important for some schemes, is 
regularity or seasonal 
concentration of benefits.  For 
example, in principle, public 
works should be more important to 
beneficiaries in the lean rather than 
the peak agricultural season 
(though evidence from states such as Orissa and Maharashtra have indicated that the 
concentration of public works employment is counter-cyclical), while for programs such as PDS 
or social pensions, regularity of benefit may be more important.  The results on seasonal 
concentration of selected benefits are presented in Table 5.8.  A few observations can be made: 
• For the two employment programs, there appears not to be any concentration of 
employment in the lean season. This is of some concern given the low average numbers 
of days of employment per beneficiary. 
• PDS in contrast is more regular for the bulk of beneficiaries, though as noted, the bigger 
question is what and how much of it they receive on a regular basis.  However, even for 
PDS, over one- third of beneficiaries report less than regular benefits. 
• Surprisingly, social pensions have less than 40 percent of beneficiaries receiving regular 
payments (though the benefit is in principle monthly), indicating bunching of payments. 
Table 5. 8: Regularity of Benefits by Program 
(2005) 
(in percent) 
Program All 
Year 
Lean 
Season 
Only 
Non-lean 
Only 
Irregular/No 
Fixed 
Timing 
Wage 
Employment 
8.5 10 4.5 76.9 
Food for 
Work 
2.2 14.3 5.5 78.0 
PDS 64.7 2.8 1.6 30.9 
Social 
Pensions 
38.9 9.4 1.2 50.6 
Source: Rural Jharkhand Baseline Survey, 2005.
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5.77 The rural Jharkhand baseline survey also reveals the problem of the BPL approach 
to program implementation. While the approach of a summary identification process and the 
provision of identification cards to BPL families seem attractive in theory, there are a number of 
problems in the implementation of this approach. In 1997 and again in 2002, the GoI Ministry of 
Rural Development directed the states to carry out a BPL census. This methodology has come in 
for serious criticism136 on the grounds that: (i) the indicators are widely disparate but have the 
same weight (for example, hunger and preferred form of assistance); (ii) the list includes 
contingent indicators (households that have migrant workers or school-age children) that would 
skew the ranking; (iii) lack of rationale in assigning values to some indicators (for example, 
artisans are presumed to be better off than 
subsistence farmers and self-employed service 
providers better than both); and (iv) lack of 
transparency in the selection of the cut-off 
scores. In addition, the problem of a list that 
remains static till the next census was not 
addressed. 137 
5.78 Several exercises, comparing the 
results from independent income and 
expenditure surveys to the BPL survey 
have shown little correspondence in the BPL and survey-based lists. Table 5.9, which 
tabulates the ORG-MARG data to capture the false-positives (not poor, but classified as 
AAY/BPL) and false negatives (poor, but classified as APL), shows that only 54 percent of the 
households had been properly classified, that 40 percent of households declared to be AAY or 
BPL were actually middle or high income and that 6 percent of households that were poor were 
wrongly classified as APL. 
 
5.79 High overhead costs and outright leakages severely limit the cost effectiveness of the 
programs.  The 2005 Programme Evaluation Organization (PEO) evaluation of Targeted Public 
Distribution System (TPDS) estimated the average leakage due to corruption to be about 36 
percent nationally, but listed Bihar138 as a state with “abnormal levels of leakage” (75 percent) as 
well as the state with the second highest share of “ghost cards” (14 percent).  Bunching of the 
off-take in March (only about 10 percent of the 2005 allotment had been drawn up to end-
February 2005), lends credence to the suspicion that stocks not drawn through the FPS are 
diverted to private traders who pocket the subsidy.   
 
5.80 Similarly, a PEO evaluation of SGRY reports rampant corruption including 
widespread use of contractors and fudging of muster rolls. About nine percent139 of 
beneficiaries in Jharkhand reported difficulties in finding work under SGRY because of the 
involvement of contractors.  The Planning Commission evaluation of IRDP140 also showed that 
136
 For a full discussion see Sundaram (2003). 
137
 See also Jalan and Murgai (2006) for detailed empirical analysis of the BPL 2002 census methodology and its weaknesses 
using NSS data. 
138
 The Bihar State Food Corporation handles the lifting and transportation of foodgrains for Jharkhand. Only nine of the 22 
districts in the state have FCI godowns. 
139
 The national average was 2.5 percent. 
140
 Planning Commission (2000). 
Table 5. 9: Comparing List of Poor Families from the 
ORG-MARG and BPL Surveys 
Status of Household as per 
Family Ration Card 
Status of 
Household as per 
ORG-MARG 
Survey 
AAY/BPL APL 
Very Poor/ Poor 8398 37% 1357 6% 
Middle/High 
Income 
9098 40% 3949 17% 
Source: ORG Center for Social Research:  Evaluation Study of 
TPDS and AAY.
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25 percent of beneficiaries existed only on paper.  The CAG evaluation of Swarnjayanti 
Grameen Swarozgar Yojna (SGSY) assessed that only 38 percent of overhead expenses in 
Jharkhand were legitimate project expenses. Overall, multiple assessments and occasional public 
scandals (for example Sholapur, Maharashtra in 2004) support the widely held view that 
corruption is one of the most significant challenges of government-implemented programs. 
 
5.81 Significant shortfalls in program allocation vis-à-vis need or eligibility, and delays in 
implementation increase the likelihood of demand for bribes. The average number of days of 
employment provided under SGRY was only 30 (against the targeted 100 days) in 2002/03, 
according to the SGRY concurrent evaluation. The delivery of the grain component under SGRY 
was seriously delayed, so much so that it is not clear whether all the participants eventually 
received their due share in kind.  Beneficiaries interviewed in the Planning Commission’s 
evaluation of poverty alleviation programs in Jharkhand reported long delays between the time 
an application was made and when payment was received under SGSY, IAY and programs under 
the National Social Assistance Scheme.  More than 80 percent reported paying “speed money” 
for the first two programs, while two-thirds paid for inclusion in the pensioners’ list. 
 
5.82 The state government (district administrations in particular) lacks the capacity to 
implement many of these supervision-intensive programs and has failed to maximize the 
use of possible supervisory agencies. Lack of technical support was a significant issue in 
failures in IRDP and SGSY projects and for the quality of works in SGRY.  Districts reported a 
serious shortage of qualified engineers and supervisors to monitor public works programs, as a 
result of widespread vacancies and without the sanction of additional positions to meet an 
increasing volume of work. This situation will require even more urgent attention for 
implementation of the recently approved NREG141. The PRIs, which could play an important 
role in supervision, are currently not operational in Jharkhand.  Approximately 40 percent of the 
panchayats had identified local leaders or facilitators for the works in the state, according to the 
concurrent evaluation, and less than half were assigned duties such as maintenance of the muster 
roll or distribution of wages. Only about half the beneficiaries said they were aware of a 
supervisory role by the implementing agency. Similarly, greater NGO involvement could 
improve the performance of SGSY, as it has in Lohardaga district, with the involvement of 
Pradan, an NGO that is providing necessary technical support for poultry development and other 
animal husbandry activities. 
 
5.83 The overall monitoring of programs is weak. At the state level, the department of rural 
development should be commended for establishing a computerized monitoring system that 
provides up-to-date information on all the major programs implemented by it.  Similar 
information was not readily available from other departments.  Only about half the districts had 
been visited by state-level officials according to the concurrent evaluation for SGRY.  At the 
district level, although regular monitoring by the deputy commissioners and SSS heads of the 
different departments is supposed to take place, the TPDS evaluation similarly reported poor 
monitoring by taluk and block officials.  PRIs, user groups and gram sabhas have not been 
widely established and do not play a significant role in regular field-level monitoring. The 
concurrent evaluation of SGRY revealed that no beneficiary committees had been appointed for 
40 percent of the works in Jharkhand. Only half the beneficiaries were aware of the price fixed 
141
 The scheme, however, makes provision for financing of additional personnel.  
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for food grains under the non-cash wage component of SGRY.  Area development programs 
lacked details and appeared to be least monitored of all the programs.  This is an important 
lacuna that must be addressed, given the rapidly increasing investment in these programs, 
particularly the state-funded Zila Yojana and MLA welfare schemes. 
 
5.84 Beneficiaries lack the necessary information about programs which constrains their 
ability to participate in them fully, demand their fair share of benefits and monitor 
program implementation.   According to the findings of the ORG-MARG survey, only 15 
percent of the population in rural areas nationwide was aware of the process of selection for 
AAY.  About two-thirds of the AAY beneficiaries in the country were themselves unaware of the 
criteria for selection.  Similarly 80 percent of the people surveyed were unaware of the selection 
process for being included in the BPL list.  Concurrent evaluation of SGRY found that only 55 
percent of beneficiaries in Jharkhand were aware of the agency that implemented works under 
that program, that half the works did not display signboards providing details of the work, and 
that 30 percent of village monitoring committees met irregularly. 
 
G.  Tribal Inclusion through Civic Empowerment 
5.85 Among adivasis in Jharkhand, land and the surrounding natural environment 
constitute the basis of their socio-political institutions, serving as a template for social 
organization and political thought besides being a mode of subsistence. The reinforcement of 
social boundaries, the protection of the environment and the enforcement of community rights 
over natural resources (land, forest, and water) constitute the foundation and the raison d’etre of 
tribal institutions in Jharkhand.   
 
5.86 Tribal institutions in Jharkhand are an expression of direct democracy. Traditional 
leaders derive their legitimacy from being primus inter pares and communities have the power to 
recall and replace traditional leaders in case of misconduct.  The application of customary law is 
based on consensual decision-making, made possible by the fact that adivasi communities in 
Jharkhand are generally small in scale and based on kinship ties. Traditional leaders apply 
customary law in regulating sustainable access to land and forest by different social groups (be it 
tribes, castes, clans or lineages) as well as in regulating marriages and ensuring the favor of 
supernatural forces for the physical and social reproduction of the group. 
 
5.87 The weakening of socio-political institutions in charge of the social reproduction of 
the group and the protection of natural resources represents a threat both to tribal society 
and to the environment. The weakening of traditional institutions also threatens the 
environment and National Resource Management (NRM)-based livelihoods. Institutions are not 
frozen but change through time, as a response to external factors or as an inherent process of 
adaptation to new demands and challenges. However, institutional change can also be imposed 
from outside. When this happens, it is perceived as a threat to the survival of the social group and 
its habitat. In Jharkhand, many ethnographic accounts have captured the process of 
transformation and weakening of adivasi traditional institutions, either under the pressure of 
religious and social movements or as a consequence of assimilation and mainstreaming efforts 
by the state. 
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5.88 Constitutional provisions aimed at protecting adivasi culture and interests have 
been mostly ineffective as seen from: 
 
 Part X (Article 244) - This deals with the administration of scheduled areas and tribal 
areas, which covers the operation of the 5th Schedule.  In practice, “experience with the 5th 
Schedule has been disappointing”.142 Tribal Advisory Councils “hardly have any teeth, laws 
applicable to the rest of the state are routinely extended to scheduled areas, the governor rarely 
exercises the powers vested” in him or her, and the overall result manifests in the “miserable 
human development indicators for adivasis” (Sundar 2003).  
 Part IX (Panchayats) – “Article 243B makes it “mandatory for every state to constitute 
panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels”. However, “an exception is made for 
scheduled areas in Article 243M”, which notes that parliament can modify or pass new laws on 
panchayats for scheduled areas.  Parliament passed the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension 
to the Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) on December 24, 1996 (Box 5.1). However, the amendment 
has mainly remained on paper (Sundar 2003). 
 
5.89 Similarly, national policies have been aimed mostly at the achievement of a single 
national identity rather than emphasizing the specific identity of adivasis as groups in need 
of protection. The new Draft Tribal Policy reiterates the same approach as it seeks to bring them 
into the mainstream of society and assimilate, while not integrating, them through opportunities 
to interact with outside cultures. 
Box 5. 1: Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) 1996 
PESA is the first law that empowers adivasis to redefine their own administrative boundaries, with the traditional 
village council (gram sabha) becoming their core institution. The formal recognition of the tribal traditional system 
as the basic unit of self-governance is the most significant aspect of PESA and the implications of this in terms of 
empowerment are far wider that it is generally acknowledged. The basic assumptions are that: (i) tribal customary 
norms and practices are somehow “more democratic than those imposed by colonial and post-colonial states”; and 
(ii) “the basic unit of governance in tribal areas is the hamlet” or the “natural” village rather than the revenue village 
(clause 4.b). However, the Act is in itself “contradictory”, when it provides for upholding custom, which would 
involve non-elected headmen at the village and pargana level, while at the same time providing for elections of the 
village panchayats, as in the clauses 4 c&g (Sundar 2003). 
5.90 The decentralization process also needs to be carried out by recognizing the special 
status of tribal community institutions, as envisaged in PESA. Statutory panchayats based on 
representative democracy are extended to scheduled areas regardless of the different constituent 
elements of already-existing adivasi institutions, contradicting the spirit of PESA. Panchayat 
leaders are elected for a term of five years and cannot be recalled by the community. Their 
decision-making process is not based on consensus-building process. Their administrative 
jurisdictions do not overlap with tribal kinship-based jurisdictions. Moreover, the very size of the 
142
 This section on laws and institutions governing tribal inclusion in Jharkhand draws considerably on discussions 
in Sundar (2003). Parts within inverted commas unless mentioned otherwise are cited from this source. 
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statutory gram panchayat (5,000 residents) suggests its incompatibility with decentralized self-
governance. 
5.91 North-East India provides an example where traditional headmen were replaced by 
elected leaders leading to extensive elite capture, land alienation and consolidation and 
social inequalities. Despite the legal recognition of collective land ownership, communities 
were dis-empowered from their traditional function to control access to and disposal of land, 
while the traditional institutional mechanisms that ensured downward accountability of the 
leaders got weakened. In Meghalaya, a demand has been expressed for “constitutional 
recognition of tribal customary leaders, like Syiems, Nokmas and Dollois” vis-à-vis elected 
leaders due to the failure of the electoral system to achieve true democracy and accountability.143 
5.92 Civil society in Jharkhand is demanding a reform of traditional structures from 
within, along the lines identified by PESA. In point of fact, PESA dismisses the possibility of 
autocratic leaders, albeit non-elected, by providing for gram sabha control. This control is meant 
to cover different economic spheres, including land protection and restoration, by legitimizing 
customary norms, which the same headmen are subject to, and by empowering communities to 
replace those leaders that misbehave. 
5.93 Care must be taken to look after the needs of voiceless groups, particularly women, 
youth, landless and migrants, and to involve them in decision-making and the everyday 
affairs of the gram sabhas. The seasonal migration from Santhal Parganas and elsewhere could 
result in usurpation of control over gram sabha or gram panchayat decisions by those who can 
afford to stay in the village. The state government should also grant rights to local people in 
natural resource management.  Customary land tenure should be recognized (Box 5.2). People 
should be “consulted on their vision of development”, their land should not be acquired without 
their prior and “informed consent instead of mere consultation”, they should have “shares in any 
project that comes up on their land” with their land ownership remaining intact, and they must be 
asked to “move only if rehabilitation has been satisfactorily completed” (Sundar 2003). It is time 
that the voices of the left-out majority of the state are finally heard and their problems acted 
upon, and that an accelerated and inclusive growth strategy finally ushers in a new development 
decade for Jharkhand. 
Box 5. 2: Recognition of Customary Land Tenure Systems through Traditional Institutions 
 
The expression “customary tenure” is used here to define property arrangements characterized by the following 
elements: ritual and cosmological relations with ancestral lands; community “rights” of control over land disposal; 
kinship or territory-based criteria for land access; and principles of reversion of unused land to community control. 
One has to understand the causes of tenure insecurity to influence the legal policy response. In the case of 
Jharkhand, tenure insecurity derives primarily from encroachment by outsiders and interaction with the state rather 
143
 See, Hussain (2004).  
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than from conflicts internal to the customary groups.  Indeed, the denial of rights has led to a situation where 
ancestral lands are still used by the adivasi community yet without any tenurial security.  
Global experience shows that the recognition of customary tenure increases tenure security on both accounts. On the 
one hand, it increases adivasi negotiating power with the government. On the other, it reduces alienation of land by 
outsiders. In the case of failure of protective laws and regulations points to the fact that a paradigm shift may be 
required. Ensuring community control over land transfers has been shown to effectively reduce land alienation 
whereby all have a stake in the land. Wherever land is owned individually, the legal owner and the community, 
through the gram sabha and other traditional mechanisms, would jointly exercise control rights over land transfers.  
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Annexes 
 
Annex Table 3. 1: Determinants of Rural Consumption: Results for the 55th Round of NSS 
 
Base Model Extended Model-1 Extended Model-2 Variables 
Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
(Constant) 651.7 29.6 654.4 24.5 644.6 22.6 
Household Size -75.2 -16.8 -77.7 -17.4 -79.9 -18.0 
Proportion of Land 
Irrigated 
34.1 2.7 65.2 4.9 65.8 5.1 
Religion (Hindu as 
reference category): 
Muslim (dummy) -35.3 -2.3 -29.9 -1.9 -25.7 -1.6 
Christian (dummy) -6.3 -0.3 14.8 0.7 10.3 0.5 
Tribal Status (Caste 
Hindu as reference 
category): 
Scheduled Tribe 
(dummy) 
-112.1 -8.2 -130.3 -9.2 -131.9 -9.4 
Scheduled Caste 
(dummy) 
-120.0 -7.8 -123.1 -8.0 -122.4 -8.2 
Other Backward Caste 
(dummy) 
-89.3 -7.3 -78.6 -6.3 -79.0 -6.4 
Education status 
(“No formal 
education” as 
reference category): 
Below Primary 
(dummy) 
-14.5 -1.0 -5.3 -0.3 -2.7 -0.2 
Primary Completed 
(dummy) 
6.8 0.4 12.0 0.7 13.1 0.8 
Secondary Completed 
(dummy) 
39.3 2.4 39.3 2.5 39.4 2.5 
Higher Secondary 
completed (dummy) 
266.0 8.5 269.4 8.7 263.5 8.6 
Graduation and Above 
(dummy) 
247.4 7.1 255.3 7.3 237.5 6.8 
Max. Level of 
Education by any HH 
Worker 
4.5 2.1 3.5 1.6 2.8 1.3 
Whether Household 
has Access to 
Electricity 
188.3 13.7 181.5 12.1 164.3 10.9 
Self-Employed in Non-
Agricultural Activities 
(dummy) 
10.9 0.8 8.1 0.6  
Non-Agricultural 
Labor (dummy) 
-69.2 -4.8 -66.2 -4.4  
Self-Employed in 
Agricultural Activities 
(dummy) 
-22.3 -2.3 -21.9 -2.2  
Whether Household 
Head is Female 
-20.9 -1.1 -12.7 -0.7 -20.4 -1.2 
Land Owned (ha.) 12.2 5.2 11.6 5.0 12.6 5.5 
No of Male Workers  15.7 2.4 15.5 2.4 16.6 2.6 
No of Female Workers -25.6 -4.6 -25.6 -4.4 -22.4 -3.9 
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Annex Table 3.1 (Contd): Determinants of Rural Consumption: Results for the 55th Round of NSS 
 
Variables Base Model Extended Model-1 Extended Model-2 
Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
District (“Pakur” as 
reference category): 
Godda -41.3 -1.7 -31.3 -1.3 
Sahib -60.0 -2.6 -61.6 -2.7 
Dumka -68.6 -2.8 -66.4 -2.8 
Deoghar -114.7 -4.7 -114.1 -4.7 
Dhanbad -18.9 -0.7 -27.3 -1.1 
Giridih -21.5 -0.8 -27.1 -1.1 
Hazari -22.5 -0.9 -31.9 -1.3 
Palamu 0.7 0.03 8.7 0.4 
Lohar -0.4 -.01 0.6 .03 
Gumla -29.0 -1.2 -30.9 -1.3 
Ranchi 38.5 1.9 42.4 2.1 
Esingh 28.8 1.3 30.9 1.3 
Wsingh 63.8 3.2 64.0 3.2 
Bokaro 3.9 0.2 -6.1 -0.3 
Kodarma 8.7 0.4 0.7 0.03 
Chatra 9.3 0.4 3.7 0.1 
Garwhwa 26.4 0.9 28.8 1.1 
Main Source of 
Income (construction 
as reference 
category): 
Agriculture -1.2 -0.1 
Mining 57.5 1.7 
Manufacturing 62.3 3.1 
Trade 58.4 2.6 
Transport Business 121.5 4.4 
Formal Service 99.7 3.5 
Informal Service -47.4 -2.2 
Adjusted R square - 0.401 - 0.428 - 0.439 
Note: The dependent variable is “per capita consumption expenditure” for rural areas. The results represent OLS estimates. 
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Annex Table 3. 2: Determinants of Livelihood Outcome: Results of Multivariate Regression 
Analysis 
 
Household Level 
Household and 
Community Level 
Household, Community 
and Region Level 
Coefficient T Ratio Coefficient T Ratio Coefficient T Ratio 
(Constant) 311.8 8.3 264.8 6.9 199.3 4.9 
Household Size -26.3 -16.7 -26.1 -16.7 -27.4 -17.6 
Age of Household 
Head 1.6 1.0 1.9 1.2 1.8 1.2 
Square of Age 0.0 -0.7 0.0 -0.9 0.0 -0.8 
Land Owned, 
Acres 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.7 
Non-and Assets* 
1000 0.3 5.0 0.3 5.1 0.3 5.1 
HH Head Female 8.0 0.5 5.1 0.3 2.2 0.1 
No of Male 
Workers 20.9 4.1 21.9 4.3 23.7 4.7 
No of Female 
Workers 9.8 1.9 10.7 2.1 10.3 2.0 
HH Member away 
for Work-now or 
10 years ago 
dummy 51.2 3.3 50.2 3.3 45.1 2.9 
Max Level of 
Education by any 
HH Member 6.2 1.8 6.3 1.9 5.8 1.7 
Education of 
Household Head:  
below primary 13.7 1.2 14.9 1.3 16.2 1.4 
Education of 
Household Head:  
primary -5.5 -0.4 -2.9 -0.2 -3.9 -0.3 
Education of 
Household Head:  
secondary -9.4 -0.9 -10.3 -1.0 -6.3 -0.6 
Education of 
Household Head:  
Post-secondary 32.2 2.4 29.7 2.2 30.4 2.3 
Education of 
Household Head:  
higher 41.7 2.0 32.9 1.6 36.9 1.8 
Muslim 14.3 1.4 19.1 1.9 23.2 2.3 
Christianity 4.7 0.2 9.8 0.5 16.9 0.9 
Tribal Religion -40.5 -3.0 -41.4 -3.0 -20.1 -1.4 
SC -29.0 -2.2 -28.8 -2.1 -29.1 -2.2 
ST -61.7 -4.5 -54.9 -4.0 -39.3 -2.9 
OBC -41.3 -4.1 -41.4 -4.1 -40.4 -4.1 
Electricity Access 45.3 6.1 37.4 5.0 39.4 5.2 
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Annex Table 3.2 (Contd): Determinants of Livelihood Outcome: Results of Multivariate 
Regression Analysis 
Household Level 
Household and 
Community Level 
Household, 
Community and 
Region Level 
Coefficient T Ratio Coefficient T Ratio Coefficient T Ratio 
Employment Type: 
farm -22.3 -1.8 -21.8 -1.8 -23.3 -1.9 
Employment Type: 
ag_wage -14.6 -0.3 -7.7 -0.2 13.6 0.3 
Employment Type: 
non- ag. wage 3.0 0.3 3.7 0.4 -3.3 -0.4 
Employment Type: 
salaried worker 114.2 2.1 109.9 2.0 121.6 2.7 
Employment Type: 
trader 54.4 0.6 36.8 0.4 27.0 0.3 
Employment Type: 
informal service 62.8 4.6 59.3 4.4 73.7 5.4 
Employment Type: 
non-farm self-
employment 82.4 3.2 81.4 3.2 83.1 3.3 
Community Level 
Factors: 
Quality of Approach 
Road: stone/ brick - - 6.2 0.7 4.4 0.5 
Quality of Approach 
Road: metalled -- - 8.6 .9 -5.0 -0.5 
Type of Market 
Connectivity: 
approach road-
market - - 22.3 1.6 14.6 1.1 
Type of Market 
Connectivity: main 
road-market - - 50.9 3.9 50.6 3.9 
Presence of SHG 
Group - - .4 .04 6.2 0.7 
Presence of NGO 
Program - - 39.6 2.0 29.4 1.5 
Presence of 
Community Shops - - 33.1 3.2 44.8 4.3 
Geographic 
Regions: 
North Chottanagpur 87.2 6.2 
Palamu 81.4 5.6 
Santhal Pargana 40.7 2.9 
South Chottanagpur 50.7 3.6 
Adjusted R square - 0.26 - 0.28 - 0.30 
Source: Estimated from Rural Jharkhand Baseline Survey Data. 
Note: The dependent variable is “per capita consumption expenditure” for rural areas. The results represent OLS 
estimates.
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Annex Table 4. 1: District-wise / Agro-climatic Region-wise Land Utilization in Jharkhand (1999/2000)
District Geographical
Area (‘000 ha)
Forest
Areas
(%)
Land
put to
non Agr
Use (%)
Barren and
Unutilized
Land
Cultivable
Waste Land
(%)
Permanent
Pasture and
Other
Grazing
(%)
Land
under
Misc.
Trees
(%)
Other than
Current
Fallows (%)
Current
Fallows (%)
Net Area
Sown (%)
Cropping
intensity
(%)
I Central and North Eastern Plateau Zone
Dumka 379.03 11.3 11.3 6.1 6.0 4.9 1.6 11.2 15.6 31.4 105
Deoghar 248.13 14.0 8.6 5.0 5.6 4.0 1.1 13.6 20.8 25.3 103
Godda 231.84 13.5 7.4 4.2 2.3 2.7 1.1 14.7 19.2 33.7 108
Pukar 181.7 11.4 8.6 6.3 4.1 3.1 2.4 10.7 19.1 32.4 107
Sahebganj 201.75 21.2 6.7 7.8 3.3 1.4 1.5 14.7 22.5 20.1 117
Jamatra 179.17 16.9 11.3 6.1 6.0 4.9 1.6 11.2 15.1 31.4 105
Hazaribagh 604.63 43.1 6.1 9.1 1.3 0.6 1.1 9.3 9.8 17.4 113
Koderma 130.2 42.4 6.3 11.3 1.5 1.1 1.4 6.9 14.1 13.9 121
Chatra 157.52 14.4 6.6 12.6 2.2 1.0 3.0 18.0 20.9 28.8 113
Giridih 493.22 32.1 6.8 6.2 3.6 2.0 2.6 11.2 17.0 15.7 121
Bokarao 288.97 25.0 15.9 8.7 3.6 0.8 1.0 12.0 25.6 5.5 163
Dhanbad 204.16 9.3 21.0 16.0 5.6 0.3 1.6 9.9 16.2 17.1 116
Sub total 3518.3 28.1 8.8 7.4 3.4 2.0 1.5 10.9 16.0 20.2 112
II Western Plateau Zone
Ranchi 758.25 21.0 9.7 5.2 3.5 0.3 1.4 8.7 16.2 33.7 107
Lohardaga 153.62 28.9 6.1 6.1 6.5 0.0 0.8 10.9 11.2 32.1 112
Gumla 538.92 15.1 5.5 8.3 5.0 0.1 1.7 11.7 31.3 30.0 105
Palamu 524.69 43.2 3.7 6.0 1.9 0.4 1.4 9.2 14.9 18.7 121
Garhwa 428.82 44.6 3.5 5.8 1.5 0.7 0.5 9.1 18.6 15.1 138
Simdega 371.63 15.1 5.5 8.3 5.0 0.0 1.7 11.6 30.9 30.0 105
Latehar 319.19 43.2 3.7 6.0 1.9 0.4 1.4 9.1 14.9 18.7 121
Sub total 3095.1 29.0 5.8 6.5 3.2 0.3 1.3 9.9 20.3 25.9 112
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District Geograph
ical Area
(‘000 ha)
Forest
Areas
(%)
Land put to
non Agr Use
(%)
Barren and
Unutilized
Land
Cultivable
Waste Land
(%)
Permanent
Pasture and
Other
Grazing
(%)
Land
under
Misc.
Trees (%)
Other
than
Current
Fallows
(%)
Current
Fallows
(%)
Net Area
Sown (%)
Cropping
intensity
(%)
III South Eastern Plateau Zone
East
Singhbhum
556.69
22.1 27.7 7.6 3.9 0.5 1.6 7.9 12.8 15.1 176
West
Singhbhum
562.7
40.4 5.1 8.9 4.2 0.6 1.2 5.8 6.8 26.3 110
Saraikela 237.23 40.0 5.1 8.9 4.2 0.6 1.2 5.8 6.8 26.3 109
Sub total 1356.6 32.9 14.4 8.3 4.0 0.5 1.3 6.7 9.3 21.7 129
Jharkhand 7970.1 29.3 8.6 7.2 3.4 1.1 1.4 9.8 16.5 22.7 114
Source: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Development Department, .GoB, Patna.
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Annex Table 4. 2: Share of Different Crops in Total Cropped Area, 1999/2000 
 
S.No Crops Jharkhand India 
1 Rice 68.65 23.93 
2 Wheat 2.77 14.62 
3 Maize 5.71 3.43 
4 Ragi 0.92 
5 Barley 0.59 0.42 
6 Jowar 0.18 5.41 
7 Bajra 0.2 4.69 
8 Course and Other Millets - 1.16 
Total Cereals 80.1 54.16 
9 Gram 0.92 3.34 
10 Arhar 1.13 1.81 
11 Kulthi 1.4 
12 Urad 1.92 
13 Pea 0.15 
14 Kesari 0.41 
15 Masoor 0.23 
16 Moong 0.13 
17 Other Pulses 0.7 6.46 
Total Pulses 6.99 11.61 
Total Foodgrains 87.09 65.77 
18 Rape-Mustard 0.4 3.2 
19 Linseed 0.35 0.37 
20 Groundnut 0.28 3.67 
21 Surguja 1.11 NA 
22 Sunflower & Til and Other 
Oil Seeds 
0.71 5.94 
Total Oilseeds 2.85 14.13 
23 Total Cash Crops 2.96 15.77 
24 Fruits 1.56 1.77 
25 Vegetables 6.99 2.56 
Total Horticulture Crops 8.55 4.33 
Total Cropped Area 100 100 
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Annex 4. 1: Reforms in the Mineral Sector 
 
• Easy and transparent access to 
minerals under standard conditions 
applicable to all investors. Introduction 
of a modern, computerized, on-line, rules-
based mining rights cadastre as against 
the manual one operating out of 22 
districts in Jharkhand will enable quicker 
and transparent access to minerals and 
securing appropriate mining titles.   
 
• Security of Mining Title. 
Jharkhand’s legal and regulatory 
framework, which is largely defined by 
the central government, has provisions 
that are inconsistent with the financial and technological requirements of the modern capital-
intensive global mining industry.  The new draft mining policy of the state needs to review some 
of those that are within the ambit of the state government. 
 
• Competitive Fiscal Provisions. The 
level and stability of taxes does affect the 
decisions of private and international 
mining companies in their exploration 
efforts.  In India, the tax regime is defined 
and administered by the central 
government.  While income taxes are 
collected by the center and distributed 
through the central budget, royalties and 
sales taxes are retained by the states.  To 
assess the current tax regime and quantify 
its potential impact on mining investment 
in Jharkhand, the total tax package was 
analyzed, regardless of how it is 
collected, and its impact assessed in a 
number of competing countries on a 
hypothetical but representative development of a large-scale base metal mine.  The results of this 
simulation are summarized in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. While Jharkhand’s tax regime appears to be 
generally competitive, its components are delicately balanced.  For example, the five-year 
exemption period that applies to the mining sector should be balanced against the relatively 
higher income tax and import duty prevailing in the state.  
 
Figure 4. 1: Rate of Return Comparison 
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Source: Colorado School of Mines and Staff estimates. 
Figure 4. 2: Effective Tax Rate 
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The net investment return or internal rate of return (IRR) that could be realized by a hypothetical, 
large-scale base metal mine144 developed in each of these countries is set out in Figure 4.2.  The 
model holds revenues and costs constant for each country, so that the only variable is the 
country’s tax regime. Accordingly, the IRR is a good indicator of the relative impact of each 
country’s tax regime on a project’s expected IRR.  The IRR in Chile is among the highest 
because it does not impose a mineral royalty.  In addition, with a corporate tax rate of only 15 
percent, in such an analysis, Chile is consistently among the most attractive countries from a tax 
perspective, and consequently has been particularly successful in attracting investment, 
developing its mineral resources, and achieving above average growth.  Indonesia’s IRR on the 
other hand is among the lowest, mainly because its royalty is based on the volume of production, 
as is the case with some minerals and coal in India, and therefore is not sensitive to metal prices 
or operating costs and expenses.  
 
• Based on these results, Jharkhand’s tax regime is reasonably competitive when compared 
with other geologically prospective and mineral dependent regimes.  Its tax regime is, however, delicately 
balanced and a change cannot be made to one component of the regime without modifying another 
component or other components, if international competitiveness is to be maintained.  The government’s 
share of net value added in Figure 4.9 shows the amount of taxes collected by the government as a 
percentage of pre-tax cash flow generated by the project over the expected life of the project, that is, the 
effective tax rate.  When formulating tax policy, the government must be careful not to stray too far from 
international norms with respect to government share.  While Canada’s government share is relatively 
high, a substantial portion of Canadian taxes are collected in the latter part of mine life, due to 100 
percent tax depreciation allowances and royalty exemptions during the first three years of production.  
Thus, the IRR of a mine in Canada is not as heavily impacted by the higher tax rates in that country as 
one might expect. 
 
• Comprehensive Social and Environmental Protection and Benefit Sharing. Sustainable 
development in mining can be defined as transformation of mineral wealth into human capital 
that is, better health, education and vocational training, as also infrastructure and increased 
community capacity to sustain growth well beyond mine closure. Jharkhand’s geography, 
specific demographics and lack of infrastructure pose additional challenges for sustainable 
mineral development, especially for tribal communities and environmental preservation. 
144
 These include Chile which is generally cited as the best model for the modern development of a successful mining sector; 
Canada which has a mature and successful mining sector that is based on laws that reflect many decades of experience; and 
Indonesia and PNG, two Asian countries with excellent geology that compete with India to attract risk capital and foreign direct 
investment.  
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